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Abstract
There is growing belief that countries with better financing environments are associated with
higher economic growth because they facilitate entrepreneurship and hence the Schumpete-
rian process of 'creative destruction'. This dissertation explores this hypothesis in more detail
by understanding how the financing environment for new ventures impacts outcomes such as
individuals' decision to become entrepreneurs, their sources of financing and the growth and
survival of their firms.
Rather than performing cross-country analyses however, the approach used in this disserta-
tion is to perform within-country studies that shed more light on the mechanisms through which
the financing environment impacts entrepreneurial activity. The first two essays in the disser-
tation exploit institutional reforms - one in Denmark and another in the US - that changed
the financing environment for new businesses to study how they impacted individuals' entry
and survival. These natural experiments are supplemented with detailed and comprehensive
micro data that allow me to both explore and the refine the mechanisms at play in more detail.
The final paper is more descriptive in nature and examines how the variation in entrepreneurs'
use of Diaspora networks in developing countries is related to the financing and networking
environment of the city in which they are based.
Thesis Supervisor: Antoinette Schoar
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Intro duction
There is a growing belief among scholars looking at economic growth that countries with bet-
ter financing environments are associated with higher economic growth because they facilitate
entrepreneurship and hence the Schumpeterian process of 'Creative Destruction' (R. G. King
and R. Levine, 1993a, 1993b). Although the relationship between finance and growth is well
articulated at the cross-country level, the micro-mechanisms through which finance facilitates
entrepreneurship and then growth have received much less attention. In this dissertation, I
explore the relationship between the provision of finance for new ventures and product market
outcomes in greater detail by understanding how the financing environment for new ventures
impacts outcomes such as individuals' decision to become entrepreneurs, their sources of financ-
ing and the growth and survival of their firms.
Rather than performing cross-country analyses however, the approach used in this disser-
tation is to perform within-country studies that shed more light on the mechanisms through
which the financing environment impacts entrepreneurial activity. The dissertation is composed
of three essays. The first two essays study institutional reforms - one in Denmark and another
in the US - that changed the financing environment for new businesses to understand how they
impacted individuals' entry and survival. The final paper is more descriptive in nature and
examines how the variation in entrepreneurs' use of Diaspora networks in India is related to the
financing and networking environment of the city in which they are based. All the papers share
a common thread of using micro data to shed light on the questions in order to both explore and
the refine the mechanisms through which the financing environment impacts entrepreneurial
activity.
The first paper in the dissertation, "Financing Constraints and Selection into Entrepreneur-
ship", studies the link between the financing environment for new ventures and the character-
istics of individuals who become entrepreneurs, a question that has received limited attention
in the literature to date. This question has particular significance with the growing consensus
that entrepreneurship is an important driver of economic growth since in this case it is not just
the rate of entry, but the characteristics of entrants that may be an important factor driving
the process of creative destruction. Although financing constraints have long been seen as
an important barrier to the entry and success of potential entrepreneurs (D. S. Evans and B.
Jovanovic, 1989, W. Gentry and G. Hubbard, 2000, D. Holtz-Eakin, D. Joulfaian and H. S.
Rosen, 1994), understanding whether the ability of those who found new businesses is impacted
by changes in the financing environment is much harder. The inferential challenge in studying
this question lies in the fact that one needs an exogenous change in the financing environment
for new entrepreneurs that is unrelated to both the opportunity cost of funding new projects
and the characteristics of potential entrepreneurs. Without such an exogenous change, it is hard
to isolate the effect of the financing environment on the characteristics of those who become
entrepreneurs from other factors that also affect selection into entrepreneurship.
The approach I use in this paper is to exploit a natural experiment in the form of a tax
reform in Denmark that reduced the rate at which some individuals, in certain tax brackets,
could expense their interest payments on personal debt. This reduction in the interest tax
shield served as a de facto increase in the cost of capital for individuals in those tax brackets.
Since new ventures are often financed through personal debt, the reform also affected the cost
at which potential entrepreneurs could finance their businesses. Using this natural experiment
as the source of exogenous variation in financing environment therefore enables me to directly
study how financing constraints affected both the rate of entry and the characteristics of those
who selected into entrepreneurship. I find that the rates of entry for individuals who faced an
increase in the cost of external finance fell by 40%, while the same probability rose by 10% for
those whose cost of external finance was unchanged. Interestingly, the decline in entry did not
come from less wealthy individuals as one might expect, but from wealthy individuals with low
ability. Personal wealth was thus not the basis for selection into entrepreneurship. This finding
provides support for the view that the relationship between individual wealth and entrepreneur-
ship in advanced economies is driven by individual preferences, rather than an inability to access
capital for new ventures. It also has implications for theories for entrepreneurial choice and our
understanding of financing constraints in entrepreneurship.
The second paper in the dissertation, "Banking deregulation, Financing Constraints, and
Entrepreneurship" is joint with William Kerr and examines the differential effect of banking
deregulation on startups compared to existing firms. One of the mechanisms through which
the financing environment can impact entrepreneurial activity is through the structure of the
banking industry. A deregulated banking sector where banks do not have local monopolies
not only has the potential to lower interests rates for firms but more importantly, is believed to
allocate capital to the most profitable projects and "best investments", regardless of whether
the project belongs to existing, incumbent firms or to startups. This allocative efficiency
stemming from deregulated banking sector has been hypothesized to be an important factor
driving the process of 'Creative Destruction' (e.g. Bertrand, Thesmar and Schoar, 2005). We
directly study the entry of newly incorporated businesses in the United States using detailed
establishment-level data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau. A particular advantage of our
data is that we can separate new establishments into new startups versus additional facilities
being opened by existing private and public firms as well as track individual establishments over
time. We use this data to study changes in the product market following a series of banking
deregulations in the US over the late 1980s and early 1990s. Our data not only allows us to
compare how the banking deregulations impacted entry of startups relative to the expansion of
existing firms, but also allows us to examine the size at which new establishments were founded
and the survival rates of the new ventures.
We find that the deregulations led to substantial increase in the entry rates of startups
compared to the expansion of existing firms, particularly among establishments entering with
under 20 employees. Interestingly, however, the vast majority of this entry led to "churning"
- that is establishments that failed within three years of entry. We did find some evidence of
greater sustained entry among startups relative to existing firms, as well as an increase in size of
entry among smaller establishments - highlighting that the successful entrants did indeed face
financing constraints. We also find some evidence that this sustained entry among startups
led to a reduced market share of the top 5 and top 10 incumbent firms. Although these
results support the view that changes in the structure of the banking industry may facilitate
the process of creative destruction, our findings suggest that the mechanism through which this
takes place is somewhat different from that posited in prior work - it is not necessarily the ex
ante allocation of capital to the best projects that leads to the success of the entrepreneurial
ventures; rather it is the fact that the banking sector allows several more startups to be founded,
some of which seem to survive ex post, while most of them fail along the way.
The third paper in the thesis is entitled "Diasporas and Domestic Entrepreneurs: Evidence
from the Indian Software Industry" and is joint work with Tarun Khanna. In this paper, we ex-
amine links between the Indian diaspora and entrepreneurs in India's software industry. Several
recent studies have highlighted the important role that cross-border diaspora networks might
play in promoting entrepreneurship in developing countries by transferring business contacts
as well as capital to the local entrepreneurs (W. Kerr, 2005, J. E. Rauch, 2001, A. Saxenian,
2002). Yet, little is known about the specific individuals in developing countries who rely on
the diaspora, and whether these diaspora networks are composed of professional contacts, or
family and ethnic ties. We use original survey data collected from CEOs in India's software
industry to study how domestic entrepreneurs' reliance on the diaspora varies based on their
local networking opportunities and access to capital. We find that entrepreneurs located out-
side software hubs, rely significantly more on expatriate networks for business leads and capital,
and that relying on these networks is related to better firm performance. However, it is pri-
marily the entrepreneurs who have previously lived abroad who access these diaspora networks,
rather than these networks being composed of family or ethnic ties. Our results suggest that
cross-border social networks serve as an important substitute to local institutions in developing
countries, but also emphasize that "brain circulation" might be critical for developing countries
to successfully tap into their diasporas.
The rest of the thesis is structured as the three separate papers outlined above, each with
their own set of analyses, literature review, and references.
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Chapter 1
Financing Constraints and Selection
into Entrepreneurshipl
1.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurs are, on average, significantly more wealthy than those who work in paid employ-
ment. For example, Gentry and Hubbard (2000a) find that entrepreneurs comprise just under
9% of households in the US, but they hold 38% of household assets and 39% of the total net
worth. Not only are entrepreneurs more wealthy, but the wealthy are also more likely to become
entrepreneurs (e.g., Evans and Jovanovic 1989, Hurst and Lusardi 2004). This relationship
between individual wealth and entry into entrepreneurship has long been seen as evidence that
less wealthy individuals are precluded from entrepreneurship because they don't have sufficient
private wealth to finance their new ventures. That is, since entrepreneurial ideas are avail-
able to all but the wealthy are more likely to raise capital to finance them, a higher share of
1I am indebted to my advisors - Simon Johnson, Tarun Khanna, Antoinette Schoar and Jesper Sorensen -
for all their guidance, to Jesper Serensen and Niels Westergard-Nielsen for providing access to the data, and to
the Kauffman Foundation for financial support through the Dissertation Fellowship award. I am also extremely
grateful to Peter Birch Sorensen for helping me understand the tax reform, to Erik Rahn Jensen for opening up
the archives for useful documents, to Peter Hougard Nielsen for help with translation and to the Danish Minister
for employment, Claus Hjort Frederiksen, for his feedback on my findings. This paper has benefited from very
helpful feedback from Amrita Ahuja, Thomas Astebro, Bill Barnett, Kevin Boudreau, Rodrigo Canales, Greg
Fischer, John-Paul Ferguson, Bob Gibbons, Lars Bo Jeppesen, Rafel Lucea, Nico Lacetera, Soren Bo Nielsen,
Tavneet Suri, Noam Wasserman, participants at the CCC conference in Lausanne, the IVS seminar participants
at the Copenhagen Business School, the MIT Organizational Economics and Finance Lunches and the NBER
Productivity Lunch. All errors are my own.
wealthy individuals become entrepreneurs (Evans and Jovanovic 1989, Gentry and Hubbard
2000a, Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen 1994).
A more recent alternate view claims that the relationship between wealth and entrepreneur-
ship may in fact be due to omitted variables rather than market failure. For example, Hurst
and Lusardi (2004) argue that the preference for being an entrepreneur may be correlated with
wealth, leading to a spurious correlation between an individual's wealth and her propensity to
become an entrepreneur. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) make a similar claim, ar-
guing that entrepreneurial choices may be driven more by preferences for risk (as in Khilstrom
and Laffont 1979), or a preference for control over the strategic direction of their own firms (as
in Hamilton 2000) than by market failure.
In this paper, I depart from the prior literature that has looked only at rates of entry into
entrepreneurship to also examine the characteristics of individuals who choose to become en-
trepreneurs. This approach allows me to distinguish the extent to which individuals' decision
to select into entrepreneurship is based on their ability to access startup capital, as opposed to
other factors. The inferential challenge in studying this question, however, lies in the fact that
one needs an exogenous change in the financing constraints for entrepreneurs that is unrelated
to both the opportunity cost of funding new projects and the characteristics of potential en-
trepreneurs. Without such an exogenous change, one cannot distinguish the substantive effect
of financing constraints on the characteristics of those who become entrepreneurs from other
omitted variables that also affect selection into entrepreneurship. 2
The approach used in the paper is to exploit a tax reform in Denmark, that increased the
de facto cost of external debt finance for individuals in high-income tax brackets, while leaving
the cost unchanged for those in the lowest income bracket. Using this reform as the source of
exogenous variation in the financing environment therefore enables me to directly study how
financing constraints affected both the rate of entry and the characteristics of those who selected
2Prior research has relied on changes in individuals' assets, such as bequests or windfall gains from lotteries,
to study whether this increase in wealth also increases the propensity of an individual to become an entrepreneur.
However, as Hurst and Lusardi (2004) point out, using such changes in assets to study the presence of credit
constraints is problematic because changes in assets are also associated with a number of other factors that
drive entry into entrepreneurship. Looking instead at changes in the financing environment to study financing
constraints overcomes this potential bias due to omitted variables.
into entrepreneurship. Since the reform affected the cost of external finance for some individuals
but not others, I can use a differences-in-differences approach to study the consequences of the
reform.
In order to study entry into entrepreneurship, I use an individual-level panel dataset, drawn
from the Danish tax registers and comprising annual observations on each legal resident of
Denmark. The dataset spans the eighteen year period from 1980-1997 and has detailed infor-
mation on the demographic and financial attributes of each individual, as well as details on their
occupation in each year. This allows me to study observable differences between individuals
who select into entrepreneurship, as well as to construct accurate measures of each individual's
(unobserved) fixed effect, based on their actual and predicted annual income in each year. I can
therefore also study how unobserved individual ability, proxied by this fixed effect, is different
for those who become entrepreneurs when the cost of external finance is high, relative to when
it is low.
I find that entry rates fell 40% following the reform for the individuals who faced an increase
in the cost of financing. However, most of the fall in entry did not come from the less wealthy
as one might expect if the individuals were unable to access external finance, but from low
ability individuals. In fact, the sharpest decline in entry came from wealthy, but low ability
individuals who had chosen to enter when the cost of external finance was low, but did not
enter when the cost of external finance rose.
These results have several important implications. First, they contribute to the current liter-
ature on financing constraints in entrepreneurship by providing direct evidence of an alternative
mechanism through which individuals select into entrepreneurship when financing constraints
change. Since wealthy, but low ability individuals chose not to become entrepreneurs following
the reform, but less wealthy individuals with high ability continued to, the result highlights
that the main driver of selection into entrepreneurship in this case was not the lack of startup
capital, but rather a preference for entrepreneurship that was mediated by the cost of external
finance. Put differently, the higher rates of entrepreneurship prior to the reform were not
driven by types of individuals who were subsequently unable to get finance for their ventures.
Rather, they were driven by low ability individuals who were able to become entrepreneurs
because the cost of external finance faced by them prior to the reform was so low. This result
therefore supports the view that the relationship between individual wealth and entrepreneur-
ship in advanced economies is driven at least in part by individual preferences, rather than an
inability to access capital for new ventures.
Second, this result highlights that many of the characteristics of entrepreneurs may be
endogenous to the financing environment. That is, the characteristics of those who are seen
as entrepreneurs may not in fact be inherent qualities of entrepreneurs, but just reflect the
specific characteristics that make an individual successful in a given environment. This has
important implications for theoretical models of entrepreneurial choice, in particular for those
that argue in favor of an 'entrepreneurial type'. Moreover, it points to an important role
that the institutional environment may play in driving economic growth by impacting the
distribution of ability across occupations (e.g., Banerjee and Newman 1992).
Finally, this result has implications for the literature relating institutional environments
to entrepreneurial outcomes. There is growing consensus in the academic literature that the
financing environment plays an important role in explaining cross-country differences in eco-
nomic growth, in part through its role in facilitating high quality entrepreneurs (King and
Levine 1993a, 1993b, Levine, 1997). Although this relationship is well-articulated at the
cross-country level, the micro-mechanisms through which the financing environment affects en-
trepreneurship have received much less attention. This study provides direct evidence of the
financing environment impacting both the number and the quality of individuals who become
entrepreneurs.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: I provide an overview of the Danish tax
reform in Section 2. In Section 3, I outline a model of selection into entrepreneurship to place
prior research in to context. I also focus on the role of individual ability in the context of this
model. In Section 4, I describe the data used for the analysis. Section 5 has a discussion of
the empirical results. Section 6 provides conclusions.
1.2 Denmark's 1987 Tax Reform3
Denmark's tax reform of 1987 was the first major tax reform in the country since the early
1900's and was part of a series of such reforms that took place across Scandinavia and many
OECD countries over the late 1980s and early 1990s, including the US tax reform of 1986.
Following the reform in 1987, Denmark was the first Nordic country to move towards a system
of 'dual income taxation', where capital and labor income are taxed at separate rates rather
than at the same rate as is done in the system of 'global income taxation'. 4 Although first
introduced in Denmark in 1987, this feature was subsequently adopted by the other Nordic
countries over the next 5 years.
Denmark's adoption of the dual income tax is credited to the efforts of a Danish professor,
Niels Christian Nielsen who argued in favor of a flat tax on capital income - that would be equal
to the corporate tax rate - combined with a progressive tax rate on the remaining (labor income)
for an individual. Nielsen was a member of the influential 'Thorkil Kristensen Committee'
advising the government, as well as on a committee of tax experts set up by the Danish Savings
Bank Association in 1984 to study the Danish tax system and both of these committees pushed
for a series of tax reforms along the lines of the dual income tax (Serensen, 1998). This led to
an agreement among the Danish political parties to change the tax system in late 1985, that
took effect as of the beginning of 1987.
One of the important changes resulting from the move towards a dual income tax in 1987
was the treatment of interest expense on personal debt. While the tax structure prior to
1987 allowed individuals to expense interest on their personal debt at their marginal tax, this
provision was removed once taxation on capital income was split from the taxation of labor
3 This section is based on Sorensen (1998), Hagen and Serensen (1998), and details provided by Erik Rahn
Jensen from the Danish Tax Ministry.
4In the dual income tax system, capital income is defined as income from interest, dividends, capital gains and
the imputed returns to the business assets of the self employed, while labor or 'personal' income consists of labor
income, private and public pensions and other government transfers. Note that since there is no clear boundary
between capital and labor income of the self-employed, taxation of entrepreneurs requires the authorities to assess
the fraction of income that is constituted by capital income. This fraction is assessed the flat capital income tax
rate. The balance, which is treated as labor income, is then assessed at the labor income tax rate. In order to
impute capital income, the authorities need to define the set of assets over which the return is calculated, as well
as decide whether to use the 'gross' or the 'net' method for treating financial assets and liabilities. While these
details are not relevant for this study, the differences in these two approaches are outlined in Sorensen (1998).
income following the reform. Thus, while prior to 1987, someone in the top tax bracket -
whose marginal tax rate then was 73.2% - could deduct 73.2% of the interest expense on their
debt, the maximum they could deduct after 1987 was 50%. This change in policy related
to expensing interest on personal debt would have been particularly hard on for owners of
unincorporated businesses, whose cost of external financing increased substantially following the
reform. Recognizing this, the tax reform also included a special provision for such entrepreneurs
that allowed them to expense debt related to their unincorporated business at their marginal
tax rate, as long as they could show - using additional accounting procedures - that the debt
was used for running the business. The change in the tax rates following 1987 implied that the
maximum an individual could deduct was 68% although in practice, the amount was between
50% and 68%. These details can be seen from the table below.
Interest Tax Shield on Debt
Owners of Unincorporated Firms Incorporated Firms
Highest Tax Bracket Middle Tax Bracket Lowest Tax Bracket
Pre 1987 73% 62% 48% 40%
Post 1987 50%-68% 50%-58% 50% 50%
It can be seen from the table above that individuals in the middle and the highest tax
brackets faced increases in the cost of external financing. For example, an individual in the
highest tax bracket who borrowed 10,000 Kroner at 10% would have had an effective interest
rate of just 2.7%. This increased to an effective interest rate of between 5% and 3.2% following
the reform, which implied an increase of between 20% and 100% over the interest payments
prior to the reform. This led to a big drop in the level of individual borrowings (as seen in
Figure 1), which was partly compensated for by an increase in the borrowing by unincorporated
businesses.5
Since debt constitutes a large fraction of the external financing of new ventures (Fluck,
Holtz-Eakin and Rosen, 1998), the change in the cost of debt financing serves as a useful
way to study the extent to which financing constraints impact entry into entrepreneurship.
As I show in the model below, this approach is particularly useful in that is overcomes the
5Although the dataset I use, does not have details on corporate borrowings, this was cross-checked using
aggregate secondary data from Statistics Denmark..
issues of a potential spurious correlation between higher personal wealth and higher rates of
entrepreneurship - a concern faced by prior studies examining the importance of financing
constraints in entrepreneurship. In order to outline how these two approaches are different
and to put the concerns about spurious correlation in context, I outline the model of financing
constraints used in the literature to show how the approach used in this paper departs from
prior work.
1.3 Financing Constraints and Entrepreneurship6
Suppose that an individual i working in paid employment has an idea for a new business and
has to decide whether to become an entrepreneur. She thus has the choice between her current
wage employment and her earnings from entrepreneurship 7, where wage employment yields her
a gross payoff of YiJ and income from becoming an entrepreneur would yield her YE. Let wage
income and entrepreneurial income be defined as:
YW = •iX X + 2 (Ai) (1.1)
and
yiE = OiK 2 + rE(Ai - Ki) (1.2)
where 0i measures her ability, Xij are factors (such as her labor force experience and educa-
tional qualifications) affecting wage income, Ai are her net assets, 7 is the gross rate of return
on capital and Ki is the amount of capital that individual i would commit to her business if she
entered into entrepreneurship. Suppose further, that if individual i's assets are less than the
amount of capital she would like to commit to the business, she faces costly external financing
S= f(Ki, Ai) such that - > 0. If however, Ki < Ai so that her net assets are greater than
the capital to be committed to the business, then ( = 08. In such a scenario, rE the cost of
6 This model is based on Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Gentry and Hubbard (2000)7The assumption here is that entrepreneurship or self employment is a choice rather than driven by necessity
as might be the case in some (particularly developing) countries.
8 Note that following Gentry and Hubbard, 2000 I abstract away from situations where entrepreneurs may be
undertaking precautionary savings. In such a case individuals may face costly external financing even if K<A
capital faced by individual i if she was to become an entrepreneur, will be T if Ki < Ai and
rE > T if Ki > Aj.
Assuming that an individual will choose to become an entrepreneur when the her income
from entrepreneurship is greater than her wage income9 , we will observe her become an en-
trepreneur, (El = 1) when YE > yW and will observe her as a wage employee (Ei = 0), when
YE < YiW . As seen from equations (1.1) and (1.2), the probability that we observe an individual
becoming an entrepreneur is the probability that income from entrepreneurship is greater than
the income from wage employment. That is:
Prob(Ei = 1) = Prob [(oiKg + rE(Ai - Ki)) - (OiX71X72 + T(Ai))] > 0 (1.3)
If an individual is unconstrained, then rE = 7 and Ki = Kf (the optimal level of capital
to be invested in the business), so that the Prob(Ei = 1) is independent of Ai. If, on the other
hand an individual faces costly external financing, then rE > T , Ki < K*, and hence the
Prob(Ei = 1) depends positively on the individual's assets Ai. To see why this is the case, first
use (1.2) to solve for the optimal amount of capital that individual i would like to invest if she
entered into entrepreneurship. If the cost of external funds is represented by + ( K(A(), then
that the potential entrepreneur chooses the amount of capital to invest in her business, Ki to:
max OiKi - 7(Ki - Ai) - 4Ki (1.4)
In such a scenario, the optimal capital to be invested in the business if the individual is
unconstrained is:
Kj* = (1.5)
which is independent of Ai.since 4 = 0 when Ki < Ai. However, when Ki > Ai - that is
when the individual faces costly external financing - the amount that the individual chooses to
91 relax this assumption later to account for individual preferences and non-pecuniary benefits affecting the
selection decision.
invest in the business is:
aoi
Ki = (1.6)
As can be seen from equation (1.6), Ki is is not only dependent on the level of Ai if the
individual is constrained, but if P > 0 and o-M > 0 as assumed, it can be seen that the level of
capital invested in the business, Ki, will be strictly less than K* (the level of capital invested in
the business if the individual is unconstrained). Equation (1.6) therefore also implies that for
two (constrained) individuals who are identical in every way except for the level of their assets,
Ai and Aj the individual with higher assets will commit more capital to her business and hence
also have higher entrepreneurial income, as seen by equation (1.2). In such an event, the higher
her net assets, the less she will need to borrow, and hence the closer Ki will be to K*. Since the
capital invested in the business is positively associated with entrepreneurial income (equation
(1.2)), the higher an individuals assets are, the higher the expected benefits from entering into
entrepreneurship, and therefore the more likely we observe Ej = 1.
Equation (1.3) also shows that since this relationship between individuals' assets and the
probability that they enters into entrepreneurship is only present when they are constrained,
finding a relationship between their wealth and the probability that they enter into entrepreneur-
ship (all other things being equal) would suggest that potential entrepreneurs face financing
constraints. The standard approach to testing credit constraints is therefore to operationalize
equation (1.3) by running a probit model where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if an
individual who is employed in one year becomes an entrepreneur in the next. If the coefficient
on individuals' personal wealth is positive, it suggests that individuals are credit constrained
(Evans and Jovanovic,1989, Gentry and Hubbard, 2000a).
1.3.1 Spurious Correlation from Sorting
There are, however, two sources of spurious correlation that might be driving such an associ-
ation. The first source of spurious correlation arises from sorting. Suppose that wealthier
individuals are more productive as entrepreneurs than as wage employees, or that increases
in an individual's wealth increase her ability as an entrepreneur more than her ability as an
employee. Examples of such an association include the fact that wealthier individuals may
have access to better entrepreneurial opportunities or networks that may them more effective
at running their businesses (Shane, 2001, Eckhardt and Shane 2003). In such a case, wealthier
individuals would sort into entrepreneurship, leading to a positive relationship between wealth
and entrepreneurship in equation (1.3) even if they were not credit constrained (that is, if
4 = 0, so that rE = T).
1.3.2 Spurious Correlation from Omitted Variables
The second source of spurious correlation might arise from omitted variables. Suppose that
the decision to become an entrepreneur also depends on a series of (observed and unobserved)
factors in addition to expected income from entrepreneurship, so that the individual's selection
criteria is a more general form of equation (1.3) and can be written as:
Prob(Ei = 1) = Prob(1[e* > 0]) = Prob (1[ZX + ua > 01) (1.7)
where el is the latent net benefit of becoming an entrepreneur, Zi reflects the net benefits
of the adoption decision in terms of the observable income variables in equation (1.3) and uq
is the 'selection error'- the unobserved heterogeneity in the selection decision. The higher
individual i's u' is in equation (1.7), the more likely she is to become an entrepreneur. In
this framework, a correlation between wealth and preferences or tastes in entrepreneurship will
lead to a positive correlation between wealth and uo and therefore make it more likely that we
observe an individual becoming an entrepreneur when she is wealthy. For example wealthy
people may have lower absolute risk aversion making them more likely to become entrepreneurs
(Evans and Jovanovic, (1989), Khilstrom and Laffont (1979)) or they may have a preference for
being their own boss that rises with wealth (Hurst and Lusardi (2004)). In fact, in an extreme
case where Z, r < 0 but (uM - Z rw) > 0 , we will observe individual i becoming an entrepreneur
even when in pure income terms she is better off in wage employment. This argument has been
put forth by Hamilton (2000) and Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) to account for the
fact that in their samples, individuals seem to become, and remain entrepreneurs, even though
their income as entrepreneurs is below that of wage employees 10 11
1.3.3 Using Changes in Assets vs. Changes in the Cost of External Finance
to Study Financing Constraints
In order to control for these sources of spurious correlation outlined above, researchers have
sought to find exogenous shocks that alleviate financing constraints, but are not associated with
the omitted variables. For example, Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994) and Blanchflower
and Oswald (1998) use inheritances as a source of unexpected capital that reduces potential
financing constraints. Finding a positive association between unexpected shocks to personal
wealth and entry into entrepreneurship would therefore suggest that individuals faced financing
constraints. However, subsequent research has highlighted several problems with using inher-
itances to study the effect of financing constraints on entrepreneurship. First, inheritances
themselves are correlated with wealth - that is, since wealthy individuals have wealthy parents,
and wealthy parents pass on larger inheritances the amount that an individual gets as an in-
heritance is correlated with her own wealth (and hence her networks, opportunities and other
omitted variables). Second inheritances can be (and have been shown to be) endogenous 12 .
That is, an individual may get an inheritance precisely because she needs the money, (or needs
it more than her sibling) - a fact that is observed by her parents but not by the researcher.
Finally, as shown in Section 3.2, if increases in wealth are related to unobserved changes in
the propensity to become and remain an entrepreneur (such as Hurst and Lusardi's argument
that entrepreneurship may be a 'luxury good'), then we would find a correlation between re-
ceiving inheritances and entry into entrepreneurship, even if the individual faced no financing
constraints.
Another approach to identifying financing constraints has been to use windfall gains from
10Although Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) do not find entrepreneurial income to be below that of
wage employment, they argue that the income for entrepreneurial households that they observe is still below the
income premium one would expect them to have over wage employmees holding public equity portfolios, given
that entrepreneurial households invest the vast majority of their wealth into a single business, thereby holding
highly concentrated, risky, and illiquid private equity portfolios.
"
1 Hurst and Lusardi (2004) also point to this explanation in trying reconcile the fact that in their sample, very
wealthy households show a strong positive relationship between wealth and entry into entrepreneurship, while
this relationship does not exist for less wealthy households.
12Hurst and Lusardi (2004) show that both past and future inheritances predict entry into entrepreneurship
lotteries (Lindh and Ohlsson, 1999). Again, although lottery winnings are not related to wealth,
there may be fixed individual attributes (such as different risk preferences) that are associated
both with participating in lotteries and becoming an entrepreneur that might lead to a spurious
correlation between receiving windfall gains from the lottery and entry into entrepreneurship 13
Hurst and Lusardi (2004) use unexpected increases in house prices as an instrument for changes
in house prices. They find that changes in house prices across the US do not predict entry
into entrepreneurship for less wealthy individuals - leading them to conclude that financing
constraints are not present for US households. However, Fairlile and Krishinsky (2006) use
similar data but get different results.
In this paper, I take a different approach. I treat the Danish Tax reform of 1987 as a natural
experiment that changed the cost of external finance for potential entrepreneurs and study the
effect this had on rates of entrepreneurship. This allows me to identify the effect of the changes
in the cost of external finance (and hence de facto financing constraints as outlined in the
model above) on rates of entrepreneurship without the concerns related to the other studies
outlined above. Recall that the tax reform in effect increased the cost of external financing
rE by raising P. Note however, that Y remained unchanged so that the cost of capital went
up for entrepreneurs who were constrained but not for others. Since Ki only depends on I) if
individuals are financially constrained and since O < 0 (from equations (1.5) and (1.6)),this
implies that the probability that an individual becomes an entrepreneur falls as the cost of
external finance goes up - but only for those who depend on external finance for their new
ventures. This allows me to directly test the extent to which financing constraints impact
entry into entrepreneurship.
This approach has another advantage. Since, the reform changed financing constraints
without directly impact individuals' wealth, it also allows me to examine the extent to which
personal wealth, as opposed to other factors is important for determining selection into en-
trepreneurship. In particular, I focus on the extent to which individual ability, rather than
personal wealth may be the basis of selection into entrepreneurship. To see why this might
13Note that the authors do not have information on the timing of entry that is they do not know if the
individual became an entrepreneur before, or after winning the lottery.
be the case, note that for a project with capital investment K, a given financing constraint
and given level of assets, individuals with higher unobserved ability will be more likely to enter
entrepreneurship. Thus, holding wealth constant, an increase in financing constraints increases
the minimum 0 above which entrepreneurship will be preferable to the individual. This implies
that while one response of an increase in financing constraints could be a fall in the entry of
those who have less capital, another response might be the fall in entry of those who have
lower ability. Understanding the extent to which these two mechanisms are at play helps to
determine whether the presence of financing constraints are precluding high ability individuals
from becoming entrepreneurs, or whether they are precluding high wealth, low ability individ-
uals from becoming entrepreneurs. The former suggests market failure, while the latter does
not. This study therefore helps to shed light on these two distinct selection mechanisms which
are hard to study when looking at shocks to personal wealth. Before turning to the results, I
provide a brief description of the data in the next section.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Description of Data
I use a matched employer-employee panel dataset for this study that is a significant improve-
ment over data used in prior studies on financing constraints. The data is drawn from the
Integrated Database for Labor Market Research in Denmark, which is maintained by the Dan-
ish Government and is referred to by its Danish acronym, IDA. IDA has a number of features
that makes it very attractive for this study.
First, it is comprehensive: all legal residents of Denmark and every firm in Denmark are
included in the database. The data is collected from government registers on an annual basis,
which makes the quality of the dataset superior to those that are based on self reported surveys.
Second, IDA is longitudinal, which makes it possible to construct panel data at the individual-
level and the firm-level. In this extract, I have annual observations on each individual for 18
years from 1980-1997. Third, IDA covers a wide range of phenomena with respect to labor
market status, so that it tracks the firm, industry, and region that an individual works in, as
well as their occupation code. This allows me to track their occupation within firms when they
work as employees, as well as transitions into and out of entrepreneurship. Fourth, the detailed
occupation codes in the database allow me to distinguish self-employed individuals from employ-
ers 14 so that I can exclude for the purposes of my analyses individuals who may be considered
'consultants' or independent contractors. Fifth, the database links an individual's ID with a
range of other demographic characteristics such as their age, educational qualifications, marital
status, parents' occupational codes as well as important financial data including annual salary
income, total income, and the value of their assets and debt. This detailed demographic and
financial data allows me to not only study the effect of financing constraints on entrepreneur-
ship, but also look at how the 'type' of person becoming an entrepreneur changes when the
cost of capital increases. Finally, since the database also maintains firm level identifiers, I can
study how established firms were affected by the change in rates of entrepreneurship.
In addition to the data, the setting provides another advantage: Denmark has a high 'safety
net' in terms of unemployment insurance, so that the individuals I measure becoming en-
trepreneurs are likely to do because they want to, rather than because they have to (Evans and
Leighton, 1989). This is important since 'push entrepreneurship' - perhaps more prevalent
in developing countries - is not examined in this model, and hence would serve to muddy the
results.
While there are several benefits to using this data and context as a setting for my study, there
may be some concerns about the external validity of a study that is based on information from
a relatively small country such as Denmark. The results I present are differences-in-differences
estimates relative to benchmarks within Denmark, and comparisons of characteristics within-
entrepreneurs. This approach should mitigate the concerns of external validity. Nevertheless,
I address some of these concerns in Table Al in the Appendix - by looking at how the rates
of self-employment, and discussing how the wealth distribution in Denmark compares to the
US, and where available other European countries . Table Al shows that in fact the levels of
14 As I outline later, I define entrepreneurship as a transition from being employed to becoming an employer.
This not only fits with the spirit of the theoretical model outlined above, but by excluding self-employment in
my definition, reduces the chances that I am picking up 'consultants' or independent contractors in those that I
define as entrepreneurs.
self-employment are relatively similar across the US and several European countries including
Denmark. However, as I note later on in Section 5, the rates of entry into entrepreneurship are
smaller in my sample than those found in comparable studies in the US. Part of this is driven by
the fact that I exclude transitions into self-employment from my definition of entrepreneurship.
However, part of it is also driven by the fact that European labor markets tend to experience
lower rates of job mobility as well as transitions into the entrepreneurship than the US. As
I show later in the analysis, the concentration of wealth and income among entrepreneurs is
also present in Denmark, as it is in the US. These comparisons should provide confidence that
the data I use has external validity beyond Denmark, at least to other OECD and developed
economies.
1.4.2 Definition of Entrepreneurship
The IDA data characterizes an individual's main occupation by the fraction of income earned
by that individual over the prior year. Individuals are therefore identified as business owners if
the majority of their income in that year came from their business. This classification system
has the advantage that individuals who set up businesses as tax shelters would typically not be
included, as in this case it would involve them having to earn a large fraction of their income
through the tax shelter. It also prevents individuals who are employed but do consulting
'on the side' from being defined as entrepreneurs. There are two main types of individuals
classified as business owners - those who are self employed and those who are self employed
with at least one employee. I focus the analysis on individuals with at least one employee to
as these are probably individuals who need to make more capital investment in their businesses
than those who are self employed. However, I do show that the results are robust to including
individuals who are self-employed. This IDA data does not directly include information on
whether an individual is a director of a newly incorporated firms. While one might be able to
infer this by looking at their occupational code, I choose to exclude partnerships and directors
of incorporated firms as it is hard to distinguish who is providing the capital for the business
and hence who faces financing constrains. Note, however, that partnerships and incorporated
firms form a small fraction of the total firms in Denmark. Owners of unincorporated businesses
- that I study - comprise about 70% of the firms in Denmark. 15
Consistent with the model in Section 2, I define transitions to entrepreneurship as taking
place when an individual who is employed in a given year becomes an entrepreneur in the
subsequent year. That is, I study transitions to entrepreneurship when an individual is an
entrepreneur in year t and is classified as being in paid employment in year t-1. I therefore
exclude individuals who were unemployed in year t-1 as well as individuals who were self-
employed in year t-1 and became employers in year t.
1.4.3 Sample used for the Analysis
One of the important factors predicting entry into entrepreneurship is the an individual's tenure
at their job. This information is not directly available in the IDA database, but given the panel
structure of the data, can be calculated from the dataset for those individuals who started a
new job at the beginning of any period. I therefore choose the sample for my study by
taking all individuals who switched into a new firm in 1981. That is, I look at all individuals
who were employed in 1981 but were not employed at the same firm in 1980. I then restrict
this sample to include individuals who are between 16 and 42 years of age in 1980, so that
no individual in my sample is younger than 16, or older than 60. Approximately 270,000
individuals (or 15% of all employed individuals in 1981) met this criteria. I then created a
panel dataset comprised of all these individuals for the period 1981-1997. Note that since I
am only interested in transitions from employment to entrepreneurship, I exclude individuals in
years in which they are unemployed, or self employed. This subset of the main IDA database,
with annual observations on each of the individuals in the sample as above, forms the basis for
my analysis.
1.4.4 Descriptive Statistics
I report descriptive statistics on my sample in Table 1. Table 1 breaks down the sample by those
who transitioned to entrepreneurship in the following year, and those who did not. As can be
15Private incorporated businesses comprise 10%, partnerships 7%, public firms 7% and other legal ownsership
structures 6% of the total firms in Denmark.
seen from Table 1, individuals who become entrepreneurs in the following year have significantly
greater household assets than those who do not become entrepreneurs, and earn a third more.
They are much more likely to be male, and have somewhat more education that those who do
not become entrepreneurs. Table 1 also captures an important aspect of the individuals who
become entrepreneurs. They are much more likely to be employed as Directors, and senior
white collar employees in the year before they become entrepreneurs, and within the group of
blue collar workers, they are more likely to be skilled rather than unskilled workers. First, it
suggests that in fact, higher ability individuals are selecting into entrepreneurship, a fact that
is confirmed later in the analysis. Second, it highlights that even though the population being
studied comprises unincorporated businesses, the businesses owners are on average more senior
in their last jobs than the individuals who do not become entrepreneurs. Thus the population
of businesses being studied is not just "dry-cleaners and corner shops" as one may fear might be
the case with unincorporated businesses. 16 The probability that an individual who is employed
becomes an entrepreneur in the subsequent year is 0.35% for the overall population, but 0.58%
for those in the 80-100th percentile of income17 . This is consistent with prior studies looking
at the role of credit constraints that find a positive relationship between wealth/income and
rates of entrepreneurship (Jovanovic and Evans, 1989; Hubbard and Gentry, 2000; Hurst and
Lusardi, 2004)
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Relationship between Personal Wealth and Entrepreneurship
I first explore the association between individual wealth and transition into entrepreneurship in
greater detail, by running logit models of transition into entrepreneurship. The basic estimation
is:
16Part of this is due to the tax laws that allowed individuals to take more beneficial deductions than if the
businesses was incorporated
17These transition probabilities are smaller than those found in the US, where estimates from the Evans and
Jovanovic (1989) and Hurst and Lusardi (2004) are around 4-4.5%. Part of this difference lies in the difference
in definition (if I include self-employed individuals, the transition probability in my sample rises to ~1%). Part
of the difference lies in underlying differences in labor market dynamics.
Prob(Eit+l = 1) = f(a +O 1LOGASSETSt + 2LOGDEBTt
+-Y Xit + Ct + Oj + c + To + eit) (1.8)
where Pr ob(Eit+l = 1) is the probability that an individual who is employed in a given year
becomes an entrepreneur in the subsequent year, Xit is a matrix of individual- and firm-level
control variables, and qt + Oj + cp + •o refer to year, industry, county and occupation-code
fixed effects, respectively. The logit models are in effect log-transformations of equation (1.3)
along with control variables. Recall from equation (1.3) that if an individual faces financing
constraints, her wealth will be positively associated with the probability that she enters en-
trepreneurship. If not (and if there are no omitted variables and no sorting) then there should
be no relationship between wealth and entry.
I report the results of the logit models in Table 2A. Model 1 shows that both higher personal
assets and higher personal debt are associated with subsequent entry into entrepreneurship,
suggesting not only that individuals might face financing constraints, but they attempt to
alleviate this by taking on debt. In model 2, I add other financial covariates and in model 3,
a range of demographic and educational controls. The coefficients on personal assets and debt
remain highly significant. The marginal effect of a unit increase in log assets (computed at the
mean) is 5%. Although all the models include Industry (SICI), Year, Region, and occupation
code fixed effects, I also run the regressions on a restricted set of industries to validate my results.
Column 4 has the same model as column 3, but with a broader definition of entrepreneurship
that includes self-employment. Consistent with assets having a substantive important to enter
entrepreneurship, the broader definition (which includes self-employment and hence in general
would require smaller capital commitment) has a smaller coefficient on both assets and debt. 18
Column 5 reports the results of the model run in Column 3, but restricting the sample to a
subset of industries, including only Manufacturing, Wholesale and Retail Trade, and Services.
The results remain robust to these restrictions.
Model 3 also highlights some other relationships between individual demographics and tran-
1sThis finding is also confirmed by the results of unreported multinomial logit models
sitions into entrepreneurship that I briefly highlight below. Individuals who work in larger
firms are much less likely to transition to entrepreneurship. This result is consistent with prior
work on the effect that large, bureaucratic firms might have on the rates of entrepreneurship
(Sorensen, 2005, Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2005). Similarly, those who have worked at
the job longer are less likely to transition out, consistent with theories of job matching and job
turnover. Finally, those whose parents were previously entrepreneurs (that is, entrepreneurs in
1980 or 1981 but not in 1982) were more likely to transition to entrepreneurship. Note that I
look at those whose parents were previously entrepreneurs in order to exclude individuals who
might become entrepreneurs purely because of family succession. Even after controlling for
this possibility, I find that the family 'exposure' to entrepreneurship is associated with entry
into entrepreneurship - a fact also documented in prior research (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000;
Serensen, 2006).
One possibility for the association between wealth and entry reported in Table 2A is that
there is some omitted variable that makes some people more likely to be wealthy and also be
more likely to become entrepreneurs. To check for this, I add in individual fixed effects into
the models. I report the results of these conditional fixed effects logit models (i.e. individual
fixed effects models) in Table 2B. These models look at whether there is an association be-
tween wealth and entrepreneurship even within individuals' careers19 . As can be seen from the
results in Table 2B, the association between personal assets and entry into entrepreneurship is
present even within individuals' careers, so that individuals are more likely to transition into
entrepreneurship when they have higher personal assets. As with Table 2A, the coefficients on
personal assets are stable and consistently significant across the different samples for which the
models were run, although it is not present for personal debt.
Although these results so far are strongly suggestive that personal wealth is important
for entering entrepreneurship, there still remains the chance that an omitted variable that
19Note that since including individual fixed effects requires variation in the dependent variable in order for the
model to be identified. Thus these regressions only include individuals who transitioned into entrepreneurship
at some point in the sample period (and hence have a much smaller sample size). Fixed individual attributes
such as sex are not identified and hence omitted. Note also that since the transition to entrepreneurship in the
model takes place in the last 'period' for each individual, any variable that is correlated with time (such as age)
will perfectly predict entry and hence is omitted from the models.
is correlated with wealth is in fact driving the relationship - rather than wealth itself. For
example, suppose that wealth increases the chance that individuals see good entrepreneurial
opportunities, or that they have access to better networks that help them as entrepreneurs,
this would still show up as a correlation between wealth and entry, even in individual fixed
effects models. Alternatively if the desire to be ones own boss is a "luxury good", as argued
in Hurst and Lusardi (2004), or Hamilton (2000), then individuals will unobservably be more
likely to prefer being entrepreneurs when their wealth increases. I therefore use the tax reform
outlined above to identify the effect of financing constraints on entrepreneurship. As outlined
above, even if individuals preference for being one's own boss is not related to an individual's
wealth, the threshold ability individuals to enter entrepreneurship is lower for those who are
more wealthy. Using the tax reform has the added advantage of identifying whether it is these
wealthy, but low-ability individuals who benefit from lower financing constraints, or the less
wealthy, high ability individuals who one expects would face the 'true' financing constraints.
1.5.2 Differences-in Differences Estimates
As I outlined in Section 3, the Danish tax reform of 1987 imposed a de facto increase in the
cost of capital for potential entrepreneurs, with a higher increase for individuals in higher tax
brackets. This provides a natural experiment for me to look at the effect of the increase in
the cost of capital on rates of entrepreneurship. Moreover, since individuals in higher tax
brackets faced a higher increase in the cost of capital, this allows me to run difference-in-
differences regressions in order to provide robust estimates of the effect of financing constraints
on entrepreneurship. That is, since the timing of the reform may have coincided with other
unrelated factors that might have caused a shift in the rates of entrepreneurship, I can control
for this baseline trend, by looking at how those in the higher tax brackets were affected relative
to those in the lowest tax bracket 20. The findings can be most easily seen by looking at Figures
2 0Note: Since the cost of external financing is based on income, and income is based on the cost of financing,
one might imagine that entrepreneurs deliberately lower income in order to take advantage of a different tax
bracket. I account for this possibility explicitly in my empirical strategy in that I do not use a regression
discontinuity design but instead choose income buckets that broadly correspond to the cut-offs for the tax
brackets. Given that there are only 3 tax brackets, my assumption here is that the cost of strategically choosing
income to maximize the benefits from the cost of external capital are only worthwhile for individuals on the
margins of the tax brackets but not for the vast majority of individuals I study
1-3. Figure 1 shows that, consistent with the cost of capital increasing, the amount of debt
taken on by entrepreneurs fell substantially following the reform. While prior to the reform,
entrepreneurs had 3-4 times as much debt as those who were employees, this number fell to
about 1.5 times the debt of employees following the reform. In Figures 2 and 3, I report
the rates of entrepreneurship before and after the reform. As can be seen from Figure 2, the
(unconditional) rate of entrepreneurship for those in the lowest income bracket actually rose
slightly following the reform. However, entry rates fell for those in the higher income brackets,
particularly for those in the highest income bracket. The magnitude of these changes is seen
most easily from figure 3, where the entry rates for the 3 categories are all set to 100 in 1983.
Figure 3 shows that the entry rates for the lowest income bracket remained relatively constant
over the period (and if anything, rose slightly following the reform). On the other hand, entry
rates for those in the two higher income brackets fell about 40% following the reform. The
differential trends for these income brackets such that financing constraints played a substantive
role in impacting entry following the reform. However, in order to control for covariates, I next
estimate the full difference-in-differences specification outlined below:
Pr ob(Eit+l= 1) = f(a + P140-80PCTILEt + / 280-100PCTILEt +A 3POSTt
+0 4POSTt * 40-80PCTILEt + / 5POSTt * 80-100PCTILEt (1.9)
+/ 6LOGASSETSt + 07LOGDEBTt + iXit + t + j + - c + io + Eit)
The variable POST is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 from 1987 onwards and zero
until 1986. 40-80 PCTILE and 80-100 PCTILE are dummy variables that take a value of 1 if
the individual is in that income bracket in a given year. The difference-in-differences estimate
is identified by interacting the POST variable with the income bucket of the individual in
each year, to see how the propensity for entrepreneurship for individuals in the higher income
brackets changed in the post period relative to that of individuals in the lower income brackets.
The two coefficients of interest therefore are those on "POST X 40-80 PCTILE" and "POST X
80-100 PCTILE", which report the entry rates of individuals in the two higher income brackets
in the post period, relative to the entry rates of individuals in the lowest income bracket.
Table 3 reports the results of these difference-in-dfferences regressions, controlling for co-
variates. Models 1, 2, 3 report the difference-in-differences estimates on entry using the more
conservative definition of entrepreneurship - that is only including business owners with at least
one employee. Since these are the two income groups that were negatively impacted by the
reform, we should expect them to have a fall in entry relative to the base category, the 0-40
Percentile of Income. This is indeed the case. Column 1 reports results for the full sample,
including industry, year, region and occupation code fixed effects. The marginal effects on the
coefficients of "POST X 40-80 PCTILE" and "POST X 80-100 PCTILE" imply a 40% decrease
in entry in these income brackets relative to the lowest income bracket in the post the post
period. Note that the coefficient on POST is not meaningful as the regressions include year
fixed effects and hence is not reported in the Tables
Column 2 reports the same specification as column 1 including self employed individuals
in the definition of entrepreneurship. Column 3 reports result for just two years, one before
and the other after the reform, to avoid concerns of standard errors being inflated due to
serial correlation (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2001). The results are robust to this
specification. Columns 4, 5, and 6 report the results for different subsets of industries from
the full sample. Column 4 reports a specification that includes only Manufacturing, Wholesale
and Retail Trade, and Services Columns 5 and 6 compare entrepreneurship in industries with a
greater dependence on external finance to those that rely less on external finance. In order to
calculate this measure of external dependence, I follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) to calculate
a measure of external financial dependence of industries at the SIC2 level, using data on US
public firms over the period 1990-2000. I then map this measure of external dependence to
the industry codes in the IDA dataset. An industry is then classified as financially dependent
if industry has above median dependence on external finance.21
Although the difference in differences estimates are a much stronger form of identification
than the individual fixed effects regressions, they still leave open the possibility that some
other simultaneous change in the environment led to the effect being measures. Looking in
21Since the measure of external dependence somewhat sensitive to the time period, bucketing industries ac-
cording to above and below median also serves as a useful way to overcome undue sensitivity of the measure.
addition at the external dependence of industries serves as a useful way to further confirm
the substantive effect of financing constraints on entrepreneurship. Industries that are more
dependent on external finance should be impacted more by the change in financing constraints
since entrepreneurs in these industries are more likely to need external finance. Checking for a
differential effect of financing constraints in financially dependent industries is therefore equiv-
alent to running a triple difference in differences, providing stronger identification. Columns 5
and 6 report the results of these regressions. As can be seen from the coefficients on "POST X
40-80 PCTILE" and "POST X 80-100 PCTILE", but there is greater decline in entry following
the reform among individuals in higher income brackets who started businesses in financially
dependent industries than those who started businesses in less dependent industries. A chi
squared test for a difference in means shows that these are significant at 5%.
In Table 3B, I report the results from multinomial logit models. The multinomial logit
models highlight that the results present for entry into entrepreneurship are not secular trends
impacting all forms of labor-market transitions, and in fact are unique to those become en-
trepreneurs. The base category in the multinomial regression is individuals who remain in
the same job as they were in the previous year. Column 1 reports coefficients for those who
become entrepreneurs with at least one employee, Column 2 reports the coefficients for individ-
uals who become self employed, and Column 3 reports the results for individuals who switch
jobs. Looking across the columns at the coefficients on "POST X 40-80 PCTILE" and "POST
X 80-100 PCTILE" shows that the effect is strongly negative for those who become employers,
less strong (and statistically insignificant) for those who become self employed, and in fact is
strongly positive for those who switch jobs. What this suggests is that individuals who in the
past were becoming entrepreneurs now choose instead to switch jobs to paid employment.
1.5.3 Identifying the basis for Selection into Entrepreneurship
Personal Wealth and Individual Ability
Although the results thus far indicate that financing constraints have a substantive impact on
entry into entrepreneurship, they do not shed light on the basis of selection into entrepreneur-
ship. In particular, they do not identify whether it is the less wealthy individuals who are the
ones who are reacting to the change in financing constraints by cutting back on entering into
entrepreneurship. While prior studies have had to assume that it is the talented, less wealthy
individuals who are precluded from becoming entrepreneurs due to financing constraints, the
fact that the change in the financing constraint due to the reform did not directly affect indi-
viduals' personal wealth allows me to directly investigate the extent to which personal wealth
was important for individuals' decision to select into entrepreneurship.
I focus on two dimensions of the selection decision for individuals - their personal wealth,
and their human capital, or ability. As was noted in Section 3 above, an increase in the financing
constraint could either imply that high ability, but less wealthy individuals are precluded from
entrepreneurship, or that individuals with lower ability are precluded from entering. Although
both types of selection decisions are impacted by a change in the financing constraints, it is the
high ability, but less wealthy individuals that a social planner (or policy makers) are concerned
about. In particular, if an increase in the financing constraint reduces entry of wealthy, but
lower ability individuals, this would not be considered to be the form of market failure implied
by higher ability but less wealthy individuals being precluded from entry.
I segment individuals by personal wealth based on whether they were above or below median
wealth. As a robustness check I try two different specifications - one in which wealth is
measured in each year, and a second in which they are segmented based on their personal wealth
in 1981. Measuring individual ability is extremely hard, not least because it is unobserved by
the researcher. I therefore proxy for individual ability using three different methods. First
I look at an observable measure of human capital by grouping people by whether on not they
have a university degree. Second, I calculate their individual fixed effect from an income
regression spanning their earnings over an eighteen year period, and use this fixed effect to
proxy for unobserved individual ability. For each of these I report these results in Tables 4A
and 4B. Finally, I account for non-random selection into entrepreneurship by running Heckman
Selection models to impute the wages that entrepreneurs would have earned as employees and
use that as a measure of their ability. I report these results in Table 5.
Observable Measure of Human Capital
In order to examine the extent to which human capital and personal wealth played a role in
the decision to select into entrepreneurship, individuals are segmented into four categories: (1)
Those above median wealth who have a university degree, (2) those below median wealth who
have a university degree (3) those above median wealth without a university degree and (4)
those below median wealth without a university degree. For each of these four groups, I then
further segment individuals into whether they were in the lowest income bracket or in one of the
two higher income brackets, giving me eight mutually exclusive categories in which to categorize
each individual. I then run the same regression as in equation (1.9), yielding the following
estimation:
Pr ob(Eit+l = 1) = f(a + iXit + t + Vj + pc +  o + POSTt
+p3 UNI-HIWEALTH-40-100t + 322UNI-LOWEALTH-40-100t
+3 3NOUNI-HIWEALTH-40-100t + 34NOUNI-LOWEALTH-40-100lt
+05 UNI-HIWEALTH-O-40 + 36 UNI-LOWEALTH-O-40t
+P37NOUNI-HIWEALTH-O-40t
+61POST * UNI-HIW-40-100t + 62POST * UNI-LOW-40-100l
+63POST * NOUNI-HIW-40-100t + 64POST * NOUNI-LOW-40-100t
+65POST * UNI-HIW-0-40t + 66POST * UNI-LOW-0-40t
+67POST * NOUNI-HIW-0-40t + Eit) (1.10)
where UNI characterizes individuals who have a university degree, NOUNI those who have
no university degree, and HIWEALTH and LOWEALTH correspond to whether the individual
is above or below median wealth. Note that for these regressions those in the 40-80 income
bracket and the 80-100 income bracket are combined. Note also that the omitted category
is low wealth individuals without a university degree in the 0-40 income percentile, and that
each of the seven dummy variables classifying an individuals wealth, human capital and income
bracket is then interacted with the POST dummy. The main coefficients of interest are 61, 62,
h3and 64. In particular, if wealth is the main basis of selection, we should see the sharpest
decline in entry coming from individuals with low wealth (coefficients 62and 64) regardless of
their human capital. If however, ability is the main basis of selection then we should see that
the sharpest decline in entry comes from individuals with low ability (coefficients b1and 63)
regardless of their human capital. It is of course possible, that both matter equally in which
case we should see an equal decline for all.
Table 4A reports the results of this estimation. Column 1 reports the results for the full
sample, and Columns 2 and 3 report the results for financially dependent and non-financially
dependent industries respectively. As can be seen from looking across the columns in Table 4A,
the strongest decline in entry came from high wealth individuals without a university degree,
followed by low wealth individuals without a university degree. Although there was decline in
entry for the low wealth individuals with university degrees, this was not statistically significant.
Moreover Wald tests reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on these individuals is the same
as that on the individuals without a university degree. Interestingly, the coefficients on all the
variables are greater in bank-dependent industries, suggesting again that there is a substantive
reason behind the fall in entry among the individuals, even those without a university degree.
Estimating Unobserved Individual Ability using Individual Fixed Effects
Much of individuals' ability is unobserved. In order to capture an element of this unobserved
individual ability, I exploit the panel structure of the data, and the detailed individual-level
observable data to back out individual fixed effects from an income regression. Each individual's
fixed effect is then used to serve as proxy for their unobserved ability. In order to calculate
this, I first run a fixed effects regression of the form
Yit = a + Gi + iXit + fit (1.11)
where Yit is each individual's total income in year t and Xit is a matrix of observables, like
those used in the regressions in Table 2, including the full set of industry, year, region and
occupation code fixed effects. In addition to these, I include an individual fixed effect, 9i.
Each individual's estimated fixed effect, 9i, can then be calculated as:
S 1 1 1(1.12)
= Yit - TE iXit - T it (1.12)
Since the error term is orthogonal to the matrix of observables, the expected value of the error
term is zero. Thus as T gets large, a = IY Y2t - -yEiXt, can can thus be 'backed' out
from the fixed effects regression shown in (1.11).
In Table 4B, I report the results of individual ability proxied by these individual fixed
effects and categorized in the same manner as for the results reported in Table 4A. That is,
I categorize individuals into four distinct groups based on whether they are above and below
median personal wealth, and above or below median ability. Each of these four categories
is further split by the income group of that individual in each year and interacted with the
post period dummy, yielding the same estimation structure outlined in equation (1.10). The
only difference, however, is that those with high human capital as defined as those with high
unobserved fixed effects, rather than those with a university degree. It can be seen from Table
4B that the coefficients follow a similar pattern to those in Table 4A. It is the individuals with
the low unobserved ability rather than those with the low wealth who are most likely not to
become entrepreneurs following the reform when financing constraints increased. Moreover,
the effect is stronger for those entering industries with a higher dependence on external finance,
though in this case the difference is not as pronounced as in Tables 3A and 4A. In unreported
regressions, I confirm that this pattern also holds within the group of individuals who became
entrepreneurs. That is, high ability individuals with low wealth do not seem to be precluded
from entering entrepreneurship, while high wealth but low ability individuals are less likely to
enter.
Estimating Ability using Heckman Selection Model
One of the potential concerns with using individual fixed effects to account for ability is that it
does not account for non-random selection into entrepreneurship. Heckman Selection models
(Heckit models) explicitly account for this non random selection. However, Heckit models
are also extremely sensitive to small changes in the specification and also rely critically on an
instrument for identification. I therefore use this measure of ability as a robustness check to
see whether the findings are consistent with those using the prior two measures.
Heckit two step models consist of a first step which is a "selection equation" - that is,
a probit model that accounts for the fact that there may be non-random selection into en-
trepreneurship. The first step also includes an instrument that is excluded from the second
step. This instrument is a variable that affects selection into entrepreneurship, but does not
directly affect entrepreneurial income. I use the dummy variable for whether an individual's
parents were entrepreneurs in the pre-period as my instrument. Sorensen (2005) has shown
that this is associated with selection into entrepreneurship but does not affect entrepreneurial
income. Also, since I find that the effect of this variable does not change following the reform
(see Table 6) I can use it to see how returns changed in the post period compared with before
the reform. The second step of the Heckit models consists of an OLS regression such as (1.11)
including a selection coefficient, lambda, or the inverse mills ratio, calculated from the first step
of the two-step model. The coefficient on lambda compares the returns for those who entered
entrepreneurship with the with the expected returns for the individuals who did not select in
(that is, for those who remained as employees). If the coefficient is positive, it suggests that
those becoming entrepreneurs earn more than what employees would have earned had they
selected into entrepreneurship. If the coefficient is negative, it suggests that those selecting
into entrepreneurship earn less than what employees would have earned had those employees
become entrepreneurs.
I run the selection models separately for those in each income bucket, for both the pre-
reform period and the post-reform period. These results are reported in Table 5. Although
the coefficients on lambda are positive in all but one case, the difference in the lambdas across
periods is revealing. While the lambda fell in the post period for those in the lowest income
bracket, it rose for those in the higher two income brackets. What this suggests is that relative
to the population, the ability of those selecting into entrepreneurship rose in the higher two
income brackets, while it fell for those in the lowest income bracket. These results are not
statistically significant because of the large standard errors but again confirm the view that the
individuals becoming entrepreneurs following the reform in the higher two income brackets had
higher ability relative to wage earners than those who selected into entrepreneurship prior to
the reform.
1.5.4 Did the Characteristics of Individuals who became Entrepreneurs change?
Having studied the basis of selection into entrepreneurship, I now examine the characteristics of
only those who became entrepreneurs, comparing those who entered before the reform to those
who entered after the reform. For each of the 10,181 individuals who became entrepreneurs
over this period only once22 I run OLS regressions where I look at several different observable
characteristics of these individuals as dependent variables. The right hand side variables include
dummies to capture the individuals' income bucket in the year prior to entry, a dummy for the
post period, and interaction terms. Thus the regressions show whether the characteristics of
individuals becoming entrepreneurs changed along observable dimensions, and whether those
who were affected by the reform changed more relative to those who did not. The estimations
therefore are of the form:
Y = a + P140-80PCTILEe + 3280-100PCTILEe + 33POSTe
+P4POSTe * 40-80PCTILEe + ) 5POSTe * 80-100PCTILEe (1.13)
+yiXi + + j + 'Pe + r7o + fi)
where the subscript 'e' refers to the year prior to which the individual entered entrepreneur-
ship. Note that this is not a panel dataset, but a cross-section of individuals who became
entrepreneurs. Hence all the control variables are measured at the year prior to entry, and the
year fixed effects are replaced by cohort fixed effects, to account for any year specific factors
that may have caused a certain cohort to have different characteristics. Note also that includ-
ing cohort, industry, region and occupation code fixed effects impose an extremely stringent
specification since they do not allow for any compositional changes to drive the difference in
2211,157 unique individuals made the 12,253 transitions. Of these were 976 serial entrepreneurs with 2072
entrepreneurial spells (an average of 2.12). Thus, 10,181 or, 91% of individuals became entrepreneurs only once.
the characteristics of the individuals.
Table 6 reports the result of these OLS regressions. Table 6 shows that relative to the base
category, those who became entrepreneurs in the post period had worked longer in their jobs,
worked in larger firms and were more likely to have been employed as a senior white collar
employee in the last job. There is also some evidence that these individuals were younger
at entry, as well as somewhat more likely to have a university degree. Taken together, these
results suggest that more qualified and able individuals were becoming entrepreneurs when
the financing constraints increased, again confirming the results from the prior section that
compared those who became entrepreneurs to those that did not.
1.5.5 Robustness Checks
Business Cycle Effects
A potential concern with the results are that they are driven by business cycle effects. In
particular, the reduction in the ability to expense personal debt also meant that mortgage
payments increased dramatically, creating a reduction in the demand for large houses and
hence a sharp fall in the property prices, particularly at the high end. This fall in asset prices
also coincided with a recession that lasted from 1987 till 1991. I include year fixed effects in
all the specifications to control for year-specific fluctuations in the business environment. Note
also that period under study spans 1981 to 1996 which includes two and a half business cycles
(one prior to and another one and a half post the reform). In particular, the property prices
increased from 1992 onwards and in fact were higher in 1996 than they were in 1986 prior to
the crash in prices. These business cycle effects do not completely explain the result as can be
seen clearly from Figure 3. Finally, the triple differences reported in Table 4A, 5A and 5B
where the results for financially dependent are distinctly different from those in non-dependent
industries give further confidence that there is a substantive effect of financing constraints on
entrepreneurship.
Was it a reduction in 'Tax Dodging'?
Another concern with the results I have reported is that the tax reform may have also reduced
tax dodging, so that individuals who had an incentive to set up a firm to dodge taxes now no
longer needed to. My discussions with both academics and practitioners suggest that this is
not the case. Prior to the reform, there was no separation between taxation of unincorporated
businesses and personal income, so there was in fact no incentive for individuals to set up
businesses specifically to dodge taxes on personal income. The ability to take on business
debt for example, did not add any benefit for individuals in terms of tax breaks. They could
take the loan for their own consumption and get the same tax shield on interest expense.
Although there was still an incentive to set up a business in order to incur personal expenses
through the business and hence avoid double taxation (such as a car for the business that
could then be written off as business expense), these types of businesses are not likely to be
included in the way that individuals are classified as entrepreneurs in IDA. The way in which
an entrepreneur is defined in the IDA data is through the primary source of income. That is,
if an individual's primary source of income is from entrepreneurship, only then are they coded
as being an entrepreneur. This reduces the likelihood of individuals who 'found a business on
the side' as being classified as entrepreneurs. It is much more likely that these are legitimate
businesses that generate sufficient income for the individual to give up their paid employment
and employ another individual for the business. 23
Other Incentive changes due to the Tax Reform
It is possible that the change in the overall structure of the tax rates may have had alternative
incentive changes that impacted individuals in a manner similar to that of a financing constraint.
There are two opposing views on the impact that a fall in marginal tax rates might have on
entry into entrepreneurship. Carroll, Holtz-Eakin et al (2000) argue that an increase in tax
rates should reduce the propensity to become an entrepreneur because of the effect on the
cash flow of businesses, as well as the incentive to exert effort as an entrepreneur. Gentry
23Note that spouses were recorded as being employed in the business in about 15% of the businesses. It is
hard to say, however, whether this is a cover for tax purposes or a legitimite case in which the spouse is involved
in the business as is the case with many family firms.
and Hubbard (2000b) support this view. However, Gordon (1998) and Cullen and Gordon
(2002) argue that in fact high marginal tax rates on unincorporated businesses relative to the
corporate tax rate may in fact increase entrepreneurial activity. Their argument is that the high
marginal tax rates on unincorporated businesses serve as an insurance policy against business
failure because they allow businesses to write off business losses against personal income in
the event that they fail, but (since the decision to incorporate can be made after knowledge of
the success of the business) successful business owners can incorporate and hence reduce the
income taxes on their profits relative to what they would have had to pay as an unincorporated
business. They argue that the value of this insurance increases as the wedge between personal
tax rates and corporate tax rates increase, and hence higher marginal tax rates may in fact
spur entrepreneurial activity.
The results in this paper are counter to the predictions of Caroll, Holtz-Eakin et al (2000)
and Gentry and Hubbard (2000b), highlighting that the role of financing constraints in this
context is an important driver of entry into entrepreneurship. They are, however, consistent
with argument that a fall in tax rates would lead to a fall in entry, although o fcourse the
mechanism posited in this paper is different. Cullen and Gordon (2002) also predict that
a fall in tax rates leads to a fall in entry among less risk-averse individuals. Distinguishing
between ability and risk aversion is hard, since even individual fixed effects regressions aimed at
measuring unobserved ability will include fixed individual preferences such as their risk aversion.
A fall in entry among those with lower ability could also be interpreted as a fall in entry for
those with lower risk aversion, consistent with the prediction of Cullen and Gordon (2002).
Distinguishing this effect from the role of financing constraints warrants further investigation. 24
1.6 Conclusions
The relationship between individual wealth and entry into entrepreneurship has long been seen
as evidence that less wealthy individuals are precluded from entrepreneurship because they don't
241 am still currently investigating the extent to which this argument is applicable in the Danish context. One
way to distinguish the two views in this context is to look at whether there are systematic differences in entry
rates among individuals founding businesses in more 'risky' industries, similar to the the results found for those
founding businesses in more financially dependent industries.
have sufficient private wealth to finance their new ventures. Recent research has challenged
this view, however, arguing that the relationship may not be a consequence of market failure
but instead perhaps a function of individual preferences. In order to examine the extent to
which personal wealth is a barrier to entry, I use a tax reform that changed the cost of personal
debt for individuals, to see how this exogenous change in the cost of external financing impacted
both the rate of entry and the characteristics of individuals who chose to become entrepreneurs.
I find that entry fell for individuals who faced an increase in the cost of external finance due
to the tax reform, showing that in fact there is a substantive impact of financing constraints
on entry into entrepreneurship. However, it was not the less wealthy individuals who were
precluded from entering when the cost of external financing increased. Rather, the sharpest
decline in entry came from wealthy, but low ability individuals who had chosen to enter when the
cost of external finance was low, but did not enter when financing constraints increased. When
financing constraints were low, and individuals could access capital for a business cheaply, it
allowed lower ability individuals to start new businesses. The increase in the cost of capital due
to the reform caused these marginal, lower-ability individuals to select out of entrepreneurship.
These findings highlight another important mechanism impacting selection into entrepreneur-
ship and help to shed light on the why even wealthy individuals may be sensitive to changes
in the cost of external finance when starting new businesses (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004; Holtz-
Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen, 1994). The cost of external finance seems to play an important
role in the selection decision for these individuals by creating a hurdle rate for entrepreneurial
projects. Thus while only higher ability individuals are able to enter when the cost of external
finance is high, low ability individuals can live their entrepreneurial aspirations when the cost of
external finance is low. For a given level of financing constraints, the threshold level of ability
required to become an entrepreneur is lower for wealthy people, which is why the strongest
decline in entry following the increase in constraints came from the wealthy, low ability indi-
viduals. These results are consistent with the findings of Evans and Jovanovic (1989) who
find that in their sample 'high asset individuals tend(ed) to be relatively poor entrepreneurs'
and may also help to shed light on the finding by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)
that wealthy entrepreneurial households seem to have a lower return on private equity than
what may be expected given their risky, illiquid investments. Although these results are also
consistent with Hamilton (2000), I am not able to directly investigate how profitable or unprof-
itable individuals' firms were, and thus cannot tell whether the preference for entrepreneurship
among wealthier individuals is sufficiently high that they choose to become entrepreneurs at the
expense of profit. However, the fact that individuals do cut entry when financing constraints
rise suggests that financing constraints do bind, even among the wealthy.
The results of this paper also have implications for the empirical literature looking at the
micro-mechanisms through which financial markets have an impact on the entry and growth of
new ventures (Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar 2005; Kerr and Nanda, 2006). These findings
suggest that the role of financing environment is not just restricted to determining rates of
entry, but also plays an important role in shaping the characteristics of individuals who become
entrepreneurs. In particular, the results highlight that at least some of the characteristics of
entrepreneurs are endogenous to the financing environment. This has important implications
for theoretical models of entrepreneurial choice, in particular for those that argue in favor
of an 'entrepreneurial type'. Moreover, it points to an important role that the institutional
environment may play in driving economic growth by impacting the distribution of ability across
occupations (e.g., Banerjee and Newman 1992).
These results should also be of interest to policy-makers. In particular, they should of
interest to those thinking about the impact of tax policy on entrepreneurial outcomes (Gentry
and Hubbard 2000a, 2000b; Cullen and Gordon 2002) and how these policies can be used to
impact both the characteristics of those becoming entrepreneurs and the allocation of their
resources across the economy. In addition, they are relevant to policy makers relating the
financing environment for new ventures to entrepreneurial outcomes. This study provides
direct evidence that the financing environment impacts both the number and the quality of
individuals who become entrepreneurs and highlights that in addition to the concerns about
precluding entry among the less wealthy, policy makers should also focus on the potential risk
of 'excess entry' among the wealthy if the hurdle rates to finance their new ventures are too
low.
FIGURE 1: AVERAGE PERSONAL DEBT FOR ENTREPRENEURS AND
EMPLOYEES (IN CONSTANT US DOLLARS)
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FIGURE 2: RATES OF ENTRY FROM EMPLOYMENT INTO ENTREPRENEURSHIP
BY INCOME BUCKET (1982-1997)
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FIGURE 3: INDEX OF RATES OF ENTRY FROM EMPLOYMENT INTO
ENTREPRENEURSHIP BY INCOME BUCKET (1983-1997): 1983=100
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
[--80-100 Percentile in Income - 40-80 Percentile in Income - A- 0-40 Percentile in Income 1
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INDIVIDUALS IN SAMPLE*
Become Entrepreneurs in
Subsequent Year Don't Become Entrepreneurs in
(N=12,253) Subsequent Year (N=3,347,747)
Mean Mean
Income and Wealth
Non Real Estate Household Assets (Constant US Dollars) 120,432 72,025
Household Debt including mortgage (Constant US Dollars) 110,293 58,533
Salary Income (Constant US Dollars) 31,438 27,386






Have Children 0.65 0.59
Parents were previously Entrepreneurs** 0.02 0.01
Highest Educational Degree
Compusory education 0.25 0.30
High school (vocational) 0.46 0.40
High school (academic) 0.03 0.05
University 0.26 0.25
Firm Size and Occpation Code in Which Employed
Average size of establishment where employed 2,306 4,447
Director or Top Manager 0.03 0.01
Senior White Collar Employee 0.21 0.11
Mid-Level White Collar Employee 0.16 0.17
Low-Level White Collar Employee 0.17 0.27
Blue Collar Tier 1 Employee 0.20 0.16
Blue Collar Tier 2 Employee 0.19 0.24
Other Employee 0.05 0.04
Industry in Which Employed
Work in Agriculture 0.05 0.02
Work in Manufacturing 0.14 0.19
Work in Construction 0.09 0.08
Work in Wholesale, Retail Trade 0.22 0.13
Work in Transport 0.07 0.06
Work in Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 0.12 0.09
Work in Public or Private Services 0.27 0.39
* The Sample was constructed by identifying all individuals who started a new job in 1981 between the ages of 15 and 45, and
creating a panel dataset for these individuals for 15 years from 1982-1996 -- so that all individuals in the panel were between 15
and 60 over the entire sample period. Descritive Statistics are reported over the cells in which these individuals were employed
at a firm -- that is years in which they were self employed, unemployed, or students are excluded from this table
** This variable takes a value of I if the individual's parents were entrepreneurs at any point between 1980 and 1982, but were
NOT entrepreneurs in the year prior to the individual becoming an entrepreneur. This prevents a potentially spurious link
between parents' entrepreneurship and an individual's own propensity to become an entreprenuer being driven family succession
TABLE 2A: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN INDIVIDUAL'S WEALTH AND THEIR ENTRY INTO
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
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<----------------- -------YES- ---------- ->
Standard Errors in parentheses; Two-sided t-tests: 
1
Logit Models: Regressions include all Individuals in the sample who were employed between 1981 and 1996. The dependent variable takes a value of I if
the individual became an entrepreneur in the subsequent year. Note that the sample is a panel but not all individuals are included in the regression in each
year since regression sample only includes those who are employed at a firm in any given year.
Notes: Industry Fixed effects at the SIC I level; Region fixed effects control for each of 16 'Amts' or counties in Denmark; Occupation fixed effects control for
the level of seniority in the organization - such as directors, senior managers, white and blue collar workers.
1: This variable takes a value of 1 if the individual's parents were entrepreneurs in 1980 Or 1981, but were NOT entrepreneurs in 1982. This accounts for a
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TABLE 2B : RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN INDIVIDUAL'S WEALTH AND THEIR ENTRY INTO
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: INDIVIDUAL FIXED EFFECTS
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Standard Errors in parentheses; 
Two-sided t-tests: 
1
Conditional Fixed Effects Logit Models: Regressions include all Individuals in the sample who were employed between 1981 and 1996. The
dependent variable takes a value of I if the individual became an entrepreneur in the subsequent year. Note that the sample is a panel but not
all individuals are included in the regression in each year since I only include those who are employed at a firm in any given year.
Notes: Model (5) only includes individuals who work in Manufacturing, Retail and Wholesale Trade or Services in the subsequent year.
Industry Fixed effects at the SIC 1 level; Region fixed effects control for each of 16 'Amts' or counties in Denmark; Occupation fixed effects
control for the level of seniority in the organization -- such as directors, senior managers, white and blue collar workers.
Because the models require variation in the dependent variable, individual fixed effects models can only be run on those individuals who
eventually become entrepreneurs - hence the number of observations in these models is significantly smaller; Also, since any variable that is
correlated with time will perfectly predict entry (since for all of these individuals the period in which they enter into entrepreneurship is the last
period in which they are observed) variables such as age are omitted; any variables that are fixed across individuals are also omitted as they






























TABLE 3A : DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES PREDICTING ENTRY INTO
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Logit Regressions: Dependent Variable is Probability that the given Individual Transitions to Entrepreneurship
Variable
[40-80th PCTILE OF TOTAL INCOME]=,
[80-100th PCTILE OF TOTAL INCOME]=
POST x 40-80 PCTILE






































































Standard Errors in parentheses; Two-sided t-tests: * p<.05 ** p<.01
Logit Models: Regressions include all Individuals in the sample who were employed between 1981 and 1996. The dependent variable takes a
value of 1 if the individual became an entrepreneur in the subsequent year. The Variable POST takes a value of I for the years 1986-1996 and
0 otherwise. The Models reports difference-in-differences estimates by looking at the interaction of various measures of individual income and
wealth with the post period indicator. Note that the coefficient on POST cannot be interpreted with year fixed effects and hence is omitted from
the tables
Notes: Models (2) and (5) only include individuals who work in Manufacturing, Retail and Wholesale Trade or Services in the subsequent year.
Industry Fixed effects at the SIC 1 level; Region fixed effects control for each of 16 'Amts' or counties in Denmark; Occupation fixed effects
control for the level of seniority in the organization -- such as directors, senior managers, white and blue collar workers.
1: Financially dependent industries are based on a binary variable that takes a value of I if the extemal dependence of a given industry (as
outlined by Rajan and Zingales, 1998) is greater than the median. This measure is calculated at the SIC2 level from Compustat data for the
period 1990-2000 and merged with the Danish Industry data at the comparable level of granularity.
2: CONTROL VARIABLES include Individual's Sex, Age, Educational Qualifications, Citizenship, Marital Status, Children, Job Tenure,
Firmsize, Indicator for whether their parents were entrepreneurs
<-----1----- 1 1 ------------- >---
TABLE 3B : DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT
MODELS
Subset of Industries*
Variable Entrepreneurs [11 Self-Employed [21 Move Jobs [3]
[40-80th PCTILE OF TOTAL INCOME]=1 0.268 -0.177 -0.113**
(0.254) (0.132) (0.029)
[80-100th PCTILE OF TOTAL INCOME]=1 0.648* -0.278 -0.196**
(0.270) (0.153) (0.035)
POST x 40-80 PCTILE -0.912** -0.236 0.086**
(0.283) (0.152) (0.033)
POST x 80-100 PCTILE -0.718* -0.037 0.117**
(0.280) (0.162) (0.035)
LOG HOUSEHOLD ASSETS 0.073** 0.024* -0.052**
(0.020) (0.011) (0.002)
LOG HOUSEHOLD DEBT 0.019 0.039** 0.009**
(0.015) (0.010) (0.001)
LOG SALARY INCOME -0.232** -0.454** -0.034**
(0.039) (0.021) (0.010)
CONSTANT -3.329** 0.198 4.434**(0.896) (0.674) (0.154)
LOG LIKELIHOOD -183000 -183000 -183000
PSEUDO RA2 0.21 0.21 0.21
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 2,130,000 2,130,000 2,130,000
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS
REGIN FXEDEFFETS ------------------- YES------------------------REGION FIXED EFFECTS
OCCUPATION CODE FIXED EFFECTS
Standard Errors in parentheses; Two-sided t-tests: * p<.05 ** p<.01
Multinomial Logit Models: Regressions include all Individuals in the sample who were employed between 1982 and 1990. The
dependent variable takes a value of I if the individual became an entrepreneur in the subsequent year, 2 if they become self-employed
and 3 if they switched jobs. The basecategory (0), represents individuals who remain in the same job in the subsequent year.
(Transitions to unemployment, or out of the labor force are excluded and hence the number of observations are somewhat smaller)
Notes*: Due to computational limitations, this model only includes the subset of individuals individuals who work in
Manufacturing, Retail and Wholesale Trade or Financial Services in the subsequent year. Industry Fixed effects at the
SIC 1 level; Region fixed effects control for each of 16 'Amts' or counties in Denmark; Occupation fixed effects control for
the level of seniority in the organization -- such as directors, senior managers, white and blue collar workers. Note that
the coefficient on POST cannot be interpreted with year fixed effects and hence is omitted from the tables
T-test for the difference in coefficients on POST X 40-80 PCTILE and POSTX 80-100 PCTILE between [1] and [2], [1]
and [3], and [2] and [3] were all significant at the 1% significance level
TABLE 4A: PERSONAL WEALTH VERSUS HUMAN CAPITAL AS BASIS OF SELECTION INTO
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Logit Regressions: Dependent Variable is Probability that the given Individual Transitions to Entrepreneurship
Variable
[UNIVERSITY-ABOVE MEDIAN WEALTH- 40-100th PCTILE]=1
[UNIVERSITY-BELOW MEDIAN WEALTH- 40-100th PCTILE]=1
[NO UNIVERSITY-ABOVE MEDIAN WEALTH- 40-100th PCTILEJ=1
[NO UNIVERSITY-BELOW MEDIAN WEALTH- 40-100th PCTILE]=1
POST x UNI-ABOVE WEALTH-40-80
POST x UNI-BELOW WEALTH-40-80
POST xNO UNI-ABOVE WEALTH-40-80









OCCUPATION CODE FIXED EFFECTS
Standard Errors in parentheses; Two-sided t-tests: * p<.l * p<.05
Column (1) Financially
Full Sample Dependent Industries
Column (1) Non-
Dependent Industries
Logit Models: Regressions include all Individuals in the sample who were employed between 1981 and 1996. The dependent variable takes a value of I if
the individual became an entrepreneur in the subsequent year. The Variable POST takes a value of I for the years 1986-1996 and 0 otherwise. The
Models reports difference-in-differences estimates by looking at the interaction of various measures of human capital, personal income and wealth with the
post period indicator. Note that the coefficient on POST cannot be interpreted with year fixed effects and hence is omitted from the tables
Notes: Models (2) and (5) only include individuals who work in Manufacturing, Retail and Wholesale Trade or Services in the subsequent year. Industry
Fixed effects at the SIC I level; Region fixed effects control for each of 16 'Amts' or counties in Denmark; Occupation fixed effects control for the level of
seniority in the organization - such as directors, senior managers, white and blue collar workers.
1: Financially dependent industries are based on a binary variable that takes a value of I if the external dependence of a given industry (as outlined by
Rajan and Zingales, 1998) is greater than the median. This measure is calculated at the SIC2 level from Compustat data for the period 1990-2000 and
merged with the Danish Industry data at the comparable level of granularity.
2: CONTROL VARIABLES include Individual's Sex, Age, Educational Qualifications, Citizenship, Marital Status, Children, Job Tenure, Firmsize, Indicator
for whether their parents were entrepreneurs
3: Due to computational limitations in calculating individual ability for all individuals, a 10% random sample was drawn from the full sample of data. This
forms the basis of the regressions. Therefore the number of observations is lower than that in Tables 3A and 3B
(1) (2) (3)
0.477 16.047** 0.332(1.014) (0.746) (0.232)




















TABLE 4B: PERSONAL WEALTH VERSUS UNOBSERVED INDIVIDUAL ABILITY AS THE BASIS OF
SELECTION INTO ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Logit Regressions: Dependent Variable is Probability that the given Individual Transitions to Entrepreneurship
Logit Models: Regressions include all Individuals in the sample who were employed between 1981 and 1996. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the
individual became an entrepreneur in the subsequent year. The Variable POST takes a value of I for the years 1986-1996 and 0 otherwise. The Models reports
difference-in-differences estimates by looking at the interaction of various measures of human capital, personal income and wealth with the post period indicator.
Note that the coefficient on POST cannot be interpreted with year fixed effects and hence is omitted from the tables
Notes: Models (2) and (5) only include individuals who work in Manufacturing, Retail and Wholesale Trade or Services in the subsequent year. Industry Fixed
effects at the SIC I level; Region fixed effects control for each of 16 'Amts' or counties in Denmark; Occupation fixed effects control for the level of seniority in the
organization -- such as directors, senior managers, white and blue collar workers.
1: Financially dependent industries are based on a binary variable that takes a value of I if the extemal dependence of a given industry (as outlined by Rajan
and Zingales, 1998) is greater than the median. This measure is calculated at the SIC2 level from Compustat data for the period 1990-2000 and merged with the
Danish Industry data at the comparable level of granularity.
2: CONTROL VARIABLES include Individual's Sex, Age, Educational Qualifications, Citizenship, Marital Status, Children, Job Tenure, Firmsize, Indicator for
whether their parents were entrepreneurs
3: Due to computational limitations in calculating individual ability for all individuals, a 10% random sample was drawn from the full sample of data. This forms
the basis of the regressions. Therefore the number of observations is lower than that in Tables 3A and 38
Variable
[ABOVE MEDIAN ABILITY-ABOVE MEDIAN WEALTH- 40-100th PCTILE]=1
[ABOVE MEDIAN ABILITY-BELOW MEDIAN WEALTH- 40-100th PCTILE]=1
[BELOW MEDIAN ABILITY-ABOVE MEDIAN WEALTH- 40-100th PCTILE]=1
[BELOW MEDIAN ABILITY-BELOW MEDIAN WEALTH- 40-100th PCTILE]=1
POST x ABOVE ABILITY-ABOVE WEALTH-40-80
POST x ABOVE ABILITY-BELOW WEALTH-40-80
POST x BELOW ABILITY-ABOVE WEALTH-40-80









OCCUPATION CODE FIXED EFFECTS
Standard Errors in parentheses; Two-sided t-tests: p<.1 p<.05
Column (1) Financially Column (1) Non-
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TABLE 5: COEFFICIENT ON INVERSE MILLS RATIO FROM HECKMAN SELECTION
MODELS
Heckman Two-Step Models: Dependent Variable is Log Total Income
Heckman Two-Step Estimates: Coefficient on A for Entrepreneurs
Coefficient on A Coefficient on A
Income Bucket 1980-1986 1987-1997 Difference (Post - Pre)
0-40th Pctile of Income 1.3 0.22 -1.08
(1.371) (0.631) (1.509)
0-40th Pctile of Income -0.008 0.018 0.026
(0.074) (0.033) (0.081)
80-100th Pctile of Income 0.046 0.148** 0.102
(0.083) (0.036) (0.090)
Standard Errors in parentheses; Two-sided t-tests:* p<.05 ** p<.01; A is Inverse Mills Ratio calculated from First Stage
Notes: All Regressions control for the same set of variables as in the regressions in Table 2A.
Heckman Two Step Models, where the first step is a probit regression predicting entry into entrepreneurship and the second step is an
OLS regression of Log Total Income on the same regressors plus the Inverse Mills Ratio calculated from the first stage regression. The
coefficients reported in the first two columns are the coefficients on the Inverse Mills Ratio for each OLS regression. The exlcusion
restriction used in the first stage of the Model is a dummy for whether the individual's parents were previously entrepreneurs (This has
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APPENDIX 1: COMPARISON OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT RATES ACROSS SELECT
OECD COUNTRIES
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The role of the financial sector in driving economic growth and development has received
increasing attention in recent years, with several authors articulating the positive relationship
between financial development and economic growth at the cross-country level (Beck et al 2000,
Levine 1997, Levine et al 2000). This research has argued that better financing environments
are associated with higher economic growth at least in part because they facilitate better
allocation of capital across investment opportunities, hence driving entrepreneurship and the
Schumpeterian process of 'Creative Destruction' (R. G. King and R. Levine, 1993a, 1993b,
Rajan and Zingales 2003, Bertrand, Thesmar and Schoar 2006).
Despite the wealth of cross-country research, however, there are few empirical studies that
directly examine the entry and exit patterns of firms in non-financial sectors or study how these
1This paper was co-authored with William Kerr We are grateful to Josh Lerner, Steve Ross, Antoinette Schoar,
Philip Strahan and seminar participants at Kellogg, Harvard, MIT, NBER, and the University of Connecticut
for insightful comments on this paper. We also thank the Innovation Policy and the Economy group for financial
assistance. The research in this paper was conducted while the authors were Special Sworn Status researchers
of the U.S. Census Bureau at the Boston Census Research Data Center (BRDC). Support for this research from
NSF grant (ITR-0427889) is gratefully acknowledged. Research results and conclusions expressed are our own
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Census Bureau or NSF. This paper has been screened to insure
that no confidential data are revealed.
are affected by changes in the capital market2 . Understanding the micro-mechanisms through
which the financing environment impacts industry structure and economic growth seems partic-
ularly important in this context given that theoretical models outlining the relationship between
financial development and product market outcomes often yield ambiguous, or even opposing
predictions3 .
In this paper, we study how banking deregulations that lifted local banking monopolies
across the US from the late 1970s through the early 1990s impacted entrepreneurship and
industry structure in non-financial sectors. The structure of the banking industry plays a
major role in influencing the financing environment faced by firms, with bank debt comprising
up to 60% of their total borrowings (Petersen and Rajan 1994). Small businesses and new
ventures in particular rely heavily on banks for financing their operations, as they have fewer
outside sources of financing (Berger and Udell 2002). Reducing distortions in the banking
sector, such as lifting local monopolies in banking markets, can therefore have first order effects
on the product market.
We examine the effect of banking deregulation on the product market by studying how the
entry rate, the distribution of entry sizes and survival rates for firms responded to changes in
banking competition once the restrictions on banking monopolies were lifted. Our analysis
is based on detailed establishment-level data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau and com-
prise annual observations on every private-sector establishment in the U.S. from 1976 to 1999.
While our study is most closely related to Black and Strahan (2002) and Cetorelli and Strahan
(2006), three particular advantages of these data facilitate a more detailed examination of the
mechanisms through which the deregulations affected entry and exit across the product market.
First, the data cover all US establishments, including private firms, small businesses and 'micro'
establishments of one or more individuals. We are thus able to characterize the effects of the
reforms across the entire firm size distribution, including small entrepreneurial startups - that
tend to be most strongly affected by such reforms but are often excluded large-scale datasets.
2Important exceptions are papers by Bertrand, Thesmar and Schoar (2006) and Black and Strahan (2002).
We discuss these papers, and how they differ from ours below.
3 For example, see Levine (1997) for the ambiguous predictions of enhanced liquidity on economic growth.
Similarly, Black and Strahan (2000) outline two opposing forces driving the effect of banking deregulation on
entrepreneurship
Second, the panel nature of the data allows us to track individual establishments over time
so that in addition to studying entry rates, we can examine the size at which new establishments
were founded as well as the survival rates of the new ventures. Since we can look separately at
the impact of the deregulation on entry rates and the entry size, we do not need to rely on more
aggreagate measures such as average entry size to infer the effect of the deregulation on entry4
In addition, we can study whether, how survival rates changed across the firm size distribution
following the deregulations.
Third, we can separate new establishments into brand new startups and additional facilities
being opened by existing firms. This allows us to compare how the banking deregulations
impacted the entry and exit of startups - that in general face greater financing constraints
- to the expansion, and closure of existing firms. In addition to having substantive value,
this distinction is also valuable from an econometric standpoint as it allows us to control for a
greater set of omitted variables than prior studies. By using the facility expansion of existing
firms as a 'within state-industry-year' baseline against which to compare the founding of new
ventures, we are able to control both for annual changes in the overall entry rates of startups
versus existing firms and for aggregate entry conditions at the state-industry-year level. Our
identification strategy therefore isolates the impact that changes in the financing environment
have on entrepreneurship by teasing out the differential response of startups to changes in
banking deregulations over-and-above the increase in facility expansions by existing firms5.
Similar to Black and Strahan (2002), we find that the inter-state banking deregulations led
to a substantial increase in the entry rates of startups. We also find that startups exhibited
a greater increase in entry than the facility expansion of existing firms and that this effect
was particularly strong among establishments entering with under 20 employees. Moreover,
for those firms that survived at least three years, startups entered at larger sizes relative to
4To see why this is important, note that greater entry by small firms when financing constraints fall will lower
the average size of entry. However, lowering financing constraints may also facilitate the entry of firms at larger
firm sizes, thereby raising the average entry size of firms (Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Cabral and Mata 2003).
As these two effects work in opposite directions, looking at aggregate measures such as average entry size forces
researchers to confound the two effects of deregulation on entry.
5We also provide new evidence regarding the dynamic patterns of entry and exit in the non-financial sectors
after the banking deregulations, which suggests that effects on the product market were a consequence of the
reform rather than causing them.
new establishments of existing firms. These results provide compelling evidence that the
deregulations reduced financing constraints and that startups - which tend to have fewer sources
of external finance and hence are more sensitive to a reduction in interest rates or credit rationing
- benefited more from the deregulation than existing firms.
We also find that the increase in startup activity relative to expansion of existing firms is
present, albeit smaller, at the higher end of the firm size distribution. Since firms that are
entering at over a hundred employees are not as likely to be credit constrained, this finding is
consistent with the view that the deregulation improved allocative efficiency across the firm size
distribution, so that good investment ideas of startups were more likely to be financed despite
the fact that they were not 'insiders' or priviledged clients. Also consistent with an increase
in allocative efficiency, we find some evidence that this sustained entry among startups led to
a reduced market share of the top five and top ten incumbent firms in state-industry cells that
experienced inter-state deregulations.
In addition to these results, however, we also find a dramatic increase the entry of establish-
ments that fail within three years. This result, that we call 'churning', is particularly strong
at the bottom end of the size distribution, for firms entering with 20 or fewer employees. For
example, for firms entering in the 6-20 person size bucket, there was an over 30% increase in
'churning' for startups relative to existing firms. This strong increase in churning following the
deregulation suggests that the benefits of banking deregulation do not necessarily stem from
the ex ante allocation of capital to better projects. Another channel through which banking
competition may facilitate the process of creative destruction is to allow several more startups
to be founded, some of which survive ex post to eventually displace incumbents.
Our findings are relevant to the developing empirical literature documenting how reforms
to the banking sector may positively impact the real economy through the reallocation of re-
sources in non-financial sectors (e.g., Bertrand et al. 2006; Cetorelli and Strahan 2006). This
study provides further evidence that well functioning capital markets affect the strength of
entrepreneurship in local economies, but also highlights important additions of the mecha-
nism through which this takes place - namely that deregulation may also facilitate creative
destruction through the 'democratization of entry' rather than only through ex ante allocative
efficiency. These results complement the findings of Bertrand, Thesmar and Schoar (2006)
who study the micro-underpinnings of the French banking deregulations but focus on large
firms above a hundred employees.
Our results also complement prior research examining the relationship between banking
structure and lending to existing small businesses (e.g., Rajan and Petersen 1994; Berger and
Udell 1995). Although the theory is ambiguous as to whether concentrated banking markets
are good for entrepreneurship, our results support the view that more competitive banking
markets have a positive effect on the entry of small, financially constrained firms (e.g., Erel
2006; Berger et al. 2005; Black and Strahan 2002; Cetorelli and Strahan 2006). However, our
findings on churning provide an important additional aspect to full picture when considering
the impact of banking deregulation on the product market.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide a more detailed
description of the theoretical considerations and our empirical approach. In Section 3, we
introduce the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) and document aggregate trends in the
rate of startup activity versus the operations of existing firms. We report our panel estimation
results on the entry rates, entry sizes, survival and churning of new establishments in Section
4. Sections 3 and 4 also provide new evidence from the LBD regarding changes in banking
structure following the deregulations. In Section 5, we conclude our study by identifying further
how our results fit into the literature and the areas for future research.
2.2 Theoretical Considerations and Estimation Design
Our approach to studying the effect of changes in banking competition on entrepreneurship is
to exploit cross-state variation in the timing of branch-banking deregulations in the U.S. The
1970s through the mid 1990s experienced a significant liberalization in the ability of banks
to establish branches and to expand across state borders (either through new branches or
acquisitions). Prior to these liberalizations, banks faced multiple restrictions on geographic
expansion both within and across states.
The McFadden Act of 1927 required national banks to obey state-level restrictions on
branching, effectively prohibiting the expansion of banks across state borders. In addition,
many states developed stringent rules governing the conduct of branch banking within their
territories. The most restrictive of these, known as unit banking, limited each bank to a single
branch. Although banks responded to these restrictions by forming multibank holding com-
panies (MBHCs) that owned more than one bank in states that imposed unit banking, states
in turn restricted the activities of MBHCs. Restrictions on intrastate branching for MBHCs
focused on the market share and concentration of these holding companies, while the Douglas
Amendment of 1956 prevented a MBHC from owning banks across state borders.
As shown in the Figure 1, only 12 states had some form of intrastate branch banking
deregulation prior to 1970, while no state allowed interstate branch banking. Starting in the
1970s, and especially in the 1980s, most states passed laws deregulating the restrictions on the
ability of banks to open or acquire new branches. Two classes of restrictions were eased over
this period. The first, related to intrastate branch banking, allowed banks to expand within
the passing state either by acquiring other bank branches or by setting up new bank branches
themselves. This allowed for more competition in the local banking market by breaking up
effective monopolies that had been in place prior to these liberalizations. 6
Second, interstate branch banking deregulations allowed banks to acquire branches in other
states with which their 'home state' had negotiated such a bilateral agreement. This class of
reforms further reduced the monopoly power of local banks, in particular due to the significant
improvements in the market for corporate control (e.g., Berger et al. 2001). 7 The intrastate
and interstate deregulations culminated in the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act of 1994, which overturned the McFadden Act and allowed national interstate
branch banking after 1995. In effect, the Riegle-Neal Act put out-of-state banks on par with
domestic banks in every state, with important implications for capital reserves and banking
6The intrastate branch banking deregulations consist of two elements. The first deregulation allows banks
to expand within states through mergers and acquisitions. The second allows banks to open de novo branches.
We focus on the leading edge of these intrastate reforms in this paper.
7The interstate deregulations may have also improved economies of scale, although Berger et al. (2001) argue
that the mergers resulted in few cost savings on average.
efficiency across the industry.8
The period following the liberalization of interstate branch banking led to an expansion
of the large MBHCs across state borders and a significant fall in the number of small local
banks. Table 1A documents aggregate changes in the banking sector taken from the LBD.
The total number of banks fell by 30% from the mid 1970s to the mid 1990s. The share of
large banks, defined as having more than 500 employees, and the share of branches controlled
by large banks increased over the same period. There was also a sharp increase in the share of
branches controlled by out-of-state banks, growing from 2% to 25%, suggesting a robust market
for corporate control across state borders.
Our findings on the changes in the banking industry using the LBD data mirror those using
bank assets rather than bank employees as a metric for bank size. For example, Berger et
al. (2001) find that the fall in the number of banks is almost completely accounted for by the
reduction in small banks with assets under $100m. Moreover, they find that the percentage of
industry assets managed by 'megabanks' (i.e., with more than $100b in assets) almost doubled
over the fifteen years from 1977 to 1994. The percentage of industry assets managed by small
banks, on the other hand, halved over the same period.
The increase in banking competition and improvements in the market for corporate control
due to the deregulations are thought to have improved allocative efficiency by allowing capital
to flow more freely towards projects yielding the highest returns and to more efficient producers.
Moreover, although the number of banks fell over this period, the number of bank branches
increased considerably, reflecting the greater competition and the increased choice for consumers
in local markets. From a theoretical perspective, these reforms could have had a strong
positive effect on entrepreneurship if startups faced substantial credit constraints. Moreover,
since entrepreneurs have fewer non-bank options for financing their projects relative to existing
firms (e.g., internal cash flow, bond markets), more efficient allocation of capital within the
"The Riegle-Neal Act opened up nationwide acquisition of banks across state lines so that a bank in any state
could acquire another bank in any state, regardless of whether their respective 'home states' had negotiated
an agreement allowing cross-state acquisitions. In addition, the Riegle-Neal Act allowed banks to set up new
branches across state borders without the need to acquire a subsidiary bank. MBHCs were also allowed to
convert their subsidiaries into branches. Kane (1996) carefully discusses the Riegle-Neal Act.
banking industry should lead to a larger increase in entry of startups relative to the entry of
new establishments among existing firms.
However, there are two theoretical reasons why these reforms may instead harm the entry
of startups. First, Petersen and Rajan (1995) argue that startups benefit from concentrated
banking markets because a monopolist bank can engage in inter-temporal cross-subsidization
of loans. As a monopolist bank can charge above-market interest rates to mature firms, they
can in turn charge below-market rates to potential entrepreneurs. By doing so, the monopolist
bank can maximize the long-term pool of older firms to which they lend.
Second, several studies argue that small banks have a comparative advantage relative to
large banks at making lending decisions for startups because they are better at screening on
'soft' versus 'hard' information (e.g., Stein 2002; Berger et al. 2005). If lending decisions
in larger banks are based on a more hierarchical decision process, the ultimate adjudication
decisions may come from officers who do not know potential borrowers personally. These
decisions are more likely to be based on credit scoring models that inherently focus on hard
information. On the other hand, local loan officers at small banks know information about
borrowers that cannot be condensed into a credit score. This ability to lend and monitor based
on soft information gives the loan officers a comparative advantage in lending to entrepreneurs.
Since the banking reforms led to a shift in industry structure from small banks towards large
banks, this could have had a direct negative effect on lending to startups relative to established
firms with a history of audited accounts. On both fronts, therefore, this second set of theories
suggest that entrepreneurs may have suffered from the banking deregulations. 9
As can be seen from Figure 1, the timing of the intrastate and interstate branch banking
deregulations is sufficiently different and independent across states that we can jointly inves-
tigate the effect of these two reforms on startup entry. The intrastate deregulation captures
the relative trade-off between allocative efficiency from increased competition and the potential
cost to entrepreneurs from a loss of concentrated markets. The interstate deregulation captures
the trade-off between these efficiencies and the potential cost to entrepreneurs from the shift
9It has been argued that the advances in monitoring technology affected bank lending to mature and public
firms, but that this may have had very different effects on startups.
away from small banks as a source of small business lending. Our study can therefore also be
seen as a test for the presence of financing constraints in entrepreneurship. Since there are
several theoretical channels through which banking competition may hinder startup activity,
evidence of an increase in entrepreneurship relative to the entry of new establishments of exist-
ing firms would indicate a very strong positive benefit to entrepreneurship through the increase
in competition among banks.
We construct tight comparisons of startup entry rates to the facility expansions of existing
firms that remove all local conditions common to the two types of entrants. We further control
for national changes in entry rates for both types of firms. This platform is only feasible due to
our establishment-level data. Since the cross-state variation in the timing of the reforms may
have been correlated with the structure of the banking industrylo, prior research regarding the
effect of these banking deregulations on the non-financial sector relies on interactions between
the timing of the reforms and each industry's dependence on external finance to achieve iden-
tification (e.g., Cetorelli and Strahan 2006). We are able to go a step further by exploiting
variation across types of entrants within state-industry-year cells. This estimation approach
controls for a greater set of omitted factors than earlier work, and we utilize a dynamic model
that parses out transitory features of the adjustment process. Most importantly, though, the
elasticities of establishment openings for existing firms provide an important benchmark for
isolating the relative importance of these deregulations for entrepreneurship specifically.
10Accounts of the political-economy of the reforms suggest their passage is exogenous to product markets,
driven in part by federal actions and state-level structure of the banking industry. Black and Strahan (2001)
argue that some of the impetus for the intrastate deregulations came from initiatives taken by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency that put banks with national charters on par with S&Ls and savings banks that
could branch freely within states. The interstate deregulations were driven in part by the S&L crisis in the early
1980s when federal legislators allowed failed banks and thrifts to be acquired by banks in any state, regardless
of the state laws governing these transactions. These paved the way for bilateral negotiations between various
states to allow interstate banking to capture the benefits of larger, diversified banks that were less susceptible to
failure. Krozner and Strahan (1999) also note that the timing of the reforms are driven in part by the relative
strength of banking interest groups that favored the deregulation. Appendix Table 1 lists each state and the
dates of the branch banking deregulations.
2.3 Longitudinal Business Database
The data for this study are drawn from the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). Sourced
from US tax records and Census Bureau surveys, the LBD provides annual observations for
every private-sector, incorporated establishment from 1976 to 1999. Approximately 3.9m
establishments, representing over 68m employees, are included each year. As the micro-records
document the universe of establishments and firms, rather than a stratified random sample
or published aggregate tabulations, the Census Bureau data is an unparalleled laboratory for
studying entrepreneurship rates and the life cycles of firms in the U.S. In addition, the LBD lists
the physical location of establishments rather than the location where they are incorporated,
which allows us to circumvent issues related to higher incorporations in certain states like
Delaware.
The comprehensive nature of the LBD facilitates the development of complete state-industry-
year panels of birth counts by type of firm and the distribution of establishment entry sizes (in
terms of employment). Each establishment is given a unique, time-invariant identifier that can
be longitudinally tracked. This allows us to identify the year of entry for new startups or the
opening of new plants by existing firms."1 Second, the LBD assigns a firm identifier to each
establishment that facilitates a linkage to other establishments in LBD. This firm hierarchy
allows us to separate new startups from expansions by existing multi-unit firms.
Publicly available series do not provide birth counts by state-industry cells; even when
they do provide approximations based on total employment, the Census Bureau is required to
suppress values that compromise the confidentiality of individual establishments. Moreover,
the entry of startup establishments versus expansion establishments is not released. Building
from the microdata overcomes these limitations. Our data includes the entry patterns of the
manufacturing, services, retail trade, wholesale trade, mining, transportation, and construction
sectors covering the 1977-1998 period. 12
"
1 We define entry for a given establishment as the first year that it has positive employment. We do not
include exit and re-entry in our birth counts. As the data begin in 1976, we can only consider entry from 1977
onward.
12Jarmin and Miranda (2002) describe the construction of the LBD. The LBD includes incorporated firms
Tables 2A to 2C provide descriptive statistics on our sample. Over 80% of the 400k new
establishments opened in each year are new firm formations. Table 2C highlights that the
rate of churning - that is establisments that exit within 3 years of entry - is over 150% greater
for startups relative to that of established firms and concentrated at the low end of the size
distribution. Figure 2 plots the relative entry rates over time of startup establishments to
the expansion establishments of existing firms, with entry rates in 1977-1981 normalized to
100% for each group. This time plot demonstrates that although startups constitute the vast
majority of new establishments, the relative increase in startup activity has consistently lagged
that of expansion establishments since the early 1980s. In fact, there is only a 10% increase in
the raw number of startup entrants over the twenty-year period, despite a 20% overall growth
in LBD employment. Figure 2 also documents a broad decline in entry rates during the early
1990s. This is consistent with the decline in credit available to firms during this period (e.g.,
Berger et al. 2001; Zarutskie 2006).
These aggregate trends are important when interpreting the upcoming panel estimation re-
sults. The aggregate trends of startups and expansion entry by existing firms will be controlled
for with separate year fixed effects for each type of firm. These panel effects remove aggregate
trends that affect these two groups differently and would otherwise bias the parameter estimates
(e.g., greater cyclical volatility of firm formations). These aggregate trends, however, include
overall movements in credit access that are partly due to deregulations. The inference of panel
estimations using the cross-state banking variation is in part from greater or weaker relative
declines in startup entry rates for states that have deregulated.
While startups account for the majority of new establishments, existing firms open new
establishments at much larger sizes. New establishments of existing firms start on average with
four times the employment of startups. Figure 3 documents the distribution of establishment
entry sizes for these types of firms. 76% of new startups begin with five or fewer employees,
versus 44% for expansion establishments of existing firms. These distributions suggest startups
only; unincorporated businesses and partnerships are not considered in this study. Sectors not included in the
LBD are agriculture, forestry and fishing, public administration, and private households. We also exclude the
US postal service, restaurants and food stores, hospitals, education services, and social services. Finally, we
separate the financial services sector for analysis. Incomplete LBD records require dropping 25 state-year files:
1978 (12 states), 1983 (4), 1984 (4), 1985 (1), 1986 (1), 1989 (1), and 1993 (2).
may face constraints on the intensive margin of entry size as well as the extensive margin of
entry rates. Looking at the capital-intensive manufacturing sector in Figure 4, the distribution
differentials are even more pronounced. There are, however, many other factors that need to be
considered in modelling starting establishment size to isolate the role of financing constraints. 13
Comparing Tables 2A and 2B also shows that the aggregate distributions of entry and
exits across the firm size distribution, industry and geographic region seem relatively similar
across the period of study. . Manufacturing accounts for just under 10% of the total entry
and exit; manufacturing, services, wholesale trade, and retail trade jointly account for 75% of
the total entry and exit of new establishments 14 . Despite the well-documented concentration
of high-tech entrepreneurship within regions like Silicon Valley and Boston's Route 128, the
broad entry and exit rates we consider are more evenly spread across US regions. There
are also no substantial differences in the extent to which startups versus existing firms found
new establishments across regions. These geographic regularities aid our using of cross-state
variation in banking deregulations to study entrepreneurship, as the results are not overly
dependent upon the outcomes of a single state or region. 15
2.4 Empirical Results
This section reports our empirical results regarding establishment entry rates, entry sizes, exit
rates and churning. We begin with state-year panel estimations that separately examine
the entry rates of startups and expansion establishments. We then turn to dynamic tests and
stacked regressions to focus on more stringent identification of the effect of banking deregulation
on entry rates and entry sizes of startups relative to that of exisiting firms. Lastly, we turn
to the effect of the deregulations on establishment exits, as well as examining the process of
13Dunne et al. (1989) provide additional details on entry patterns in the manufacturing sector.
14The exclusion of health, education, social services, and community organizations reduces the proportion of
services entry in the sample relative to the overall population. The relative entry and exit of startups versus
existing firms in retail trade and construction are quite different. Our core estimations control for detailed
industry differences, and we have further confirmed that our results are robust to excluding these sectors entirely.
15See Dumais et al. (2002) and Ellison et al. (2006) for further studies of startup and existing firm expansion
agglomeration and coagglomeration, respectively.
churning -namely is the exit of establishments within three years of their entering the product
market.
As we highlight in the sections below, our results provide strong support for the view that
the banking deregulations helped reduce financing constraints and improve allocative efficiency
- that particularly benefited startups relative to existing firms. However, we also show that
the deregulations substantially increased "churning" of startups, particularly at the lower end
of the size distribution. Our results therefore suggest that while reducing distortions in the
banking industry may increase ex ante allocative efficiency, it also seems to be associated with
democratizing entry among startups. The net result is that while a few of these startups
surivive ex post to enable the process of creative destruction, much of the startup entry at the
low end of the size distribution results in churn.
2.4.1 Estimations of Entry Rates at the State-Year Level
To understand the impact of banking deregulations on entry rates of new establishments, we
first investigate a simple panel data model at the state-year level. The estimation takes the
form,
ln(BIRyIpe) = q + T_ + ITRATRAst + OTERTERst + Est, (2.1)
where ¢, and Tt are vectors of state and year fixed effects, respectively. The state effects control
for fixed differences in entry rates across states due to factors like California's larger economic
size. The year effects account for aggregate changes in entry rates over time that result from the
business cycle, national policy changes, and so on. BIRst is the total count of establishment
births in the state-year cell for the indicated Type of firm: startups or existing firms. TRAst
and TERt model the intrastate and interstate banking deregulations, respectively. These
indicator variables take a value of zero before the deregulations and one afterwards. As BIRet
is measured in logs, the 0 coefficients measure the mean percentage increase in a state's births
in the years following the deregulations. 16
16 The LBD is centered on March of each year. We thus date the reforms such that a passage of TRA in 1987,
for example, is coded as changing from 0 to 1 in 1988. Appendix Table 1 lists states and reform dates. We also
Panel A of Table 3 reports two regressions for three samples: all sectors, manufacturing only,
and non-manufacturing. The first regression of each set considers startup entry rates, while
the second regression focuses on the entry rates of new establishments opened by existing firms.
These six regressions are all undertaken at the state-year level, so that the observation counts
do not change across columns. We conservatively cluster standard errors at the state cross-
sectional level to address the serial correlation concerns for differences-in-differences estimations
of Bertrand et al. (2004). Regressions are weighted by 1977-1985 total birth employment in
the state cell; these weights do not change across entrant types. 17
The specifications find that interstate banking deregulation is consistently associated with
higher rates of startup entry. The coefficient elasticity of 6% is smaller, but similar in di-
rection, to the 11% elasticity of Black and Strahan (2002) using Dun & Bradstreet incorpora-
tions. This positive response is evident for the whole sample and for the manufacturing and
non-manufacturing subsamples. In unreported regressions examining sectors with the non-
manufacturing subsample, stronger effects are found in wholesale trade and retail trade than
in services. Nevertheless, a higher and statistically significant entry of startups following the
interstate reform is evident for each sector analyzed. We find the intrastate banking deregula-
tion is associated with higher entry rates in manufacturing sector only. For non-manufacturers,
which again comprise the bulk of the sample, no effect on entry is registered.18
These results suggest the interstate branch banking deregulations had a very large economic
impact, leading to a 6% growth in startup birth rates. Looking at the establishment entry
rates of existing firms, the second regression of each set, we find a similar pattern of coefficients.
The interstate banking deregulations are associated with higher entry rates that are statistically
different from zero, although the estimated elasticity of 4% for existing firms is somewhat weaker
include in each regression an interaction of the reforms with an indicator for an Economic Census year (i.e., 1977,
1982, 1987, 1992, 1997). In these years, more manpower is devoted to updating the business registry. As a
result, longitudinal bumps occur in establishment entry counts for both types of firms. These interactions flexibly
accommodate these shifts, although the interactions are insignificant and their coefficients are not informative.
They can be excluded from the regressions without impacting the results. See Autor et al. (2006) for further
details.
17The weights afford population estimations of the impact of the banking deregulations. Similar results are
obtained in unweighted regressions.
18Black and Strahan (2002) find an elasticity of 3% in Dun & Bradstreet incorporations to intrastate
deregulations.
than the 6% estimated for startups.
It is premature, however, to infer that these deregulations have a direct, causal benefit
for entrepreneurship. It is possible, that the deregulations were a response to greater levels
of economic activity including entrepreneurship, rather than causing them. For example,
Krozner and Strahan (1999) argue that the timing of the reforms are driven in part by the
relative strength of banking interest groups that favored the deregulation. In order to examine
this proposition more carefully, we turn to dynamic specifications that identify whether the
timing of entry is consistent with greater competition in the banking industry. The dynamic
specification allows us to identify whether there were strong lead effects to the deregulation in
terms of higher entry rates19 .
The dynamic extension to (2.1) documents whether the entry rates follow the deregulations
in a pattern consistent with a causal interpretation20 . The complete dynamic specifications
take the form,
3
ln(BIRype) = + Tt + + 3TRAt+qATRAqt+ + TRAt±4TRAst+4 (2.2)
q=-2
3
+ iE TERt+qATERst+q + 3TERt+4TERst+4 + Esjt*
q=-2
The pre-reform and post-reform indicators in (2.1), TRAst and TERst, are replaced by a series
of lead and lag indicators. TRAst+4 and TERst+4 take a value of one four or more years after
the deregulation. The variables E3=-2 ATRAst+q and E3=2 ATERst+q are six separate
indicator variables that span the six-year period from two years prior to the reform to three
years after the reform. These six indicators take a value of one in their specific lead or lag year
only and are zero otherwise. Their coefficient pattern thus models the short-term dynamic
'
9Such a test has yet to be documented in a consistent way in the literature
20The dynamic specifications identify whether the timing of entry is consistent with greater competition in the
banking industry, even if the introduction of the competition itself was endogenous. Endogeneity in the banking
sector can still be viewed as exogenous to the product markets, especially the relative impacts for startups
versus facility expansions that we study later in this section. The stacked specifications ultimately remove all
state-industry-year trends.
effects around the reform, with TRAst+4 and TERst+4 capturing outcomes four or more years
after the deregulations.
Our main coefficients of interest are the long-term effects I3TRAt+4 and /TERt+4. The co-
efficients _z=-2 TRAt+q and 3=-2 TERt+q foCUS on the timing of the reform and document
whether the entry of new establishments following the reforms is consistent with a causal ef-
fect. In particular, we should be concerned if a strong lead effect is evident just before the
deregulations are passed, regardless of whether it is heightened or diminished entry rates, as
this would suggest an omitted factor is highly correlated with the timing of the deregulations.
We also want to confirm that the dynamic pattern of effects leading into the long-term effects
make economic sense. Note that the coefficient values for the leads and lags in (2.2) are relative
to the period three years before the reforms and earlier; by comparison, the post indicators in
(2.1) are relative to period immediately before the reforms.
Panel B of Table 3 reports six specifications again examining the startups - existing firms
dimension both within and outside of the manufacturing sector. To conserve space, we report
in Table 3 a condensed form of (2.2) where the six single-year leads and lags are consolidated
into three two-year increments. The long-term effects are still captured by the four-year lag co-
efficients /TRAt+4 and OTERt+4. Appendix Table 2 reports the complete dynamic specifications
for the full sample.
The dynamic specifications show a very consistent entry response for startups and multi-
unit firms to the interstate banking deregulation. In both cases, the forward effect is of a small
magnitude and statistically not different from zero. After the reforms, the coefficients show
an increasing pattern consistent with growing financial access due to greater bank competition.
The long-run magnitudes again maintain the expected order, with startups having a greater
elasticity than the expansion establishment formation of existing firms. No consistent effect is
again evident for the intrastate deregulations.
The second set of regressions in Panel B highlight that the long-run elasticities of entry
in the non-manufacturing sectors are higher than those in the manufacturing sector. Some
may find this surprising given the perceived higher financial dependency of manufacturing.
Two notes can be made. First, many industries within manufacturing (e.g., leather goods)
are less dependent on external finance than those in trade or services; we test directly the
financial dependency prediction later in this section and find some evidence for it. More
importantly, manufacturing is experiencing stagnant employment trends during this period,
while other sectors are expanding. It is not surprising that the elasticities of establishment
entry to changes in financing constraints are weaker for a declining sector. For a hypothetical
industry with no entrepreneurial enticement, the expected elasticity from the deregulations
would be zero.
As a robustness check that in fact our results are being driven by enhanced competition
following the deregulations, we can use Table 3's empirical apparatus to analyze further how
the banking deregulations impacted the commercial banking industry itself. In particular,
we document how the state-level compositions of in-state versus out-of-state banks changed
following the banking deregulations. We further analyze the extent to which these changes
were driven by large, multi-state banks. These results are reported in Appendix Table 3,
which follows the same format as Table 3. The dependent variables in Appendix Table 3 are
the log number of banks in a given state-year cell. That is, we aggregate establishments to the
bank-level and report results for the total number of banks in a given year. 21
Column 1 of Panel A shows a sharp increase in the number of out-of-state banks following
the interstate deregulations. Moreover, Column 2 shows a significant proportion of this growth
was driven by large banks, where we define large banks as those with an average of 500 or
more employees prior over the period 1977-1985. The trends confirm the descriptive statistics
outlined in Table 1. We report the results from dynamic specifications in Panel B. We find no
statistically significant lead effect for the entry of the out-of-state banks, and the coefficients
grow considerably following the passing of the interstate deregulations. Columns 3 and 4 show
these results are robust to including linear state time trends too.
21As in Table 1, we identify commercial bank establishments as SIC 602. A particular advantage of the LBD
data in this context is the ability to study the long-run effects of these reforms on the number and size of out-of-
state banks. Following the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, banks are not required to hold their assets locally in each
subsidiary. Accordingly, prior studies using bank assets have been limited in their ability to drawn inferences
beyond 1994. Since the LBD focuses on establishment-level employment, it provides a consistent longitudinal
metric before and after the Riegle-Neal Act.
The observed growth of out-of-state banks following the interstate deregulations is informa-
tive of the mechanism through which banking liberalizations impacted entry in the non-financial
sector. Both factors follow the interstate deregulations in dynamically consistent patterns, with
limited to no response to intrastate changes. Taken together, these results suggest that in-
creased competition from out-of-state banks played a particularly important role in promoting
entry of new establishments, both of new startups and of existing firms following the inter-state
deregulations.
2.4.2 Estimations of Entry Rates at the State-Industry-Type-Year Level
The state-year panel estimations provide us with two pieces of evidence for moving forward.
First, we note that the most simple estimation highlights that interstate deregulations had a
positive, significant effect on the entry of new establishments. Moreover, this entry response is
dynamically consistent with a view that greater competition from out-of-state banks increased
credit for startup firms. While this effect is stronger for startup establishments, we also noted
the somewhat smaller, but still statistically significant, response for the entry of expansion
establishments associated with existing firms. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the two
entry elasticities are the same at the state-year level.
One of the potential concerns with our results so far is that they may be driven by unobserved
differences in industry structure across states or other factors occuring across states that may
also be correlated with changes in the structure of the banking industry. For example, changes
in technology may be associated with both the changes in the structure of banking as well as
the structure of the product market 22 . In this section, therefore, we move to a more stringent
differences-in-differences specification, by comparing the effect of the banking deregulations
on brand new startups to the establishments formed as part of expansion of existing firms.
The empirical claim is that facility expansions of established firms can serve as an appropriate
22It is important to note that all states but one move from the control to the treatment group during our
sample period, suggesting the timing of any omitted factor would need to be closely correlated with the timing
of the deregulations. We also note that the results are robust to including linear state time trends in these
state-years panels, as shown in Appendix Table 2. The state time trends require that identification is based
solely on the discontinuity surrounding the reform.
control group conditional on removing the aggregate differences documented in Figure 2. Panel
B of Table 3 suggests that this reasonable. Similar to the startups, the facility expansions do
not have a lead pattern prior to the inter-state reforms; moreover, the dynamic growth in their
coefficients is reasonable.
Aside from controlling for potential omitted variables, our identification strategy also has
a useful substantive interpretation in that it teases out the differential response of startups to
changes in banking deregulations over-and-above the heightened facility expansions of existing
firms. Since startups are particularly dependent on banks for external finance, these results
can also be interpreted as a way to understand how much more important the changes in the
structure of the banking industry are for startups relative to existing firms.
With this comparison in mind, we move to a more stringent specification that exploits
the full potential of the Census Bureau data. We calculate from the LBD entry counts by
cells constructed on four dimensions: state, SIC2 industry, year, and type (i.e., startup or
existing firm). Put another way, we stack the data so that both entry types are included in the
same regression rather than in separate regressions; we also incorporate the industry dimension.
Over 110k observations are created through this technique. We can easily relate this augmented
specification, however, to the earlier state-year estimations through the specification,
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In this specification, 'Type is a vector of state-industry-type cross-sectional fixed effects similar
to state vector c, in (2.2). Likewise, T7ype extends the earlier vector of year fixed effects Tt to
be by Type. These two extensions allow the startups and existing firms to have independent
panel effects as in the separated regressions. The remainder of (2.3) interacts the dynamic
TRA and TER deregulation indicators from (2.2) to be by Type. By interacting both Type
forms, the main effect is dropped and the coefficients replicate the single Type specifications
above.23
The first column of Table 4 shows this proposed similarity. The dependent variable is again
the log establishment entry counts in constructed cells. The first block of coefficients are for
the startup type interactions with the two sets of reforms; these coefficients are very close to
the estimates in Column 1 of Table 3. The lower block are interactions for expansions by
existing firms; these parallel Column 2 of Table 3. These coefficients are estimated jointly,
with standard errors conservatively clustered at the state-type level. The minor differences to
Table 4 come from including the industry dimension, but the dynamic patterns and coefficient
magnitudes are similar to the earlier patterns.
Column 2 of Table 4 extends (2.3) to include state-industry-year fixed effects. As these
additional fixed effects saturate the model, the dynamic coefficients for startup firms become
relative to the establishment expansions of existing firms. Indeed, this specification is only
possible by contrasting types within a state-industry-year cell, and separate coefficients for
expansion establishments are no longer estimated. These fixed effects fully absorb changes
in local conditions at the state-industry level. They thus account for the state-year and
industry-year dynamics typically modelled in this literature, further easing any endogeneity
concern. Moreover, the fixed effects control for the unique outcomes of specialized state-
industry combinations like the software industry in Silicon Valley.24  From an econometric
standpoint, this specification allows us to isolate the elasticity from more potential omitted
factors. From a substantive perspective, this second specification directly contrasts the growth
of startups following the banking reforms to the establishment expansions of existing firms.
23 Similar to the earlier specifications, we include interactions for Economic Census years and weight the
regressions by the 1977-1985 birth employments in the state-industry cell. While all state-year observations
have startup and facility expansions, this is not true at the industry level. To maintain a consistent observation
count in log specifications, we recode a zero entry count as one and include unreported dummies for zero count
observations by type. The results are robust to dropping these observation entirely; in general, these cells receive
very small weight.
24It is important to note that cross-sectional fixed effects are also included. Estimations without the cross-
sectional controls can be biased by the non-proportional allocation of industries across states, even if state-year
and industry-year controls are included.
Column 2's differential elasticity estimate of 10.6% for startups relative to the opening of
new establishments by existing firms is our preferred estimation. This estimate is statistically
different from zero; recall that this statistical difference could not be established with the earlier
state-year estimations. Columns 3 and 4 report two robustness checks, the first an unweighted
specification and the second dropping the period after the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act of
1994 that allowed national interstate branch banking. The continued positive elasticity, along
with the dynamic pattern of effects, suggests that the interstate deregulations had a positive
impact for entrepreneurship relative to existing businesses. More generally, it points to specific
financing constraints faced by entrepreneurs that were in part eased by these reforms.
As a robustness check on our earlier findings and to compare our results with other studies
that exploit this specification, we also look at whether the effect of the deregulations is more
pronounced in sectors that are more dependent on external finance. We follow Rajan and
Zingales (1998) and Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) in constructing a measure of the dependence
of industries on external finance using Compustat firms.25 Using this measure as an indicator
for the relative dependence on bank finance across industries, we check whether startup activity
in dependent industries benefited more from the deregulation relative to those in non-dependent
industries.
If startups are more financially constrained, we should expect that the relative elasticity of
entry for startups compared to expansion of established firms should be greater in industries
that are more dependent on external finance compared to industries that are less dependent on
external finance. The results of these regressions are reported in Appendix Table 4. In all four
specifications, the higher coefficient magnitudes for financially dependent sectors support the
theoretical prediction, although the long-term elasticities are often not statistically different.
The differences within manufacturing, which is the typical sector studied, are stronger than the
overall differences.
Although we report these results on external dependence as a robustness check, they are in
25Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we take the universe of Compustat firms in the "Industrial Annual"
database in the period 1990-2000. We compute a measure of external dependence at the SIC2 level. We then
create an indicator variable for an industry being above or below the median external dependence.
fact an even more stringent test on the presence of credit constraints than has been identified
in the prior literature. A first difference compares the elasticity of entry among startups to
existing firms, and the second difference compares these elasticities in industries that are more
dependent on external finance.
2.4.3 Entry Size Estimations
Having documented the effect of the banking reforms on the overall entry rates for startup
establishments, we turn to the distribution of entry sizes for firms. Theoretical models of
financing constraints suggest that even if potential entrepreneurs are not precluded from starting
a new business due to financing constraints, they may still start firms that are smaller than is
optimal for the project at hand (e.g., Evans and Jovanovic 1989). If indeed the increases in
relative entry rates are an indication of financing constraints facing potential entrepreneurs, we
may also find effects in the intensive margin of initial firm employment.
Empirically identifying the effect of changes in financing constraints on the intensive margin
of entry is complicated, however, by the fact that there are simultaneous changes in both the
extensive and the intensive margins. The ideal estimations would compare entry sizes before
and after the reforms for firms that would have entered regardless of the banking deregulations.
In this case, average entry size could be an appropriate metric. The earlier estimations,
however, document that greater entry is facilitated by the deregulations, and we do not have a
way of distinguishing which firms would have entered in the counterfactual. This is particularly
true at the lower end of the size distribution, where we might expect to see the strongest effects
on both the intensive and extensive margins of greater financial access.
To clarify these issues, we first repeat (2.3) with the vector of state-industry-year effects
for different entry sizes. We group entering establishments into four size buckets based upon
employment in the year of entry: 1-5 employees, 6-20 employees, 21-100 employees, and over
100 employees. The coefficients on the banking reform indicators in these regressions estimate
the relative elasticity of startup entry rates to facility expansions within each size grouping.
The results of these regressions are reported in the first four columns of Table 5.
Table 5 shows that relative growth in startup entry rates following the interstate deregula-
tions are particularly strong at the lower end of the entry size distribution. The increased entry
in the 1-5 employee bucket offers the best indication of the extensive margin of entry. The
greater relative increase in entry within the 6-20 employee category suggests that the reform
also had an effect on the intensive margin by boosting the size at which smaller firms enter.
The coefficient in this specification implies a 20% increase in relative entry in the 6-20 employee
category following the interstate deregulations. The long-term relative increases are weaker in
the larger entry size categories. This entry size pattern is consistent with financing constraints
impacting both the extensive and intensive margins of entrepreneurship. 26
We also undertake a second test in Column 5 of Table 5 that employs the longitudinal nature
of the Census Bureau data. For each establishment that survives three years, we calculate its
entry size relative to the maximum employment it achieves in its first three years of operation.
We then calculate the mean of this entry size ratio by state-industry-type-year cells. Examining
the unweighted means across these cells, startup firms and facility expansions enter at 68% and
75% of their maximum three-year sizes, respectively.
These lower relative entry sizes for startups may directly reflect financing constraints on the
intensive margin, but the differential may include other factors like increased caution due to
greater uncertainty too. To assess whether financing constraints play an important role, we test
whether startups enter closer to their maximum three-year sizes after the banking deregulations.
Using the (2.3) framework, the estimation is again a comparison to the baseline provided by
facility expansions. This approach provides a more direct metric of financing constraints on
the intensive margin by looking within establishments rather than at the cross-section of entry.
It is potentially limited, however, by the conditioning on survival for three years. In particular,
startups have different hazard functions of failure relative to facility expansions, and this may
introduce some bias in the mean ratios.27
26Table 5 finds more mixed evidence than the aggregate entry regressions regarding the impact of intrastate
deregulations. There is some evidence that relative entry rates for startups, especially in the larger size categories,
may have declined following these reforms.
27Taking manufacturing as an example, about 50% of startups fail in their three years of operation versus
40% of expansion establishments. The three-year window trades off this survival bias with allowing more time
for new establishments to reach their desired size (e.g., due to internal cash flows or better external finance
opportunities).
Column 5 of Table 5 again finds no measurable impact on the intensive margin following
the intrastate deregulations. Following the interstate deregulations, however, there was a 2%
increase in the entry sizes of startups compared to the maximum sizes they achieved in the first
three years of operation. This estimation is again a relative comparison to the responses of
expansion establishments for existing firms, providing evidence that entrepreneurs in particular
are able to enter closer to their optimal project sizes following the deregulations. While a full
analysis of the entry sizes requires a broader investigation of the firm size distribution, this
result again suggests that the effects of financing constraints for entrepreneurship are present
on both the extensive and intensive entry margins.
2.4.4 Estimation of Establishment Exits
In this section, we turn to the impact of the banking deregulations on establishment exits.
One of the ways in which banking deregulation is argued to facilitate the process of Creative
Destruction is through allocative efficiency by moving capital away from worse performing firms
(Bertrand et al 2006). In Table 6, we document exit rates for firms across different buckets
of the firm size distribution. As with Table 5, the coefficients reflect the relative increase (or
decrease) in exit rates for single unit establishments compared to establishments belonging to
multi-unit firms.
As with the prior results, there was no measurable increase in the relative exit rates of
establishments following the intra-state deregulations. However, exits did increase following
the inter-state deregulations. As can be seen from the first two columns of Table 6, the
increase in exit rates for single unit establishments below 20 employees was over 20% greater
than that of establishments belonging to multi-unit establishments. Exit rates for larger single
unit establishments also increased, though by less and the difference between the exit rates of
single and multi-unit establishments was only marginally significant.
Comparing columns 1-4 in Table 6 with the equivalent columns of Table 5 shows that the
growth in exit rates seem to increase proportionately with the growth in entry rates. Interest-
ingly, comparing column 1 shows that in fact the relative increase in exit rates for startups below
5 employees was significantly higher than that of the entry rates. We investigate this result in
more detail in the next section; overall these results suggest that there was no excessive exits
due to worse performing firms. If worse performing incumbent firms were shut down following
reforms, we would have seen that the rates of exits for single unit firms, particularly at the
higher end of the size distribution, would have been lower. Our results therefore suggest that
the state of the US banking system prior to its reforms was not like that of France, examined
by Bertrand et al (2006).
As a robustness check, we examine how the market shares of the top 5 and top 10 incumbent
firms, and the HHI index of firm concentration in a given industry changed over time and
examine whether these fall sharply in states that deregulated. These results are reported in
Appendix Table 5. Although we do find small evidence of a decline in market shares of the
top firms, they are not dramatic falls.
2.4.5 Longer-Term Entry versus Churning
As we noted in Table 6, the rate of increase in exits among small startup establishments was
even greater than the rate of entry. While some of this may have been due to the fact that
the US economy was growing, so that net entry was higher and hence the increases in entry
were calculated over a larger base28, we dig deeper into the issue by separating entry by new
establishments into those that survived more than three years, and those that exited within
three years of entry. We label the former as longer-term entry and the latter as churning.
These results are reported in Table 7.
Panel A of Table 7 reports the results of the longer term entry. Interestingly, even though
the entry rates in Table 5 showed much greater elasticities of entry at the low end of the size
distribution, looking at the across the columns of Panel A shows that in fact the longer term en-
try following the inter-state deregulation was much more consistent across the size distribution,
with even the largest startup establishments experiencing a 10% increase in entry rates relative
to the increase in new establishments of existing firms. Since these large establishments were
28 Therefore leading to a lower elasticity increase.
likely not credit constrained, these results are consistent with a view that there was in fact
an improvement in allocative efficiency where startup firms received financing for projects that
they may not have received in the past because they were not 'insiders'.
Panel B of Table 7 paints a more dramatic picture of the effect of the banking deregulations.
In shows that the increase in churning for startups relative to existing firms was over 25% greater
following the banking deregulations. Moreover all of this increase came from firms that entered
below a 100 employees; firms that entered between 6 and 20 employees saw a relative increase
in churning of over 30%. This dramatic increase in the entry of new establishments that
failed within three years was not just a consequence of banks learning about different markets
following the deregulations; the effect that we document is a long-term effect arising from four
or more years subsequent to the complete passing of the deregulation, and in fact was seen to
increase, not decrease subsequent to the reforms29 . The dramatic increase in churning does not
seem consistent with a model of ex ante allocative efficiency on the part of banks. Instead, it
suggests that in addition to ex ante efficiency in allocation of credit, another channel through
which the deregulations impact the process of creative destruction is to allow the planting of
several seeds, only some of which untimately bloom to compete with, and perhaps displace,
incumbents.
2.5 Conclusions
Although there is a growing consensus that financial markets play an important role in driving
economic growth, the micro-foundations behind this relationship are much less understood.
The role of the banking industry in promoting entry through the efficient allocation of capital
is of particular interest in this context, since there is increasing evidence that entrepreneurship
plays a key role in facilitating innovation, impacting industry structure, and promoting economic
growth.
In this paper, we look at how the increase in U.S. banking competition through the dereg-
29Note that in these regressions we do see the presence of some lead effects; however the coefficient grows
significantly following the deregulations.
ulation of branch banking affected both the entry and survival of new establishments. We
employ unique establishment-level data housed in the Census Bureau's Longitudinal Business
Database for our analysis. These micro-records facilitate several analyses that have not been
undertaken in prior work. First, they allow us to compare the elasticity of entry for startups
relative to the opening of new plants by existing firms, which allows us both to control for a
greater set of omitted variables as well as to isolate the differential effect of the reforms on
entrepreneurship. Second, we are able to track individual establishments over time so that
we can study how entry size of establishments were affected by the reforms, how entry rates
and exit changed at different points of the entering size distribution and as well as track sur-
vival rates of new ventures. This allows us complement the results of prior studies as well as
shed more light on the mechansims through which the deregulations impacted product market
outcomes.
We do not find that the intrastate branch banking deregulations had a consistent, measured
impact on either the entry rates or the entry sizes of new establishments. This was true for both
startups and the new establishments of existing firms. Our findings suggest that the intrastate
branch banking deregulations did not affect the competitive environment of the local banking
industry significantly, at least not in such a way that affected the entry of new businesses.
On the other hand, we find that the interstate branch banking deregulations had a strong
positive effect on the entry of startups that was significantly higher than that of existing firms.
The rate of entry among startups relative to existing firms was 10% higher in states that
deregulated interstate branch banking relative to states that did not. Among startups entering
with 20 or fewer employees, the elasticity was even higher at 15-20%. We also find evidence
for growth in employment size at entry. Overall, our results find strong support for the view
that the deregulations reduced financing constraints, that benefited startups more than existing
firms. We also find evidence consistent with the fact that the deregulations improved allocative
efficiency and somewhat reduced market shares of incumbents in the product markets.
In addition to these results, we found that the entry of startup establishments that failed
within three years increased as much as 30% relative to new establishments of existing firms,
particularly at the lower end of the size distribution. While we are not yet able to distinguish
between various explanations for this churning30 result, it does highlight that the increase in
banking competition seems to 'democratize entry' and that the banking deregulations seem to
drive the process of creative destruction not just by the efficient allocation of capital ex ante,
but potentially also through allowing large-scale entry and efficient closures of firms ex post.
The churning results are also relevant to the apparent contradictory findings from Black and
Strahan (2000), who report large increases in entry rates of startups following the inter-state
deregulations and the results from Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), who report a fall in the overall
share of firms at the smallest end of the firm size distribution following the same reforms. Our
finding, that in fact much of the entry at the low end of the size distribution resulted in churn,
explains why this did not translate into a greater share of firms at the lowest end of the firm
size distribution.
Further, this paper sheds light on a possible reason why studies regarding the effects of
banking competition on small businesses have had somewhat contradictory results. Consistent
with the literature documenting a fall in credit extended to small businesses in the early 1990s,
we also find a dip in startup activity over that period (e.g., Berger et al. 2001; Zarutskie 2006).
Indeed, we further document how the relative growth of startups has lagged behind the growth
of establishment openings by existing firms since the late 1970s. However, the implications of
our panel estimations are that the increase in banking competition dampened national declines
in startup entry in states that deregulated interstate branch banking relative to states that
did not. This result, highlighting the importance of banking competition for startup entry in
the face of financial-sector downturns, is a particularly interesting factor that warrants further
investigation.
We see two other areas in particular that warrant further study. First, the specific mecha-
nisms through which the increased banking competition impacted entrepreneurial entry should
be analyzed, especially the trade-off between greater competition and the benefits of relation-
ship banking. The limited impact of the intrastate deregulations for entry rates, especially
30It is possible that lowering financing constraints leads to weaker or more frivolous entry (Nanda, 2006),
that greater competition entrants leads to higher failure rates, or that changes in the structure of banking - in
particular the loss of relationship banking - may be causing the churn.
compared to the interstate deregulations, suggests that either the intrastate deregulations did
not have enough bite or that there was something specific about the out-of-state banks that was
important for promoting entrepreneurship. While some argue that the interstate deregulations
enhanced the market for corporate control, others suggest that the main benefits of the inter-
state banking deregulation were the better allocation of credit and the better use of technology
by the large, multi-state banks. Understanding these mechanisms is an important question
for future analysis, especially whether the reforms came at the expense of firms that rely more
on soft information. For example, our findings that so many firms fail within the first three
years, particularly at low end of the size distribution, leaves open the possibility that there
may in fact be a dark side to banking deregulation for entrepreneurial startups as suggested
by Petersen and Rajan (1995). If changes in the organizational structure of banks following
the deregulation led to different lending strategies (Berger et al, 2005, Sah and Stiglitz 1986)
or lowered the ability for banks to evaluate projects because of weaker relationships, this may
have had negative consequences for the survival of startups.
The Census Bureau data is an ideal source to investigate this further, as it provides county-
level detail on the location of bank branches and new businesses. In addition, it provides
some data on the loans and revenue sources for local bank branches in the Census of Finance,
Insurance and Real Estate. We hope to combine this data, once access is obtained, with
industry-level characteristics regarding the reliance of young firms for soft information early in
their life-cycle. This should help disentangle some of these competing effects. Second, we
can track merger and acquisition activity in the banking sector at the branch level through the
LBD. This should allow us to compare the effects on startup entry in counties that experienced
competition through the acquisition of local banks, as opposed to competition through the
threat of acquisition or de novo entry from large MBHCs.
Relating the product market changes due to the banking deregulations to productivity
growth in the US is an important area of further investigation. For example, Jayaratne and
Strahan (1996) focus on effect of the intra-state deregulations and find that these seem to have
positively impacted productivity growth and output in the US. Our findings, and those of Black
and Strahan (2000) show little evidence of changes in the extensive margin of entry and exit
following the intra-state deregulations. This fact seems hard to reconcile with the percieved
wisdom that better developed financial markets impact economic growth through the process
of entrepreneurship and that the effect of the banking sector on productivity growth is driven
by changes at the extensive margin rather than reallocations within firms (Bertrand et al 2006).
We intend to study this further as part of future studies of how greater financial access and
increased entrepreneurship might have long-term impacts on industrial structure and economic
performance.
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Table lA: LBD-Based Descriptive Statistics on U.S. Banking Industry
1977 1994
Total Number of Banking Organizations 12,810 8,547
% with less than 50 employees 79.0% 69.8%
% with branches in multiple states 0.3% 2.6%
Total Number of Banking Branches 38,231 64,155
% owned by banks with 500+ employees 49.5% 65.9%
% owned by banks with mean 500+ employees before 1985 52.4% 62.4%
% owned by banks originally located in other states 2.4% 25.3%
Notes: Descriptive details taken from LBD for SIC 602 (1987 classifications).
Table IB: Asset-Based Descriptive Statistics on U.S. Banking Industry
1979 1994
Total Number of Banking Organizations 12,463 7,926
Small Banks (less than $100m in assets) 80.3% 71.1%
Real Gross Industry Assets (in trillions of 1994 dollars) 3.26 4.02
Industry Assets in Megabanks (more than $100b in assets) 9% 19%
Industry Assets in Small Banks (less than $100m in assets) 14% 7%
Source: Berger at al. (2001).
Table 2A: LBD Descriptive Statistics on U.S. Product Market Entry
All Establishments Establishments
Entering of New of Existing
Establishments Start-up Firms Firms
Mean Annual Entry Counts 407,783 335,807 71,976
Mean Annual Entry Empl. 3,811,409 2,081,801 1,729,608
Mean Annual Entry Size 9.3 6.2 24.0
Entry Counts by Entry Size
1-5 Employees 70.3% 75.9% 44.4%
6-20 Employees 22.8% 19.8% 36.6%
21-100 Employees 5.8% 3.8% 14.9%
100+ Employees 1.1% 0.4% 4.1%
Entry Counts by Sector
Manufacturing 9% 9% 6%
Services 28% 29% 22%
Wholesale Trade 12% 11% 17%
Retail Trade 25% 22% 42%
Mining 1% 1% 1%
Construction 17% 20% 1%
Transportation 7% 7% 10%
Entry Counts by Region
Northeast 19% 20% 17%
South 36% 35% 37%
Midwest 22% 21% 24%
West Coast 24% 24% 22%
Notes: Descriptive statistics for entering establishments outside of the financial sector in the Longitudinal
Business Database from 1977-1998. Jarmin and Miranda (2002) describe the construction of the LBD. The
LBD includes incorporated firms only; unincorporated businesses and partnerships are not considered in this
study. Sectors not included in the LBD are agriculture, forestry and fishing, public administration, and private
households. We also exclude the US postal service, restaurants and food stores, hospitals, education services,
and social services. Incomplete LBD records require dropping 25 state-year files: 1978 (12 states), 1983 (4),
1984 (4), 1985 (1), 1986 (1), 1989 (1), and 1993 (2).
Table 2B: LBD Descriptive Statistics on U.S. Product Market Exits
All Exiting Exiting
Exiting Establishments of Establishments of
Establishments Single-Unit Firms Multi-Unit Firms
Mean Annual Exit Counts 362,376 299,668 62,708
Mean Annual Exit Empl. 3,454,544 1,919,014 1,535,530
Mean Annual Exit Size 9.5 6.4 24.5
Exit Counts by Establishment Size
1-5 Employees 71.3% 76.1% 48.6%
6-20 Employees 21.5% 19.2% 32.5%
21-100 Employees 6.1% 4.3% 14.6%
100+ Employees 1.1% 0.5% 4.3%
Exit Counts by Sector
Manufacturing 9% 9% 9%
Services 27% 28% 20%
Wholesale Trade 12% 11% 19%
Retail Trade 27% 25% 40%
Mining 1% 1% 1%
Construction 17% 20% 2%
Transportation 7% 6% 9%
Exit Counts by Region
Northeast 20% 20% 18%
South 35% 35% 35%
Midwest 22% 21% 24%
West Coast 23% 23% 22%
Notes: Descriptive statistics for exiting establishments outside of the financial sector in the Longitudinal
Business Database from 1977-1998. See Table 2A.
Table 2C: LBD Descriptive Statistics on U.S. Product Market Chum
All Establishments Establishments
Entering of New of Existing
Establishments Start-up Firms Firms
Mean Annual Churn Counts 173,371 153,519 19,852
Share of Entrants that Chum 43% 46% 28%
Churning by Establishment Entry Size
1-5 Employees 76.2% 79.3% 51.9%
6-20 Employees 18.8% 17.1% 31.6%
21-100 Employees 4.4% 3.2% 13.1%
100+ Employees 0.7% 0.4% 3.4%
Churning by Sector
Manufacturing 8% 9% 7%
Services 29% 30% 23%
Wholesale Trade 11% 10% 18%
Retail Trade 25% 23% 38%
Mining 1% 1% 2%
Construction 18% 20% 2%
Transportation 7% 7% 10%
Churning by Region
Northeast 18% 18% 17%
South 37% 37% 37%
Midwest 20% 20% 23%
West Coast 24% 24% 23%
Notes: Descriptive statistics for churning establishments outside of the financial sector in the Longitudinal Business
Database from 1977-1996. See Table 2A.
Table 3: Banking Deregulations and Establishment Entry Rates in U.S. Product Markets
All Sectors Manufacturing Non-Manufacturing
Single-Unit Multi-Unit Single-Unit Multi-Unit Single-Unit Multi-Unit
Start-Ups Establish. Start-Ups Establish. Start-Ups Establish.
Openings Openings Openings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Pre-Post Specifications for Log Establishment Birth Counts by State-Year
Intra-State Banking 0.000 -0.015 0.037 0.023 -0.004 -0.020
Dereg. Post Indicator (0.025) (0.035) (0.018) (0.042) (0.027) (0.036)
Inter-State Banking 0.060 0.037 0.059 0.039 0.059 0.040
Dereg. Post Indicator (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.028) (0.021) (0.019)
B. Dynamic Specifications for Log Establishment Birth Counts by State-Year
Intra-State Banking -0.039 -0.015 0.025 0.032 -0.046 -0.022
Dereg. Fwd. 1-2 Yrs (0.034) (0.024) (0.022) (0.039) (0.037) (0.024)
Intra-State Banking -0.041 -0.018 0.012 -0.003 -0.047 -0.020
Dereg. Lag 0-1 Yr (0.046) (0.046) (0.036) (0.062) (0.048) (0.046)
Intra-State Banking -0.045 0.012 0.011 0.115 -0.052 0.003
Dereg. Lag 2-3 Yrs (0.035) (0.043) (0.031) (0.051) (0.036) (0.046)
Intra-State Banking -0.029 0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.032 0.002
Dereg. Lag 4+ Yrs (0.048) (0.050) (0.034) (0.055) (0.050) (0.052)
Inter-State Banking 0.025 -0.021 0.052 0.027 0.023 -0.024
Dereg. Fwd. 1-2 Yrs (0.032) (0.026) (0.025) (0.044) (0.034) (0.027)
Inter-State Banking 0.059 0.005 0.082 0.061 0.057 0.004
Dereg. Lag 0-1 Yr (0.033) (0.029) (0.027) (0.049) (0.035) (0.030)
Inter-State Banking 0.170 0.078 0.137 0.071 0.173 0.083
Dereg. Lag 2-3 Yrs (0.038) (0.035) (0.031) (0.056) (0.039) (0.036)
Inter-State Banking 0.223 0.129 0.141 0.071 0.231 0.141
Dereg. Lag 4+ Yrs (0.056) (0.046) (0.041) (0.064) (0.060) (0.048)
Observations 1,097 1,097 1,097
Notes: Panel estimations consider log counts of establishment births taken from the LBD for 1977-1998. Sectors and types of firms for
dependent variables are indicated in the column headers. Single-unit start-ups are new firm formations. Multi-unit establishment
openings are new establishment openings by existing firms. The sample includes all states and DC from 1977-1998, excepting 25 state-
year cells where LBD files are not available, for 1097 observations. Regressions include state and year fixed effects. Regressions
include unreported interactions of explanatory indicators with a Census year dummy. Regressions are weighted by average birth
employment in cells from 1977-1985. Standard errors are conservatively clustered at the state cross-sectional level.
Pre-Post specifications compare annual entry rates before and after the state-level banking deregulation indicated. Dynamic
specifications replace the post deregulation indicators with a series of leads and lags for each reform. To conserve space, leads and lags
are consolidated into two-year increments extending from two years prior to the deregulations to four or more years after the
deregulations. The coefficient values for the dynamic leads and lags are relative to the period three years before the reforms and earlier.
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App. Table 1: Timing of State Branch Banking Deregulations
Intrastate de novo Intrastate M&A Interstate













































































































































































































Source: Jayaratne and Strahan (1996). Deregulations prior W970 are listed as 1970.
App. Table 2: Complete Dynamic Specifications for Table 3
All Sectors Adding Linear State Time Trends
Single-Unit Multi-Unit Single-Unit Multi-Unit
Start-Ups Establish. Start-Ups Establish.
Openings Openings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable is Log Est. Birth Counts by State-Year
Intra-State Banking 0.006 -0.049 0.001 -0.045
Dereg. Fwd. 2 Yrs (0.023) (0.029) (0.019) (0.030)
Intra-State Banking -0.055 0.003 -0.070 0.004
Dereg. Fwd. 1 Yrs (0.041) (0.027) (0.041) (0.033)
Intra-State Banking -0.038 -0.016 -0.057 -0.013
Dereg. Change (0.043) (0.035) (0.044) (0.046)
Intra-State Banking -0.047 -0.017 -0.073 -0.027
Dereg. Lag 1 Yr (0.048) (0.057) (0.053) (0.062)
Intra-State Banking -0.061 0.002 -0.085 -0.005
Dereg. Lag 2 Yrs (0.043) (0.051) (0.051) (0.059)
Intra-State Banking -0.023 0.029 -0.049 0.014
Dereg. Lag 3 Yrs (0.039) (0.043) (0.060) (0.060)
Intra-State Banking -0.029 0.006 -0.067 0.010
Dereg. Lag 4+ Yrs (0.050) (0.051) (0.058) (0.065)
Inter-State Banking 0.008 -0.019 0.035 -0.019
Dereg. Fwd. 2 Yrs (0.032) (0.027) (0.034) (0.024)
Inter-State Banking 0.062 -0.018 0.099 -0.012
Dereg. Fwd. 1 Yrs (0.041) (0.031) (0.042) (0.031)
Inter-State Banking 0.043 0.003 0.078 -0.004
Dereg. Change (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034)
Inter-State Banking 0.106 0.012 0.144 -0.001
Dereg. Lag 1 Yr (0.036) (0.032) (0.039) (0.036)
Inter-State Banking 0.168 0.067 0.206 0.050
Dereg. Lag 2 Yrs (0.041) (0.036) (0.047) (0.039)
Inter-State Banking 0.226 0.112 0.263 0.088
Dereg. Lag 3 Yrs (0.047) (0.036) (0.058) (0.048)
Inter-State Banking 0.258 0.144 0.278 0.098
Dereg. Lag 4+ Yrs (0.060) (0.049) (0.078) (0.067)
Notes: See Table 3. 106
App Table 3: Banking Deregulations and Changes in the Composition of U.S. Banking Industry
Base Specification
Number of N







Including Linear State Time Trends
Number of Number of
Out of State Out of State Banks
Commercial Banks with Mean 500+
Empl. before 1985
(1) (2) (3) (4)






Dereg. Fwd. 1-2 Yrs
Intra-State Banking;
Dereg. Lag 0-1 Yr
Intra-State Banking
Dereg. Lag 2-3 Yrs
Intra-State Banking;
Dereg. Lag 4+ Yrs
Inter-State Banking
Dereg. Fwd. 1-2 Yrs
Inter-State Banking;
Dereg. Lag 0-1 Yr
Inter-State Banking;
Dereg. Lag 2-3 Yrs
Inter-State Banking






























































Notes: Panel estimations consider log counts of out-of-state banks taken from the LBD for 1977-1998. Commercial banks are defined as firms
in SIC 602 (1987 classification). Home state for a bank is defined through the bank's primary state in its first year of operation. See Table 3 for
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Entrepreneurs: Evidence from the
Indian Software Industry1
3.1 Introduction
In developing countries, institutions that facilitate the formation and growth of new businesses
are either weak, or completely missing. Entrepreneurs based in developing countries therefore
use a number of strategies to overcome these weaknesses, including a greater reliance on in-
formal networks to help conduct business (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Rauch and Casella,
2001; Banerjee and Munshi, 2004). One set of informal networks that has received particular
attention in recent years is diaspora, or cross-border networks, constituted by ties between ex-
patriates from developing countries who are based abroad and entrepreneurs who live at 'home'.
Several recent studies have shown that these cross-border networks seem to foster innovation
1This paper is coauthored with Tarun Khanna. We are extremely grateful to Kiran Karnik and Sunil Mehta at
NASSCOM for allowing us to survey NASSCOM members for this research. This paper has benefited from very
helpful discussions with Abhijit Banerjee, Kevin Boudreau, Rodrigo Canales, Sylvain Chassang, Bob Gibbons,
Bill Kerr, Asim Ijaz Khwaja, Nico Lacetera, Karim Lakhani, Rafel Lucea, Antoinette Schoar and Jordan Siegel.
We also wish to thank the participants of the MIT Development Economics lunch, MIT Strategy Seminar, MIT
Organizational Economics Lunch and the HBS International Seminar for their comments on early stages of this
research. All errors are our own.
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and entrepreneurship in the home country by acting as a conduit through which technology,
capital and business leads are transferred to entrepreneurs (Saxenian 2002, 2006; Rauch 2001,
McCormick and Wahba 2001; Kerr 2005), and that these in turn help increase bilateral trade
with developed nations where the expatriates are based (Rauch 1999, 2001; Rauch and Casella
2001; Rauch and Trindade 2002) and also impact economic growth (Kerr 2005).
Although these papers provide compelling support for the importance of cross-border ethnic
networks, and offer the possibility that developing countries could tap into their diaspora to
overcome weak or missing institutions, we still know very little about the composition and
the structure of these cross-border ties. Understanding the micro-foundations of these ties
between local entrepreneurs and the diaspora is not only key to better developed theories of
these diaspora networks, but also of great importance to policy makers interested in leveraging
their countries' diasporas to help with development.
In this paper, we address three questions relating to ties between local entrepreneurs and
the diaspora that help to shed light on the micro-foundations of these networks. First, do en-
trepreneurs vary in their reliance on the diaspora based on the availability of local networking
opportunities? For example, do entrepreneurs based in hubs - where local networking oppor-
tunities are plentiful because of a high concentration of firms in a given industry - rely on the
diaspora differently than entrepreneurs based outside hubs? Second, is relying on the diaspora
related to systematic differences in 'real' outcomes at the firm level? That is, do entrepreneurs
who rely on the diaspora have better performing firms? Third, are these networks composed
of links between people from the same family or ethnicity, or are they based on professional
contacts that are unrelated to familial or ethnic ties?
We build a model of diaspora networks to study these issues, and in particular to examine
how the local networking environment of an entrepreneur might affect her networking strategy
as well as her firm's revenue. We then use original data, collected through a survey sent to the
CEO's of all member firms of NASSCOM - India's primary software association - to test our
model2 . To our knowledge, this is the first such systematic study of individual entrepreneurs
2NASSCOM (the National Association of Software and Service companies) is the primary business association
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in India's software and services industry and therefore our findings on the backgrounds of the
entrepreneurs and performance of their firms should also be of broader interest to those studying
software and services firms in India.
We find that in fact, there is substantial variation in the reliance on diaspora networks
across the CEOs in our sample. Entrepreneurs based outside software hubs - in cities with
fewer local networking opportunities - rely substantially more on diaspora networks than those
based in hubs. Moreover, these networking strategies are also related to firm performance, and
even more so for entrepreneurs based outside hubs. That is, relying on diaspora networks has
a greater effect on firm performance for entrepreneurs based outside hubs than for those based
in hubs. We show that these results are consistent with a framework in which entrepreneurs
choose their optimal mix of local and diaspora ties based on the relative cost of accessing these
networks- and where expatriate networks serve as substitutes (rather than complements) to
the local networking environment. Although we cannot rule out all sources of endogeneity, we
provide a number of tests to check for specific alternative explanations. In particular, we show
that our results do not seem to be driven by omitted variables related to individual ability or
the networks that individuals may have been exposed to when they were growing up.
Finally we examine the extent to which the diaspora links are based on professional con-
tacts rather than ethnic ties. We find that the benefits from the diaspora accrue most to
entrepreneurs who have previously lived abroad and returned to India, compared with those
who have not lived abroad. We find weaker evidence that individuals from certain ethnicities
benefit more from the diaspora, suggesting that in fact it is professional, rather than ethnic ties
that form the basis for these networks.
Our results therefore suggest that cross-border social networks are an important substitute
to formal institutions available in developing countries, but that these networks function pri-
marily through personal, rather than familial or community-based networks. These findings
also highlight that 'brain circulation', where individuals from developing countries who have
for the Software and Services Industry in India and estimates that its members account for about 90% of industry
revenues (www.nasscom.org)
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emigrated abroad return back to their home country, might be key for developing countries to
successfully tap into their diaspora.
3.2 Diasporas and Domestic Entrepreneurs
A growing literature spanning both Economics and Sociology has highlighted the important
role that informal networks play in firm-level outcomes. Studies looking at the role of informal
networks in overcoming 'weak institutional environments' have shown their ability to transfer
reputation by association in contexts where such information may be hard to gather, (Uzzi,
1996), to help generate leads to new businesses as well reinforce agglomeration economies within
a region (Sorenson and Audia, 2000; Figueiredo, Guimaraes and Woodward, 2002). In addition
to studies on local or regional networks, several recent studies looking at cross-border networks
have also found that reliance on expatriate networks seems to be vital in overcoming information
barriers in cross-border business (Rauch, 2001, Saxenian 2002, 2006) and an important factor
in driving knowledge transfer across countries (Saxenian 2002, 2005, 2006; Kerr, 2005).
However, prior research has not focused on the interaction between entrepreneurs' reliance
on local and cross-border networks. That is, do some entrepreneurs in the 'home' countries
benefit more from relying on expatriate networks - and is this related to their access to local
networks? On the one hand, several accounts of the links between Silicon Valley and software
hubs in China and Taiwan (e.g. Saxenian and Li, 2003) suggest that complementarity between
local and expatriate networks may well be at play in developing countries. In such a case, an
entrepreneur's productivity from networking with the diaspora is enhanced if she has access
to strong local networks and in turn, the benefits from local networks are greater if the en-
trepreneur has more ties to the diaspora. Thus those who live in hubs will benefit more from
the diaspora than those who live in smaller cities. On the other hand, if diaspora networks
serve as substitutes to help overcome weaknesses in the local networking environment (Rauch
2001), then entrepreneurs living outside hubs will benefit more relying on the diaspora.
The Indian software industry provides an ideal setting to study how entrepreneurs in a de-
veloping country might rely on diaspora networks. First, the vast majority of software business
is conducted for clients outside India. Since output of software products and services is often
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hard to specify in advance or verify easily, and cross-border formal contracts are extremely hard
to enforce, 'relational contracting' is especially important to generate business in this industry.
While firms in the Indian software industry have been documented to use a number of formal
mechanisms to overcome hurdles to business generation - such as the use of quality certifica-
tions (Arora et al 2001) or choice of contract structure (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000) - anecdotal
accounts suggest that expatriate networks have played an important role in generating business
and getting access to capital for entrepreneurs in India, specially because the industry is highly
export oriented3 . Our own discussions with entrepreneurs in India supported this view, with
many entrepreneurs telling us that particularly in the early years of their company's existence,
their network of Indians living abroad was invaluable in generating new business for their firms.
Second, India provides a good setting for such a study because the Indian diaspora is both
extensive and varied, estimated at over 18 million people spanning 130 countries (Khanna and
Nanda, 2005). A significant portion of the diaspora is composed of highly-skilled immigrants
who maintain strong ties to their home country. For example, Saxenian's survey of Chinese
and Indian immigrant professionals in Silicon Valley found that 80% of the Indian respondents
exchanged information on American jobs or business opportunities with people in India, 67%
served as an advisor or helped to arrange business contracts and 18% invested their own money
in start-ups or venture funds in India (Saxenian 2002).
Third, Indians from different regions in the country have different (and distinguishable) last
names so that it is possible to analyze whether people of different ethnicities - from different
regions of the country - rely on the diaspora to different extents. This allows us to study the
extent to which ties between domestic entrepreneurs and the diaspora are based on ethnicity,
rather than 'professional contacts'.
Finally, software firms in India are spread across a number of cities with varying degrees of
formal networking opportunities available to entrepreneurs. One of the primary modes of formal
networking available to India's software entrepreneurs are conferences and seminars organized
by NASSCOM - both for its members to network with each other, and to provide them exposure
3Devesh Kapur (2001) provides numerous examples where the Diasporas from developing countries have
played a role in either enhancing or vouching for the reputation of businesses in developing countries.
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to potential clients. As can be seen from Table 1A, these conferences are run across a number of
cities in India, but a large fraction of them are situated in one of the software hubs. This gives
firms based in hubs an important advantage in terms of local networking. In addition to easy
access to potential clients, hubs also offer other networking advantages to entrepreneurs - they
have a large pool of local businessmen to network with by virtue of agglomeration economies,
they allow firms that don't directly compete with each other to collaborate on marketing efforts,
and they further facilitate meetings with potential clients who can stop by to visit local firms
located close to other companies they have business with. Firms located outside hubs have far
less access to these domestic networking channels and entrepreneurs located in these cities must
either look to contacts located in hubs, or those living abroad to compensate for the lack of local
networking opportunities. Since Indian cities vary considerably in terms of their concentration
of software firms and hence local networking opportunities for entrepreneurs, this provides us
with a natural testing ground to examine whether the local networking environment of cities is
related to entrepreneurs' reliance on diaspora networks.
3.3 A Model of Diaspora Networks
In order to guide the interpretation of our results, we develop a simple model to examine how
entrepreneurs' location might affect the extent to which they rely on local or expatriates and
how this in turn would impact their firm's performance. In addition, we look at how individual
attributes, such as entrepreneurs' prior career experiences (or ethnicity) might mediate these
results.
In our model, revenue for entrepreneurs' firms is based on the extent to which they net-
work locally or with the diaspora. Entrepreneurs choose the 'optimal investment' in local
and diaspora networks in order to maximize firm revenue, a choice that is based on (1) each
entrepreneur's own relative costs of accessing local and diaspora networks and (2) a parame-
ter, constant across all entrepreneurs, that determines the extent to which local and diaspora
networks serve as complements rather than substitutes. As we show in our model, the op-
timal investment in diaspora networks for a given entrepreneur varies considerably based on
the extent to which the two sets of networks serve as complements rather than substitutes.
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This allows us to generate specific predictions on the strength of diaspora networks, as well as
firm performance for entrepreneurs based on different levels of complementarity of these net-
works. We then take these predictions to the data, gathered through a survey sent to domestic
entrepreneurs, in order to shed light on which predictions fit best with the data.
3.3.1 Setup
The setup of the model is as follows: We consider a static economic environment consisting
of I entrepreneurs who are located among J cities. Each city j is characterized by its 'cost
of local networking' CL which captures the ease with which individuals based in that city are
able network to gain critical information for their business. The lower CL is, the easier it is
to effectively network. We assume that all individuals in a given city j face the same cost of
local networking, so that the cost of local networking for an individual i, CLj E [0 1] is identical
within cities, but differs for individuals located in different cities.
While the environment of a city imposes some constraints on the ability of an entrepreneur
to network locally, their cost of networking is also affected by their prior career histories. In
particular, some entrepreneurs may already have an established informal network of contacts
that can help with leads to new business and other critical information for their startup. In the
highly export oriented software industry, one such very useful informal network is that of the
expatriate community. If, for example, an entrepreneur has lived abroad at some point prior
to starting their business, they will have built direct ties with the expatriate community and
hence find it easier to sustain, and rely on, such a network for their business. They may be also
connected to certain communities that make it easier for them to network abroad. We therefore
also model individuals based on how hard it is for them to access the expatriate network. Let
an individual's type be defined by their cost of accessing the expatriate community CE1 E [0 1]
In this framework, therefore, those whose cost of accessing the expatriate network is lower (say
because they have lived abroad) will have a lower CE. -
Revenue for entrepreneur i's firm, Yi is determined by (i) the extent to which she networks
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locally and with the diaspora 4 and (ii) by the firm's production function. We model firm
revenue using the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function. The CES
production function has the attractive property that inputs are treated as either complements,
or as substitutes depending on the parameters of the model. We can therefore model the
optimal combination of local and diaspora networking for a given entrepreneur depending on
the parameters of the model and generate testable hypotheses about how the relationship
between the local and diaspora networks would vary based on whether these networks serve as
complements or substitutes. More formally, let revenue for the entrepreneur i's firm, Yi be
modeled as:
1
Yi = A[9L7 + (1 - 9)E7]r (3.1)
where A captures all aspects of firm production that are not dealt with explicitly in this
model (and are normalized to 1) and Li and Ei represent the entrepreneur's degree of networking
with the local and the expatriate community, respectively. 0 and 7 are parameters in the
model and are constant across individuals. 0 E (0 1) determines the weight of each input in
determining revenue, and -oo < 7y < 1 determines the extent to which the inputs are treated
as complements or substitutes in the production function. When - = -oo the inputs serve as
perfect complements; This is, the isoquants are 'L' shaped, so that individuals want to choose
inputs in equal proportions. When y = 1,the inputs serve as perfect substitutes. That is, the
isoquants are straight lines. The entrepreneur aims to maximize firm revenue subject to her
'budget constraint' imposed by the amount of time she can spend networking. For simplicity,
we assume that 0 = 1, so that domestic and expatriate networks contribute equally to firm
revenue5 . Thus, the entrepreneur's maximization problem can be written as:
1
max Yi[KiLL = [L7 + Efi] s.t. LiCL, + EiCE, <= T (3.2)
where, as above, CLi and CEi are the cost of networking locally and with the expatriate commu-
nity respectively, and T is the fixed amount of time each day that can be spent on networking.
4For the purposes of this model, we normalize all other factors contributing to revenue to 1. In the empirical
analysis we control explicitly for several firm-specific attributes.
5Note that the value of 0 does not substantively affect the results.
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Note that we assume that in this static framework CLj and CE, are fixed for a given individ-
ual6 . Entrepreneurs therefore choose to allocate their networking time between the local and
expatriate market in such a way that it maximizes firm revenue given the cost of accessing the
local and expatriate network. By solving the entrepreneur's maximization problem in (3.2),
we can derive the optimal level of local and expatriate networking for individual i given y and
costs CL, and CE·. Solving this, we get that:
1 1
T(CLJ)-1 a T(CE)YZ 1
L and E - (3.3)(C •T- 1 +- (C•iy -1 (C•)-1 + (C•i -
Substituting the values of L* and E* from (3.3) into (3.1), we can then solve for entrepreneur
i's firm revenue which is:
T (CL) T(Ei)i
+i 1[+- 1 1 (3.4)
3.3.2 Relative Strength of Diaspora Network
At the optimal level of local and expatriate networking, we can calculate the ratio of the
expatriate to local network (that is, the relative strength or the reliance on the diaspora network)
by dividing the two terms in equation (3.3). This ratio, which we define as D* is:
1
D * (3.5)
The comparative statics on equation (3.5) yield the first set of testable predictions in our
model. We examine how the relative strength of the diaspora network varies by individuals
based in cities with different costs of local networking, and by their individual attributes. In
particular, since entrepreneurs based in hubs have a lower cost of local networking, and certain
6 Clearly both the location decisions and career paths of individuals are endogenous in the long run and thus
can be chosen by entrepreneurs. However, we treat them (and hence CL and CE ) as fixed for the purposes of
this static model. We examine the implication of relaxing this assumption in Section 4.
122
entrepreneurs (such as those who have previously lived abroad) have a lower cost of accessing
the expatriate network, we have the following two claims:
Claim 3.1 D!* is decreasing in CEi. That is, the Relative Strength of the diaspora network will
be less for entrepreneurs whose cost of accessing the diaspora network is high.
Claim 3.2 D* is increasing in CL,. That is, the Relative Strength of the diaspora network will
be greater for entrepreneurs based outside Hubs.
The results of both these Claims follow from equation (3.5), where it can be seen that
S> 0 and -•D  < 0.
We now examine the more interesting question of whether an individual's attributes interact
with their local environment in determining their reliance on the diaspora. That is, we examine
whether the difference in reliance on diaspora networks between those with different costs of
accessing the diaspora, also varies by the city in which they are located. To do so, we look at
the cross partials of equation (3.5). Note that:
1
S-- (- ) CE - and (3.6)
OCE I -1) E CLj
02D* 0 2 D* 1 CE --i - - o - CEi (3.7)9CE0 CL CL0CE ( - 1)2CECL CL" 3
The results from equation(3.7) lead to the following two claims:
82D*Claim 3.3 lim--,_o, D = 0, V y $ 0;
Claim 3.4 a20 < 0; V s.t. 0 < - < 1
It can be seen from equation (3.7) that as 7 - -oo, the cross partials tend towards 0
irrespective of the value of CE and CL. The intuition behind this result is that as domestic and
expatriate networks tend towards being perfect complements, entrepreneurs want to combine
them in equal proportions regardless of their cost of accessing these networks. Hence even if
entrepreneurs have a very high cost of accessing the diaspora they will attempt to have some
diaspora ties, so that the more E and L are complements, the less the difference in the strength
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of diaspora networks for people in different cities and different costs of accessing the expatriate
network. Note, however, that although the relative strength of the networks will be the same
in each of these cases, the absolute strength of both expatriate and local networks will be much
greater for those in Hubs (driven by the lower cost of networking in hubs). This will lead to
better firm performance for entrepreneurs based in Hubs. We return to this in more detail in
Claim 6 below.
As y -- 1 so that E and L function more as substitutes, a change in CE has a stronger effect
on Di when CL is large than when it is small. That is, differences in the cost of accessing the
expatriate network (such as when an individual has lived abroad vs. not) have a much greater
impact on the relative strength of the diaspora network in small cities than in hubs. The
intuition for this result is that when these networks serve substitutes, the relative mix between
local and expatriate networks has less of an impact on firm performance. Hence entrepreneurs
will choose their optimal mix of local and expatriate networks based on their cost of accessing
these networks. Since the cost of local networking is higher outside hubs, those who have
a low cost of accessing the expatriate network but live outside hubs will rely much more on
expatriates than those who have a low cost of accessing expatriates but live in hubs (since the
latter entrepreneurs can also access the local network at a low cost).
In order to show these difference graphically, we plot simulated values of - in Figure 1A
and lB. The charts plot the ratio of the external to the local network as a function of the ease
of local networking when the networks serve as complements vs. substitutes. It can be seen that
when E and L are substitutes (Figure 1B), there is a strong effect of the interaction between an
individuals background and their local networking environment; when there are complements
(Figure 1A), the effect is close to zero.
3.3.3 Networking Strategy and Firm Revenue
We now turn to the effect that the relative prices, CE and CL and the parameter y have on
firm revenue. Although the optimal mix of diaspora and local networking for the entrepreneur
(i.e. the 'networking strategy') maximizes firm revenue for a given entrepreneur, it can be seen
from equation (3.4) that different costs of accessing the local and expatriate networks will lead
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to different optimal combinations of the networks, and hence will also affect the absolute level
of firm revenue. We therefore examine this relationship between networking strategy and Firm
Revenue in this section.
Claim 3.5 Y, is decreasing in CE V Y 0 and 7 < 1. That is, other things being equal,
entrepreneurs who have a low cost of accessing the diaspora have higher firm revenue
Claim 3.6 Yi is decreasing in CL V Y # 0 and y < 1. That is, other things being equal, firms
in hubs have higher revenue.
To see this, note that
c -T (CE) (CL) + (CE,)7] < 0 and (3.8)
OYi - I + 1--2
-CL T(CL,)-- [( CEi)-T+(c y < 0 (3.9)
The intuition of these results is simple. Since a higher cost of networking 'inputs' leads to
a fall in the inputs used, output - that is firm revenue, will be lower too.
As with the strength of the diaspora networks, we now examine whether those who have
different costs of accessing the diaspora have different firm revenue based on the city in which
they live. To do so, we look at the cross partials of equation (3.4), which are:
02yi 2yi T(1 -27)(CECL)T [(CL~) (CEiJ')r
- - -(3.10)
OCEOCL - OCLCE (Y - 1) (3.10)
This leads to the following Claim:
Claim 3.7
0< O Vy s.t - oo < < 0.5 and -7#0
CE CL -- 0 for 7 = 0.5 (3.11)
> 0 V7y s.t 0. 5 < < 1
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That is, when -y < 0.5, being able to access the diaspora cheaply increases revenue more in
hubs that outside hubs. However, when 0.5 < y < 1, being able to access the diaspora cheaply
increases revenue more outside hubs that in hubs. To see why this is the case, recall that when
the networks serve as complements, entrepreneurs want to combine the networks in close to
equal proportions. In hubs, those who have a low cost of accessing the diaspora have a low
cost of accessing both networks and hence their 'stock' of inputs is very high - those who live in
hubs but have a high cost of accessing the diaspora still need to network with the diaspora in
order for the complementarity of the networks to yield benefits. Thus although their relative
strength of the diaspora network is the same as those who have lived abroad, their stock of
both networks is lower. Hence their revenue is lower. The same is true for those who live
outside hubs, since they have a high cost of accessing at least one of the networks. Because of
this, the relative difference in the stock of networks for those who live in hubs is greater than
for those who live outside hubs. Hence a lower cost of accessing the diaspora has a stronger
effect on revenue for entrepreneurs based in hubs than those based outside hubs.
The opposite is true when 0.5 < ' < 1. When networks serve as substitutes, being able to
rely on the diaspora can help overcome a poor local networking environment. So entrepreneurs
outside hubs who have a low cost of accessing the diaspora can make up for this weakness by
relying more on the diaspora. The relative gains to relying on the diaspora are much greater
outside hubs than in hubs, where the strong local networking conditions don't give those with a
low cost of diaspora access a much greater advantage. Again, in order to show these difference
graphically, we plot simulated values of Y1* in Figure 2A and 2B. The charts plot simulated
firm revenue as a function of different costs of local networking. It can be seen that when E
and L are substitutes (Figure 2B), the difference between firm revenue for those who have lived
abroad and those who have not, is greater in cities with high costs of local networking, while if
E and L are complements (Figure 2A), then the difference is greater in hubs where there is a
low cost of local networking.
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3.3.4 Empirical Strategy
Given the Claims in the Section above, we run the following two regressions to operationalize the
model and test the relationships related to reliance on the diaspora network and firm revenue.
First we look at how firm location and individuals' attributes are related to their reliance on
the diaspora by estimating the regression:
Ei 1 1 1Di = ( ) = ao + OFa•L- ~ + 3  1 ) +  Xi + Ei (3.12)Li CLi CE2  (CLi * CE)
where CLi and CEi are defined as before. Hence 1is the degree to which the city in which
the individual lives has strong local networking opportunities, C is a variable that captures
the ease with which an individual can access expatriate networks and Xi is a matrix of other
individual-, firm- and city- level controls. The fourth term in equation (3.12) is the interaction
between 1 and 1 and therefore captures whether easier access to the diaspora has a different
effect on diaspora reliance for entrepreneurs based in hubs compared to those who are not.
In the second regression, we look at how these same variables are related to the en-
trepreneur's firm revenue, by estimating:
1 1 1
Yi = o + 01- + (2 * +3 + PXi + (i (3.13)CLi CE, (CLi * CE)
Based on the Claims from the model in the section above, we can make specific predictions
about the coefficients in equations (3.12) and (3.13). In particular, note that since ' < 0
(Claim 1) and 9D > 0 (Claim 2) we should expect a 2 > 0 and al < 0. Similarly since <0
(Claim 5) and y < 0 (Claim 6) we should expect /2 > 0 and Q1 > 0. Our predictions on
the coefficients a3 and 33 depend on the value of - that is, whether the diaspora functions
as a substitute or complement to local networking opportunities.
Recall from equation (3.7) that the interaction between the cost of local and foreign net-
working has a different effect on the relative strength of the diaspora network for different values
of 'y. Since 7 is unobserved, but we have proxies for the other parameters in the model, the
value of a 3 in equation (3.12) can therefore help to shed light on extent to which 3Y treats the
inputs as complements rather than substitutes. Similarly, the value of 33 in equation (3.13)
127
sheds light on the extent to which ^y treats the inputs in equation (3.10) as complements rather
than substitutes. In the table below we summarize the predicted sign we expect to see on as
depending on whether the inputs serve as complements or substitutes (based on Claim 3 and
Claim 4) . Similarly, based on Claim 7, we summarize the predicted sign we expect to see on
33 in each case.
Predicted Sign
Parameter Complements Substitutes
a3  = 0 <0
133 > 0 <0
Note that regressions (3.12) and (3.13) therefore also impose two sets of checks on the
consistency of our theoretical model. First, we have specific predictions for the coefficients
al, a2, ,1 and 02 that provide a consistency check on the framework of our theoretical model.
Second, we look at whether two different estimations of the extent to which the networks serve
as complements vs. substitutes -through the coefficients a3 and P3 - are also consistent with
each other. That is, we want to make sure that if equation (3.12) implies that the networks
function as substitutes, then equation (3.13) implies the same as well. Before turning to the
results in Section 5, we outline the data that we use for this study.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Survey Design and Implementation:
In November 2004, we administered a survey to the CEOs of all member-firms of the main
industry associations for Indian Software Industry: the National Association of Software and
Service companies, or NASSCOM. NASSCOM has approximately 900 members that represent
over 90% of the revenues of the Indian software industry, making it a very attractive sample
of firms to study. Moreover, since statistics on India's software industry are generally based on
data gathered from NASSCOM's member firms, this sample also provides a useful comparison
and complement to other studies on the software industry in India (Athreye, 2005).
There are two limitations to this sample that are important to bear in mind when inter-
preting the results. First, NASSCOM member firms constitute a much smaller fraction (about
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30%) of total firms in the industry. Given that they account for 90% of the industry's revenues,
these are therefore among the largest and perhaps more successful firms in the industry. Sec-
ond, membership to NASSCOM is voluntary and therefore raises an important concern about
selection bias, in that the sample of the firms that choose to become members of NASSCOM
might be different from those that choose not to. Since some of the important benefits of
NASSCOM membership are greater visibility - through listings in the directory of members
and various networking events - and the ability to lobby government, it is quite likely that the
firms that choose to incur the costs of membership are the ones that are ambitious to grow
their businesses and be part of the community of higher-profile firms in the industry. Although
this would of course lead to a selection bias in the population that we study, it is also a pop-
ulation of firms that might most want to leverage a network such as the diaspora, making it
an attractive sample examine variation within this group of entrepreneurs. In addition, larger
firms in the industry would tend to be less constrained by weak networking institutions and
thus any effect that we see along these lines might be thought of as a 'lower bound' to the types
of constraints that may be faced by firms that are smaller, and less reputable than NASSCOM
members. Nevertheless, these two limitations to the sample are important to bear in mind
when interpreting the results.
The survey was administered online, after significant work in designing and pre-testing
both the questions and the web-interface. It included a number of questions relating to the
respondents' background, such as their prior education, work experience and the time they had
spend living or working outside India. In addition, the survey included questions relating to
their sources of funding and their most important business contacts in India and abroad. To our
knowledge, this is the first such systematic study of entrepreneurs in India's software industry.
We received 218 responses from the 920 emails sent out, which is a response rate of approx-
imately 24%. After removing expatriate Indians and foreign CEOs were left with 207 responses
of which we have complete data for 182 . In Appendix 1, we report the breakdown of firms by
their city of location, firm age and firm size (number of employees), and compare these to data
7However, due to the fact that private firms often do not share their revenue data, we have revenue data for
only 111 firms
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we have on entire population of NASSCOM member firms. As can be seen from these tables,
the firms in our sample are very representative of the population of NASSCOM members along
these observable metrics.
3.4.2 Main Variables:
As shown in equations (3.12) and (3.13), our main dependent variables of interest are (1) The
strength of the diaspora network and (2) Entrepreneurs' firm Revenue. Operationalizing the
strength of an individual's reliance on diaspora is difficult. In order to do so, we asked the
respondents to list up to top 5 business contacts (not in their firm or paid consultants) who they
had consulted in the previous three months for client leads, business generation and matters
relating to their firm's business. For each of these 5 contacts, we asked the respondents to list
the city in which the contact was based, and whether the person was of Indian origin. We
then coded those members of the network who were of Indian origin but lived outside India
as being part of the Indian diaspora. Although this measure, which we call DIASPORAi
does not capture the strength of the entire diaspora network, it does proxy for reliance on the
diaspora through the importance that CEOs place on their diaspora network.8 We also asked
founder-CEOs about their sources of start-up capital, and the fraction of this that came from
abroad. As a alternative measure of reliance on the diaspora therefore, we also look at the
share of start-up capital for these entrepreneurs' firms that came from abroad. We call this
variable FOREIGNFRACi.
Many, but not all firms, report their revenue to NASSCOM as part of secondary data that
the association collects from its members. We use revenue data that NASSCOM collected from
its member firms for fiscal 2004 for this study. Our dependent variable for equation (3.13), is
the log of revenue in Million Rupees, and is coded as LOGREVi.
As shown in equations (3.12) and (3.13), our main right-hand-side variables are (1) the
ease of local networking opportunities available to entrepreneurs in each city and (2) the ease
8We also cross-checked this measure with two other questions - one that asked respondents whether they had
ever used a contact who was Indian and based abroad for help with generating leads for their business. (The
correlation with this measure was 0.14 and significant at 5%) The second measure asked them the fraction of
their overall network that was composed of Indians based outside India. (The correlation with this measure was
0.39 and signficant at 0.1%)
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with which entrepreneurs can access the diaspora. We proxy local networking opportunities
by looking at networking events organized by NASSCOM for their members in the two years
prior to our study, and look at the share of these events that were held in each of the cities in
our sample. We call this variable NETWORKSHARE and use it to operationalize the ease
of local networking in each city. As a robustness check, we also look at the city's share of
all software firms to provide a measure of localization - that might also drive the ease of local
networking. This second measure is based on data gathered from the Software Technology
Parks of India 9 and therefore constitutes the universe of software firms in the country, not just
the larger firms that are NASSCOM members. We call this variable LOCALIZATION. As
can be seen from Table IB, our two variables are correlated at 74%.
In order to operationalize the ease of accessing the diaspora, we create a dummy variable that
takes a value of 1 if the respondent had lived abroad for at least one year prior to their current
job (either as a student or for work). Our premise here is that since individuals who have lived
abroad will have developed direct links to expatriates based abroad, this would make it easier
for them to network with the diaspora. We call this variable LIVED ABROAD. In addition,
we code the ethnicity of each entrepreneur based on their last name, using the 'Encyclopaedia
of Indian Surnames' (Roy and Rizvi, 2002). Based on these codings, we create several dummy
variables to represent the region of the country to which the entrepreneur belongs. We then
check whether any of these is associated with a greater reliance on the diaspora.
We have a number of variables to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the individual,
firm and city level. At the individual level, we control for the CEO's age, their educational back-
ground (as a proxy for human capital and 'ability') and whether they are the firm's founders.
At the firm level, we control for the firm's age and size (in terms of number of employees), its
business line(s), whether the firm is a subsidiary of an Indian or Multinational firm, whether it
has a foreign office or is part of joint venture. Finally, at the city level, we control for the city's
population density and the share of total software exports from India that are constituted by
the firms in that city. Each of these variables, and their sources are outlined in Appendix 2.




In Table 2 we report t-test of how reliance on the diaspora and some of the main control
variables vary by firms located in hubs vs those located outside hubs. As can be seen from
Table 2, respondents and firms across hubs and non-hubs are very similar along demographic
and educational characteristics. However, CEOs based outside hubs are much more likely to
have one of their top contacts based outside India (55% compared to 44%). In addition, they
are more likely to have one of their top contacts from the diaspora (36% compared to 23%).
These numbers show another interesting fact - that within the group of contacts outside India,
CEOs based outside hubs are more likely to rely on the diaspora. (65% of the their top foreign
contacts are of Indian origin, compared to 52% for CEOs located in hubs).
In Figures 3A, and 3B, we break provide more detail on the relationship between the city
in which entrepreneurs are located and both their reliance on the diaspora and their firm's
revenue. Figure 3A plots the share of top contacts that are from the diaspora for each city,
comparing these fractions for entrepreneurs who have lived abroad vs. those who have not. As
can be seen from Figure 3A, entrepreneurs who have lived abroad and now live outside hubs
use the diaspora much more than those who have not lived abroad and live outside hubs. This
difference is not present for entrepreneurs living in hubs. Comparing Figure 3 to Figures 1A
and 1B, it can be seen that it maps closely to the lower panel (Figure 1B) - suggesting that in
fact these networks function as substitutes rather than complements.
Figure 3B plots firms revenue for each city, based on whether the entrepreneurs have lived
abroad or not. As can be seen from Figure 3B, the difference in firms performance between
those who have lived abroad and not is much greater outside hubs than in hubs. Again,
comparing this results with the simulated results in Figures 2A and 2B, it can be seen that the
findings are consistent with the lower panel - suggesting that in this case too the networks are
seen to function as substitutes rather than complements.
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3.5.2 Main Results
Although suggestive of our findings, the results shown in Figures 3A and 3B are only bivariate
comparisons. In Tables 3 and 4, we therefore, report results from multivariate regressions,
controlling for observable covariates at the individual, firm and city level. Table 3 reports
the results of Tobit Regressions where the dependent variable is the share of the CEO's top 5
contacts that are from the diaspora. That is, we operationalize equation (3.12) by running the
regression:
DIASPORAi = ao + alNETWORKSHAREi + a2LIVEDABROADi (3.14)
+a3(NETWORKSHAREi * LIVEDABROADi) + @Xi + ei
where ei are clustered at the city level. As can be seen from Table 3, consistent with Claim 1,
a2 > 0, so that CEOs who have lived abroad rely on the diaspora more. Moreover, consistent
with Claim 2, al < 0, so that CEOs based in hubs rely less on the diaspora (although this is not
statistically significant in the later models). Finally, similar to the results in Figure 3A, CEOs
who have lived abroad and are based outside hubs use the diaspora the most, that is as < 0
consistent with the view that diaspora networks function as substitutes to the local networking
opportunities of entrepreneurs. These results are robust to the inclusion of Individual, Firm-
level and City-level covariates into regressions.
In Table 4, we report results from both OLS and quantile regressions where the dependent
variable is the Log of Firm Revenue in 2004. That is, we operationalize equation (3.13) by
running the regression:
LOGREVi = o0 + 3lNETWORKSHARE1 +/32LIVEDABROADi (3.15)
+3 3(NETWORKSHAREi * LIVEDABROADi) + 4Xi + (
Again, as with Figure 3B and consistent with the view that local and diaspora networks are
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substitutes, we find that /33 < 0. That is, the benefit from 'cheaper' access to the diaspora is
greater for firms outside hubs than in hubs. We also find that Claims 5 and 6 are supported,
in that that both 01 and /2 are positive so that firms based in hubs have higher revenue, and
the firms for CEOs who have lived abroad have higher revenue. In Table 4B, we run quantile
regressions to make sure the results are not being driven by outliers.
3.5.3 Robustness Checks
Given that we only have cross-sectional data, we cannot rule out all omitted variables, but in
the following sections we look at alternative measures of our variables, and also try to explicitly
test some potential counter-explanations for our findings.
Alternate Measure of Reliance on the diaspora
In Table 5, we look at a second measure of the reliance on the diaspora - the share of for-
eign funding that the founders received from abroad. That is we re-run equation (3.14) with
FOREIGNFRACi as the dependent variable. As with Table 3, we find that those who have
lived abroad but live outside hubs have the highest fraction of foreign funding. This result
suggests that the reliance on diaspora for capital follows a similar mechanism as the reliance on
the diaspora for leads. It is the entrepreneurs based in small cities who have access to diaspora
who tap into it for both leads and capital.
Alternate Measure of Local Networking Opportunities
In Table 6A and 6B we look at our second measure of the cost of local networking in each city
the fraction of firms in the software Industry that are located in that city. Note that this
fraction is based on data from the Software Technology Parks of India (STPI) that comprise
approximately 3,000 software firms (much larger than the 900 firms that are members of NASS-
COM). We re-run equations (3.14) and (3.15) using this second measure, LOCALIZATION
instead of NETWORKSHARE. As can be seen from Tables 6A and 6B, the coefficients on
both regressions are again consistent with our theoretical model and again imply that local
networks and diaspora networks serve as substitutes, rather than complements.
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Alternate Measure of Access to diaspora
In Tables 7 we look at the alternative measures of access to the diaspora. We use the surnames
of the CEOs to code their ethnicity, using the Encyclopaedia of Indian Surnames (Roy and
Rizvi, 2002)10 and add these dummies as explanatory variables in regression (3.14). As can be
seen from tables 7 the results are mixed. We find some evidence that North Indians use the
diaspora more, and that North Indians based in hubs use the diaspora less than North Indians
based outside hubs. This is exactly consistent with the results in Tables 3 and 511. However,
these results are not present for any of the other ethnicities 12
Although the results are mixed, the fact that these results are present for at least one
ethnicity suggests that living abroad does capture a substantive element related to the ease of
accessing the diaspora and is not just reflecting an omitted variable (such as individual ability).
We find further evidence suggesting that it is primarily personal, rather than ethnic ties
that seem to be driving access to the diaspora by looking at the sources of capital for founders.
Family and friends contributed on average 15% of the startup capital, compared with 35% from
the founders themselves, 20% from business partners, and 30% from institutional sources such
as banks, VCs and Angel Investors. The share of funds from abroad that family and friends
contributed was even smaller. Again, this suggests that the locus of diaspora benefits lie with
those who have personal, rather than ethnic ties to the diaspora.
Weak Institutions or Weak Entrepreneurs?
A potential concern with our results is that they are driven by unobserved individual ability, in
that "weaker entrepreneurs" might settle in smaller cities and also rely more on the diaspora.
loIndian surnames are extremely informative, with information on an individual's religion, caste and the region
to which they belong. Marriage is very often within these ethnic boundaries defined by the surnames, particularly
so before the 1960 and 1970s when our respondents' parents were married. This is thus a (potentially noisy)
but still informative signal of an individual's ethnicity.
11The most common Indian surnames in the US are from the North, and West of India suggesting that North
Indians might have easier access to the Diaspora (source: Indian News Editor, 100 Top Indian Surnames from
US Census)
12We also cross-check our results by constructing an index of the number of people living in the US with the
same last name as each of our respondents (using an online database with updated telephone records across the
US). These results, not reported, are consistent with our findings reported in Table 7
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Our regression results suggest that this is not the case. First, we control for individual ability
using a dummy of whether the CEO went to IIT. This seems to be a good measure of individual
ability, in that entrepreneurs who went to IIT perform better on average that those who didn't
(see results in Table 8B). Yet, entrepreneurs who went to IIT don't use the diaspora less,
or place less importance on their diaspora networks. In fact, the coefficients suggest that if
anything they use the diaspora more (though not significant)13
Secondly, we re-run regression (3.12), substituting the local networking opportunities in
their current city, with a dummy that is equal to one if the high school they went to was a hub.
These results are reported in Table 8A. We find that the high-school that the entrepreneurs
went to has no effect on their reliance on the diaspora, suggesting that the location of the
cities in which they grew up is not a driver of their reliance on the diaspora. To the extent
that individuals who grew up in smaller cities did not have access to the same education, or
networks, or have the same exposure to the diaspora, we do not find any difference in the extent
to which they rely on the diaspora. Thus it is not where entrepreneurs grew up, but where
they currently live that is related to their choice of networks.
Other Issues
While it may be possible that there are unobservables between hub and non hub based software
firms that might account for latter's greater use of diaspora, we note that we have controlled
for several observable factors that would be obvious candidates. We control for firms' business
line, whether they are headquartered outside India, whether they have a joint venture, or are
a subsidiary of a multinational firm. We also explicitly control for the export intensity of
the city, as well as the city's population. While we cannot control for the individual firm's
export intensity, note, however, that unobserved export intensity at the firm level (that may be
correlated with whether or not a city is a hub) will not in itself account for our results. Our
results are based on an interaction between the prior career histories of individuals and their
location.
13We also do not find that the distribution of individuals who went to IIT varies consistently by their location
suggesting that at least on this observable measure of individual ability, there is no sorting by cities
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It is possible that our results may be driven by selection: that is, since it is harder to do
business in small cities, firms in small cities may be less likely to survive relative to firms in hubs,
unless they have access to diaspora networks. Since we only surveyed the CEOs of surviving
firms, the firms outside the hubs might be more likely to be ones where the CEOs relied on
the diaspora. While this explanation is plausible, and cannot be ruled out, it is equivalent to a
strong-version of model that we develop in that it is the entrepreneurs in small cities without
connections to the diaspora do so poorly that they are forced to shut down.
We also cannot distinguish the extent to which our results are driven by the location decision
of entrepreneurs. It is possible that individuals who have more diaspora connections, settle
in smaller cities precisely because they are less constrained in their location decisions. While
some of our discussions suggest that this might be the case, we do not find systematic evidence
of this in our qualitative discussions with entrepreneurs in the software industry.
The fact that we are finding consistent differences between entrepreneurs' location and firm
performance raises two important questions. First, what is it that makes the cost of local
networking for entrepreneurs based outside software hubs so high? Our discussions with the
entrepreneurs revealed substantial 'frictions' in networking opportunities of entrepreneurs based
outside hubs. Many entrepreneurs said they found it hard to break into the social networks in
hubs. Others told us that 'travelling all the way to Mumbai or Bangalore' was not worth it.
On the other hand, those in hubs such as Bangalore told us that it was very easy to network
locally. 'People just swing by' and 'walking into a hotel in Bangalore is just like walking into
a hotel in the US'.
The second question our results raise is why entrepreneurs do not all either locate their firms
in hubs or use the diaspora more intensively? There might be several explanations for this.
Previous studies on entrepreneurs' location decisions we find that there is significant 'inertia'
in choosing where to locate their business (Buenstof and Klepper 2005; Figueiredo, Guimaraes
and Woodward, 2000). Individuals have a strong preference for locating close to their family
home, or the city in which they grew up. We find this to be true in our data as well. We
heard quotes such as the following in our discussions with entrepreneurs: "being from South
India, I wanted to start my business here because of the familiarity" or "people prefer to start
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their business in their home town - it gives them a sense of familiarity". This pull towards the
family home often led entrepreneurs to locate outside hubs.
Why, then, do entrepreneurs in small cities not all rely more on the diaspora when the bene-
fits seem so large? Consistent with the estimates in the regressions, we find that entrepreneurs
who do not have strong ties to the diaspora find it hard to break into the diaspora networks.
Some entrepreneurs living in the smaller cities explicitly told us that they had a hard time
getting Indian expatriates to help them with business, and that they wished they had more
connections with the diaspora to help them sell business more aggressively.
3.6 Conclusions
While several recent studies on cross-border ethnic networks have highlighted the important
role that they might play in facilitating entrepreneurship in developing countries, little is known
about the extent to which domestic entrepreneurs rely on the diaspora and whether this varies
systematically by the characteristics of the entrepreneurs or their local business environment.
In this paper, we develop a model of diaspora networks, where individuals choose their optimal
mix of local and diaspora networking in order to maximize firm revenue. One key driver
of the optimal mix in our model is each entrepreneur's relative cost of local and expatriate
networking. Thus, individuals who live in hubs (where local networking is easy) have a different
share of expatriate networks from those living outside hubs; similarly those who have lived
abroad and have easier access to the diaspora have a different share of expatriate networks
than those who have not. A second key driver of the predictions in our model is the extent
to which diaspora networks serve as complements versus substitutes to the local networking
opportunities. Although the interaction between local and diaspora networks is unobserved,
we can shed light on the relationship by testing our model, using original data that we collected
through a survey of entrepreneurs in the Indian software industry.
We find that there is substantial variation in the extent to which domestic entrepreneurs rely
on diaspora networks, in a way that is consistent to the predictions of our model. Moreover, we
find that relying on the diaspora is related to firm performance, particularly so for entrepreneurs
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based outside hubs. These findings are consistent with a model where entrepreneurs choose
their networking strategy based on the relative costs of accessing each network, and where
diaspora networks serve as substitutes to the local business environment of entrepreneurs (rather
than as complements). Our findings also suggest that it is the entrepreneurs who have lived
abroad prior to founding their businesses who rely most on the diaspora, and that family (and
ethnic) ties are less important conduits for these cross-border diaspora networks.
Our findings therefore suggest that 'brain circulation' might be critical for developing coun-
tries to tap into their diaspora. These results are consistent with, and complementary to, the
findings of Agarwal, Kapur and McHale (2006) who also find that 'co-location and co-ethnicity
seem to substitute rather than complement each other in terms of knowledge flows'. These
results should also be of relevance to policy makers in developing countries aiming to leverage
their diasporas to help with domestic entrepreneurship. The implications of our findings is
that they may be better off developing links between the diaspora and smaller cities rather
than with hubs.
There are several avenues of further research that would be fruitful in shedding more light
on diaspora networks. First, our findings (and those of Agarwal, Kapur and McHale (2006))
are based on the Indian diaspora. It would be interesting to see whether these results are
similar for other countries such as China or Taiwan. Second, our results call for a deeper
understanding of the links between the location decisions of entrepreneurs and their reliance
on informal business networks such as the diaspora. Do individuals choose to locate outside
hubs because they have access to the diaspora, or do they reach out to the diaspora because
they are constrained by their location? Research in this area would also have implications
for studies that look at the origin and growth of agglomerations or clusters. Finally, our
finding that having lived abroad prior to working in India is an important factor predicting
reliance on the diaspora calls for a better understanding of brain circulation. In particular,
understanding what factors drive members of the diaspora to return their home country seems
like an important avenue for further research.
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TABLE 1A: MEASURES OF NETWORKING COST ACROSS CITIES
Share of NASSCOM Share of all Share of all
City Events Software Firms Software Exports Population Rank
Delhi 29% 9% 8% 3
Bangalore 19% 20% 35% 5
Mumbai 18% 17% 8% 1
Hyderabad 12% 11% 10% 5
Chennai 7% 11% 16% 4
Kolkata 3% 5% 2% 2
Pune 3% 6% 7% 8
Gurgaon 1% 6% 8% 152
Noida 1% 5% 4% 140
Other 0% 1% 1% 30
Note: "Other" cities include Ahmedabad, Bhubaneshwar, Chandigarh, Cochin, Comibatore, Indore, Jaipur, Nagpur,
Pondicherry, Raipur, Rajkot, Trivandrum, and Vadodara; Population Rank for these cities is average across all
Source: 2002-2003 NASSCOM Directories; Software Technology Parks of India Directories, Census of India


















TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS ON CEOs AND FIRMS BY FIRM LOCATION
Two-Tailed T-test for
Total Sample Software Hub I Non-Hub City 2  Equality in Means
Total Responses 207 140 67
Complete Responses 182 127 55
Firm Age (Years) 8.1 7.8 8.8 -0.96
Firm Size (Employees) 733 824 524 0.85
Firm Revenue (Million Rupees) 88 89 87 0.04
Fraction that are Subsidiaries of MNC or Indian 24% 26% 18% 1.13
Business Group
Age of CEO (Years) 43 42 44 -1.44
Fraction of CEOs who have lived abroad 58% 55% 64% -1.07
Fraction with a technical degree 54% 54% 55% -0.02
Fraction with an MBA 37% 36% 40% -0.48
Fraction who have studied at an I1T3  21% 23% 18% 0.69
Fraction who have studied at an IIM3  14% 13% 15% -0.2
Fraction of Top 5 Contacts based outside India 47% 44% 55% -1.99**
Fraction of Top 5 Contacts from Diaspora 27% 23% 36% -2.94***
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%
1: Coded as Hub if CEO is based in Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad, Mumbai or New Delhi
2: Coded as Non-Hub if CEO is based in Kolkata, Pune, Gurgaon, Noida or one of the "Other" Cities
3: IIT (Indian Institutes of Technology) and IIM (Indian Institutes of Management) are elite educational institutions in India
Source: Survey Data; Firm Revenue from NASSCOM
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TABLE 3: RELIANCE ON DIASPORA (Testing Equation 13)
Tobit Regressions: Dependent Variable is Fraction of Top 5 Contacts that are from Diaspora
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NETWORKSHARE -0.976*** -0.933*** -0.224 0.013 -0.064 -0.125
(0.340) (0.321) (0.521) (0.460) (0.497) (0.443)
LIVED ABROAD 0.078 0.234** 0.233*** 0.245** 0.243**
(0.065) (0.108) (0.089) (0.109) (0.111)
NETSHARE x LIVED ABROAD -1.213** -1.362*** -1.373** -1.354**
(0.557) (0.454) (0.565) (0.575)
CONSTANT 0.255*** 0.205** 0.11 -1.334*** -1.316*** -1.243***
(0.071) (0.081) (0.098) (0.370) (0.393) (0.377)
Individual-Level Covariates No No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Level Covariates No No No No Yes Yes
City-Level Covariates No No No No No Yes
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 19 cities in the sample
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: NETWORKSHARE (Share of NASSCOM conferences) measures the cost of local networking and correponds to the term HUB in
equation (8); LIVED ABROAD is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO has lived abroad to study or work for at least a year prior to working
at current job, and corresponds to the term ACCESS in equation (8). The interaction term in the table above correponds to the interaction term
in equation (8)
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TABLE 4A: FIRM REVENUE (Testing Equation 14)
OLS Regressions: Dependent Variable is Log Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NETWORKSHARE 1.813 2.373 7.013* 7.484** 4.465*** 3.918***
(2.160) (2.097) (3.551) (2.776) (0.742) (1.093)
LIVED ABROAD 0.369 1.377** 1.253* 0.669*** 0.714***
(0.453) (0.595) (0.597) (0.173) (0.205)
NETSHARE x LIVED ABROAD -7.371* -7.234* -4.660*** -4.950***
(4.029) (3.607) (1.453) (1.584)
CONSTANT 4.307*** 4.018*** 3.301"** -6.547** -5.162*** -4.808**
(0.337) (0.456) (0.487) (2.291) (1.575) (1.694)
Individual-Level Covariates No No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Level Covariates No No No No Yes Yes
City-Level Covariates No No No No No Yes
Observations 111 111 111 111 111 111
R^2 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.24 0.79 0.79
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by city
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 4B: FIRM REVENUE (Testing Equation 14)
Quantile Regressions: Dependent Variable is Log Revenue
OLS 0.25 0.5 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NETWORKSHARE 3.918*** 3.96 4.037** 4.918"***
(1.093) (2.809) (1.676) (1.811)
LIVED ABROAD 0.714*** 0.541 0.576 0.693*
(0.205) (0.616) (0.389) (0.350)
NETSHARE x LIVED ABROAD -4.950*** -3.693 -3.896* -4.023*
(1.584) (3.623) (2.194) (2.264)
CONSTANT -4.808** -5.322 -6.373 -2.865
(1.694) (6.881) (5.366) (1.837)
Individual-Level Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Level Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-Level Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 111 111 111 111
R^2 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79
Bootstrapped standard errors using 100 draws in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: NETWORKSHARE (Share of NASSCOM conferences) measures the cost of local networking and correponds to the term HUB in
equation (9); LIVED ABROAD is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO has lived abroad to study or work for at least a year prior to
working at current job, and corresponds to the term ACCESS in equation (9). The interaction term in the table above correponds to the
interaction term in equation (9)
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TABLE 5: ROBUSTNESS CHECK OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE IN EQUATION 13
OLS Regressions: Dependent Variable is Fraction of Foreign Funding for Startups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NETWORKSHARE -0.204 -0.109 0.627** 0.518 0.406 0.341
(0.405) (0.359) (0.260) (0.399) (0.395) (0.410)
LIVED ABROAD 0.205** 0.358*** 0.335*** 0.349*** 0.351***
(0.074) (0.102) (0.103) (0.086) (0.087)
NETSHARE x LIVED ABROAD -1.202* -1.086* -1.182** -1.221**
(0.582) (0.578) (0.485) (0.520)
CONSTANT 0.301*** 0.164** 0.066 0.459 0.415 0.377
(0.077) (0.063) (0.043) (0.973) (1.158) (1.172)
Individual-Level Covariates No No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Level Covariates No No No No Yes Yes
City-Level Covariates No No No No No Yes
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109
R^2 0 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.28 0.28
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by city
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note 1: The number of observations are less because not every CEO was a founder and hence did not have detailed information on the fraction of
startup capital came from abroad; We also omit all individuals who received start-up capital from parent companies
Note 2: NETWORKSHARE (Share of NASSCOM conferences) measures the cost of local networking; LIVED ABROAD is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the CEO has lived abroad to study or work for at least a year prior to working at current job, and measures the CEO's cost of accessing
the Diaspora
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TABLE 6A: ROBUSTNESS CHECK OF "HUB" MEASURE IN EQUATION 13
Tobit Regressions: Dependent Variable is Fraction of Top 5 Contacts that are from Diaspora
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LOCALIZATION -0.939** -0.892** 0.099 0.286 0.396 -0.069
(0.448) (0.408) (0.610) (0.572) (0.582) (0.716)
LIVED ABROAD 0.086 0.300** 0.282*** 0.334** 0.326**
(0.065) (0.120) (0.107) (0.131) (0.138)
LOCALIZATION x LIVED ABROAD -1.721*** -1.756*** -2.090*** -2.050***
(0.665) (0.589) (0.709) (0.749)
CONSTANT 0.244*** 0.189** 0.064 -1.429*** -1.469*** -1.355***
(0.086) (0.085) (0.108) (0.365) (0.406) (0.343)
Individual-Level Covariates No No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Level Covariates No No No No Yes Yes
City-Level Covariates No No No No No Yes
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by city
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 6B: ROBUSTNESS CHECK OF "HUB" MEASURE IN EQUATION 14
OLS Regressions: Dependent Variable is Log Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LOCALIZATION 4.995** 5.625*** 11.961*** 9.199*** 3.446* 1.845
(1.930) (1.938) (2.687) (3.106) (1.707) (2.275)
LIVED ABROAD 0.414 1.776** 1.385** 0.391 0.378
(0.469) (0.673) (0.653) (0.361) (0.372)
LOCALIZATION x LIVED ABROAD -10.607** -8.959** -2.967 -2.964
(4.923) (4.158) (2.702) (2.828)
CONSTANT 3.922*** 3.598*** 2.713*** -5.147*** -4.133*** -3.770**
(0.364) (0.455) (0.445) (1.732) (1.239) (1.326)
Individual-Level Covariates No No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Level Covariates No No No No Yes Yes
City-Level Covariates No No No No No Yes
Observations 111 111 111 111 111 111
R^2 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.24 0.78 0.78
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by city
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: LOCALIZATION (City's share of all software firms) measures the cost of local networking; LIVED ABROAD is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the CEO has lived abroad to study or work for at least a year prior to working at current job, and measures the CEO's cost of
accessing the Diaspora
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TABLE 7A: ROBUSTNESS CHECK OF "DIASPORA ACCESS" MEASURE
Breakdown of CEOs' Ethnicity Based on their Surnames
(Source: Enclyclopaedia of Indian Surnames)
Fraction in each
Frequency Fraction category that are
based in Hubs
North Indian 52 29% 60%
South Indian 36 20% 77%
East Indian 14 8% 64%
West Indian 30 16% 56%
Other or Unknown Ethnicities 50 27% 84%
Total 182 100% 70%
Note: North Indian Includes those from Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Punjab, Haryana, Himachal
Pradesh, Uttaranchal and Jammu & Kashmir; South Indian includes individuals from Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu
and Kerala; East Indian includes individuals from West Bengal, Orissa, Assam and other North Eastern States; West Indian
Includes Gujarat and Maharashtra; Other includes Christians, Muslims, Parsis as well as individuals for whom the ethnicity was
ambiguous
TABLE 7B: ROBUSTNESS CHECK OF "DIASPORA ACCESS" MEASURE IN EQUATION 13
Tobit Regressions: Dependent Variable is Fraction of Top 5 Contacts that are from Diaspora
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NETWORKSHARE -0.976*** -0.966*** -0.409 0.276 0.492 0.486 0.441
(0.340) (0.352) (0.520) (0.554) (0.489) (0.554) (0.598)
CEO FROM NORTH INDIA 0.024 0.191"** 0.178* 0.184** 0.211*** 0.238***
(0.074) (0.093) (0.091) (0.082) (0.082) (0.089)
NETSHARE x NORTH INDIAN -1.391** -1.322** -1.297* -1.336* -1.420*
(0.618) (0.611) (0.687) (0.806) (0.863)
CEO LIVED ABROAD 0.225** 0.222*** 0.240** 0.235**
(0.105) (0.085) (0.103) (0.105)
NETSHARE x LIVED ABROAD -1.142** -1.275*** -1.330** -1.287**
(0.530) (0.429) (0.521) (0.524)
CONSTANT 0.255*** 0.247*** 0.176* 0.041 -1.303** -1.303*** -1.201***
(0.071) (0.082) (0.101) (0.106) (0.381) (0.388) (0.389)
Individual-Level Covariates No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Level Covariates No No No No No Yes Yes
City-Level Covariates No No No No No No Yes
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182 182
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by city
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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TABLE 8A: ROBUSTNESS CHECK: WEAK INSTITUTIONS OR WEAK ENTREPRENEURS?
Use City in which CEO went to Highschool to Proxy for Opportunities and Quality of Education
Tobit Regressions: Dependent Variable is Fraction of Top 5 Contacts that are from Diaspora
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HIGH SCHOOL CITY IS A HUB -0.006 0 -0.032 -0.063 -0.074 -0.085
(0.062) (0.058) (0.070) (0.063) (0.069) (0.068)
LIVED ABROAD 0.095 0.071 0.034 0.037 0.031
(0.069) (0.072) (0.066) (0.095) (0.095)
HISCHOOL HUB x LIVED ABROAD 0.057 0.086 0.086 0.11
(0.074) (0.067) (0.079) (0.089)
CONSTANT 0.129** 0.073 0.087** -1.472*** -1.503*** -1.323***
(0.055) (0.046) (0.044) (0.374) (0.382) (0.342)
Individual-Level Covariates No No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Level Covariates No No No No Yes Yes
City-Level Covariates No No No No No Yes
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by city
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 8B: ROBUSTNESS CHECK: WEAK INSTITUTIONS OR WEAK ENTREPRENEURS?
Coefficient on Dummy for Whether CEO went to lIT
Models 4-6 in Diaspora Reliance Models 4-6 in Revenue Regressions
Regressions (Table 3 and Table 6A) (Table 4A and Table 6B)
(4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6)
Coefficient on IIT Dummy in Table 3 0.035 0.049 0.051
(0.030) (0.041) (0.040)
Coefficient on IIT Dummy in Table 6A 0.05 0.061 0.066
(0.040) (0.047) (0.049)
Coefficient on IIT Dummy in Table 4A 0.772*** 0.636* 0.657*
(0.244) (0.347) (0.356)
Coefficient on IIT Dummy in Table 6B 0.811*** 0.664* 0.694*
(0.223) (0.345) (0.371)
Individual-Level Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Level Covariates No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
City-Level Covariates No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 182 182 182 111 111 111
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by city
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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